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Results 
Introduction 
Overview 
In this introduction, the research foci of this dissertation are shortly revisited. 
These consist of the investigation of mechanisms which aim at the reduction 
of post-war intergroup hostilities and at moving the war-affected societies 
towards a more peaceful coexistence via approaches for dealing with 
differences. The chapter continues with a section reminding of the value 
involvement of non-violence and equality in the research aims, constituting 
the basis of this research project. The succeeding section points to the 
idiosyncratically rich experiences of LNGOs with working at the grassroots 
level, while indicating that it is the persistence of hostility at this level which is 
a sine qua non for a sustained wide societal participation in violent conflict. It 
will then be explicated how, in the style of grounded theory methodology, the 
research foci shifted during the field research in the light of LNGOs’ 
emphases.  
This explication is followed by the presentation of the major results of the 
field study, commencing with a short portrayal of the prevalence of intergroup 
enmity at the time of the study. The major sections addressing the chief 
results of the study, in turn, are structured into two main parts: The first one 
presents LNGO measures for “improving intergroup relations by reducing 
enmity and by challenging dichotomous group categorisations”, while the 
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second part engages with LNGO approaches towards “dealing with 
differences”. 
Research aims 
The overarching research aim of this dissertation is the examination of 
mechanisms which might have the potential of being conducive to the 
reduction of post-war intergroup hostilities, and to moving the war-affected 
societies towards a more peaceful coexistence, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter. This aim is embedded in the more general agenda of peace 
research, which is the endeavour to contribute to the global reduction of 
direct violence (as part of working towards, in Galtung’s taxonomy, “negative 
peace”, e.g. 1990), and, related to this, to the perception of the Other as a 
“fellow human being” (Ramsbotham et al., 2005: 244; cf. Curle, 1995: 139) 
as the long-term aim of “cultural peacebuilding” (ibid., drawing on Galtung’s 
term, op.cit.).  
In the second theory chapter it was argued that within a post-war setting 
characterised by the prevalence of enemy-images some degree of cultural 
peacebuilding is a pre-condition for the broad acceptance of structural 
peacebuilding, since a collaborative planning and implementation of 
structural peacebuilding measures – involving former war parties – is unlikely 
to happen as long as the conflict opponent is seen as inherently 
untrustworthy in character (cf. Zartman, 2005: 50; Kriesberg, 2005: 77). 
Similarly, in the first theory chapter it was indicated that mechanisms for 
addressing the ‘conflict issues’, to which Fisher et al. refer (2000: 14, cited 
above), cannot be expected to be fruitful, as long as enemy images are 
present.  
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Without the reduction of intergroup hatred, there is little prospect for either a 
cooperative intergroup analysis of needs (envisaged by the theory family of 
conflicts which is oriented on interests and needs; Burton, 1990, 1999; Azar, 
1986; Kelman, 1999; Fisher & Ury, 1999), or an open intergroup 
communication procedure of mutual understanding and the creation of a 
common view of reality (envisaged by the constructivist theory family of 
conflicts; e.g. Väyrynen, 2001; Jabri, 1996; Gergen, 1999); neither are 
gestures of reconciliation likely to be instigated, such as apologies or 
compensation attempts, as long as the opponents’ side is regarded as 
responsible for the past war. Correspondingly, it was argued that the 
reduction of intergroup hostilities and prejudices is of pivotal significance 
when peacebuilding activities are initiated. 
While reducing intergroup hostilities is essential for structural peacebuilding 
and for work on underlying conflict issues, it is, as mentioned, also regarded 
as an aim in itself. The long-term agenda of peacebuilding is conceptualised 
here, drawing on Curle (1995: 139) and Ramsbotham et al. (2005: 244), as 
partially constituted by the re-humanisation of the opponent. The recognition 
of the others as ‘fellow human beings’ (Ramsbotham et al., ibid.) can be 
conceived as equivalent to having overcome intergroup animosities under 
the condition that these ‘fellow human beings’ of the former opponent group 
are regarded as possessing equal rights as the people of the own side. 
Another characteristic of a peaceful society is by definition the absence of 
direct violence, which implies that the society needs to incorporate capacities 
for non-violent ways of dealing with emerging conflicts; this is the classical 
endeavour of conflict resolution and conflict transformation models.  
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These two broad aims, i.e. the fostering of recognition via the reduction of 
mistrust and the capacity to deal non-violently with conflicts, are interrelated 
insofar as the perception of the opponent as inherently bad in character 
suggests that dealing collaboratively with the opponent is not possible. 
Conversely, a transformation of the relationship in the direction of mutual 
recognition entails that conflicts are not solved by the forceful assertion of the 
one side’s aims irrespective of the other side’s interests.  
There is no automatism, however, from granting the former opponent the 
same rights (as those granted to members of the own side) towards 
peacefully dealing with conflicts, since even conflicts among people who 
would allocate themselves to the nominally same society or sub-group are 
obviously not necessarily solved non-violently. The sort of recognition that 
would imply nonviolent conflict handling is recognition in a more 
comprehensive sense, namely that the other’s interests or needs are fully 
respected. Fostering the alternative route of nonviolent conflict handling 
consists of establishing nonviolent capacities for dealing with conflict as a 
widespread skill and standard norm. In any case, when dealing with conflicts 
between members of former war parties, reducing hostilities and prejudices 
between these former opponents (cf. Zartman, 2005: 50; Kriesberg, 2005: 
77) is likely to be a prerequisite before conflict parties are willing to engage in 
nonviolent conflict handling procedures.  
The main foci configuring the research framework informed by these 
research aims prior to the field research were constituted furthermore by an 
investigation of the particulars of conflict handling, in relation to the aspects 
discussed in the first chapter: Whilst the Burtonian premise – according to 
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which the satisfaction of a stipulated list of needs is necessary and sufficient 
for conflict resolution (Burton, 1990, 1999) – was rejected, the potentially 
significant role of needs and interests in the escalation and de-escalation 
was acknowledged as a field of high heuristic value. Similarly, whilst the idea 
of creating a joint comprehensive view of reality was assessed as unrealistic, 
the comparison of the framework conditions of Habermasian discourse ethics 
and ideal speech situation (Habermas, 1986, ; cf. Finlayson, 2005; cf. Jabri, 
1996) with local principles of communicative practices was regarded as 
possibly elucidating. In other words, part of the initial research orientation 
was to investigate the procedural framework used by LNGOs for intergroup 
communication, as well as to examine whether there are regularities in the 
substance by which LNGOs attempt to build bridges during intergroup 
encounters. Candidates for this substance were – in addition to Burton’s 
(1990, 1999) “fundamental needs” – material needs, shared (super-ordinate) 
intergroup goals, as well as needs and interests understood more general 
and possibly idiosyncratic (as opposed to pre-supposed by a stipulated list).  
Even when, however, it is attempted to solve conflicts non-violently by taking 
the interests and values of the other seriously, the interests and values can 
be contradictory to a degree that the differences appear to be unbridgeable, 
so that the term ‘intractable conflict’ (Zartman, 2005: 47-64) or ‘radical 
disagreement’ can be employed (Ramsbotham et al., 2005; 2010). How 
LNGOs deal with such deep differences was part of the second focus of this 
research, while initially assuming that the differences would be less acute 
after the dissolution of enemy images.  
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In summary, the areas of investigation developed prior to the field research 
were: the potential of needs and common aims in reducing intergroup 
enmity, dealing with past war events, the potential of Habermasian 
framework principles of discourse ethics as well as the ideal speech situation 
as guide posts for intergroup exchanges, and practices of dealing with 
“radical disagreements”. These main areas of interests functioned as 
orientation posts at the outset of the field research, and were re-oriented in 
the process of the research in light of the emphases expressed by the 
research participants. 
 
Peacebuilding as norm-guided 
As a form of activity which is striving for social change, any peacebuilding 
agenda is inevitably a norm-guided activity, aspiring explicitly or implicitly 
towards particular aims, which in turn are inherently based on standards or 
values, as argued previously. Value judgments are thereby an inherent 
aspect of any goal-oriented societal involvement. When the aim of 
peacebuilding is defined as aiming for the recognition of the other as a fellow 
human being – and thereby also as striving for nonviolent ways for dealing 
with conflicts – there is no room for manoeuvring attempts to accommodate 
discriminatory local practices. A minimal value basis constituted by 
conceptualisations of peacebuilding is needed, which sets at least an 
approximate framework for peacebuilding endeavours. 
The value aims of non-violence and equality which form the basis for this 
research project informed on the one hand the selection of the research foci, 
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while on the other hand stipulating the desired direction of change. As was 
argued earlier, contrary to the positions of positivism and relativism, values 
do not need to be regarded as arbitrary. A possible ground for values relates 
on the one hand to the mentioned fact/value entanglement. When e.g. 
factual beliefs in the superiority of certain human groups turn out to be false 
(Putnam, 2005: 13), or when the plurality of human capacities becomes 
recognised (Parekh, 2008), components of the basis of discrimination 
become eroded. Another pillar buttressing a value ground is formed by the 
quasi-universal approval of some basic values (Putnam, 2008: 377-88; cf. 
Booth, 1995), accounted for by Putnam (ibid.) through the term “appeal” of 
values, as indicated.  
This ground formed by values is not conceived as formed by certainty, but by 
trust (Putnam, 1992; cf. Wittgenstein, 1969), as neither relations to factual 
beliefs nor references to a quasi-universal “appeal” of some values can 
overcome the scepticism of those who do not share these values. This 
reliance on trust, however, is not a characteristic which is idiosyncratic to 
moral values. Trust is a pivotal precondition for all of our statements (and all 
of our actions), as Wittgenstein (1969) taught us. “I really want to say that a 
language-game is only possible if one trusts something (I did not say ‘can 
trust something’)” (§509). As mentioned, one has to treat at least some 
fundamental assumptions as certain; “If you are not certain of any facts, you 
cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either” (§114). The significant 
conclusion is that values are in a similar epistemic position as factual 
assumptions; both can be part of the trusted basis of fundamental 
assumptions.  
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The semblance of values’ compared to factual assumptions’ epistemic status 
has another dimension, insofar as values as well as factual assumptions are 
required for motivating action. Without values, human action (and language) 
would be void of direction, and without factual assumptions, it would be void 
of a way. Values and factual beliefs are therefore forming together the 
inevitable basis on which action and language become possible, and which 
therefore need to be trusted. 
The rationale for investigating experiences of local NGOs 
Investigating activities which attempt to contribute to a reduction of direct 
violence – by fostering the re-humanisation and recognition of the former 
opponent as well as by building capacities of nonviolent conflict handling – is 
at the centre of the present dissertation. As these aims appear to be outside 
of the immediate foci of IGOs, practice experiences of local NGOs were at 
the centre of this research project.  
LNGOs can be expected to have – being part of the grassroots level of 
society (‘Level 3’ in the classification of Lederach, 1997: 51-5) – the richest 
experience with work on this local level. It is the sustainment of group 
categorisations and hatred on this level which is the conditio sine qua non for 
a broad societal participation in violent conflict. While some politicians might 
fuel conflicts and wage wars due to self-interests in solidifying their own 
power basis (cf. Anderson, 1999; Silber & Little, 1996), support from a large 
part of the society depends on the broad acceptance of enemy images 
justifying war as an appropriate means to deal with the adversary. Activists of 
local NGOs are likely to have detailed knowledge within the societies 
concerned of the past development and present prevalence of group 
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categorisations and prejudices. This insider position might entail a particular 
degree of creativity, claimed by Prendergast (2006: 158) to be characteristic 
of for this level: “the greatest vitality and innovation in peacebuilding are to 
be found at the grassroots level, with diverse responses and initiatives being 
undertaken that involve both external agencies and internal actors.”  
The selection of the specific LNGOs, approached with the request for 
participation in this research project, was guided by the mentioned research 
interests, to the effect that the selection of the sample followed the principle 
of theoretical sampling, being “aimed toward theory construction, not for 
population representativeness” (Charmaz, 2006: 6; cf. Charmaz, 2003: 265). 
Guided by the research interest, most of the visited LNGOs had been 
selected on the basis of their endeavours of working towards the 
improvement of intergroup relations. (The only additional NGOs included into 
the sample were two associations lobbying for specific interest groups – the 
one for war veterans and the other for war victims; these associations were 
included to gain further information on the needs of these war affected 
groups.) 
 
The refinement of the research foci in interaction with the 
development of the results 
Research foci were relocated and refined in the process of the engagement 
with the experiences of LNGO activists in the following ways:  
NGO activists’ responses indicated an orientation towards a comparatively 
concrete level of communicative frameworks, rather than referring to abstract 
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Habermasian principles of argumentation. They pointed towards cultivating 
communicative practices which are supporting self-expression, exchange, 
personalisation, and reflection. NGO activities aiming at the reduction of 
intergroup enmity followed multiple routes, instead of being solely 
concentrated on intergroup collaboration on common goals or correction of 
stereotypes by mediation.  
By giving space for stories of victimisation, for a better understanding of past 
motivations, for discovering intergroup commonalities, and for reflection on 
double standards, it was enabled that prejudices on imagined homogenous 
groups could be questioned and images of the own group’s moral superiority 
could be challenged. By fostering interpersonal encounters which unearthed 
heterogeneous experiences and motivations within groups, and by building 
on commonalities in values, needs, war-related experiences and feelings, 
enemy images could be undermined. 
As expected, activists did not tend to employ preconceived lists of needs 
during their work on intergroup divisions and conflicts. The needs of LNGO 
projects’ recipients seemed to be very different depending on the particular 
target group or individuals, as well as on the time elapsed since local war 
events, and on the particular local setting. These specificities imparted 
significance to an introductory phase of the projects which consisted of an 
extended pre-analysis phase and envisioning processes. This introductory 
phase constituted the informational, visionary and relationship-building 
foundation for subsequent steps. 
One of the topics which were wide-spread across settings was material 
scarcity of target group members, since those areas which were seriously 
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affected by the war were often areas which had been subjected to economic 
decline, and since the idiosyncratic income conditions of war victims and war 
veterans were often constrained. Therefore, projects on the material basis 
could have the potential to reduce a source of frustration while providing an 
intergroup connector of high relevance.  
A further project field which loomed large in some LNGO activity profiles was 
constituted by fostering the recognition that some members of the outgroup 
were victimised as well, and by giving assistance to participants’ dealing with 
traumatisation. For the endeavour of constructing bridges across groups, 
dealing with values played a pivotal role in some activities, either in the form 
of finding ways for dealing with differences, or through common values which 
provide a common ground for envisioning an intergroup future. 
In the field of dealing with disagreements, the LNGOs’ orientations followed a 
variety of principles and strategies. Features which were widely depicted as 
valuable were elements of signalling respect by listening, and exploring the 
nature of the conflict in terms of underlying needs, values and background 
assumptions. Depending on the contingencies of these underlying 
differences, diverse specific approaches were expressed as useful, varying 
from clarifications of misunderstandings, to finding viable modes of 
cohabiting, such as establishing a communicative framework in which 
disagreements can be continued, based on shared values.  
The local NGO’s practice experiences as reflected in the results of the 
research project are outlined in detail in the remaining sections of this 
chapter. The presentation of these results is structured into two main 
sections. The first main section, section I, comprises those projects and 
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aspects of LNGO activities whose overarching aim is to reduce the 
intergroup division created by former conflicts and war events; the second 
main section, section II, encompasses those LNGO activities which are 
directed towards the building of capacities for dealing with disagreements 
and differences.  
Prior to these two main sections, a separate section will present activists’ 
references to the prevalence of enemy images in the former Yugoslavia, 
setting the stage for the topic of section one, i.e. the reduction of enmity and 
of dichotomous group categorisations.  
 
The two main sections have the following major subsections:  
I) Improving intergroup relations by reducing enmity and by challenging 
dichotomous group categorisations 
 I.A) Improving intergroup relations by projects on the 
community/municipality level, rendering intergroup commonalities 
visible; fostering a superordinate identity and undermining prejudices, 
partially through interpersonal contacts based on shared interests and 
needs 
 I.B) Working directly with people who were very seriously affected by 
the war; supporting personal encounters which fragment the image of 
the outgroup through the provision of personal information about 
individuals, so that the internal heterogeneity of the opponent’s group 
is rendered visible; at the same time, bringing commonalities in war-
related experiences, feelings, and motivations to the foreground which 
cross-cut nominal group memberships 
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 I.C) Challenging enemy images in the wider public by presenting 
examples which deviate from their stereotypes, by presenting role 
models who have learnt from the war experiences, and by raising 
awareness for the suffering inflicted by members of the own side, so 
that the imagination of the own side’s moral superiority is undermined  
 I.D) Learning from the past and planning for the future: creating 
spaces for joint intergroup reflections on the past of the societies; 
envisioning desired future societal states, which can support the 
discovery and development of common values 
II. Dealing with differences 
 II.A) General mechanisms for dealing with conflicts  
 II.B) Dealing with deep intergroup differences 
 
 
The presence of enemy images in the former Yugoslavia 
The situation in the former Yugoslavia at the time of the study underlying the 
present disquisition was described by the participating activists as still 
characterised by hostilities within substantial parts of the previously warring 
groups. It was pointed to the persisting depth of the cleavages between parts 
of the societies.  
Measures aiming at the reduction of enemy images can be analytically 
described as challenging at least one of three characteristics of enemy 
images: α) an attribution of certain characteristics to members of one group 
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to members of another which imply that the other group is the threat to the 
own group, so that cooperation is impossible and opposition is inevitable, β) 
an exaggerated belief in the homogeneity of the characteristics ascribed to 
the other group, and γ) – related to the former points – a sense of moral 
superiority which is based on these assumed characteristics and on beliefs 
about historic events. 
Generalised attributions, the homogenisation of the perception of the own 
and the other group, as well as a belief in the own moral superiority, are 
reflected in the following quotations. These citations express the claim of 
each group concerned that it was only defending something against a 
devious other, placing the blame for the war(s) on the opponent:  
A Croatian will say “somebody attacked us first so we retaliated”. Serbs 
will say, we are not blame, because we were trying to defend 
Yugoslavia.1  
For example, I banalise, Serbs are declaring that they were defending 
Yugoslavia. Croats say that they are defending their country, their right 
for independence. And Bosnians are saying that they are defending their 
own lives, because Croats and Serbs attacked them. For example in 
Sarajevo, every man who fought will say “I defend Sarajevo, I defend my 
own house, my town, my street, my family”. In these wars everyone is 
defending. Every single ex-combatant will say to you “I went to war to 
                                            
1
 Activist of a local war veteran and peacebuilding organisation in Zagreb, Croatia, June 
2007 
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defend” something. And if you hear that you will conclude that in the 
region of ex-Yugoslavia all wars were defending wars.2  
People in Kosovo […] see themselves as victims in the hands of Serbs 
in the last war.3 
If you ask the Bosnians, they will say the Serbs were the aggressors, 
they didn’t defend, they attacked something. But if you ask Serbs, they 
will say, we were defending our people, we were afraid that the same 
thing would happen as in World War II, and it was violent act that Bosnia 
has become independent, because the referendum for example was 
boycotted by Serbs, so it was in a way a violent decision.4 
[All sides] take the attitude that […] they were victims […] “we deserve 
the compensation, we deserve all the sympathy.”5 
 
All of these quotations state that every of these mentioned ‘ethnic’ group 
sees the own group’s involvement in war as a necessity arising from the 
actions of at least one opponent, implying that the opponent’s intentions had 
posed a serious threat, which became translated into the severe victimisation 
of the own group. This perception of threat appears to extend into the post-
war period: 
                                            
2
 Activist M of a local peacebuilding organisation in Belgrade, Serbia, June 2007 
3
 Activist H of a human rights LNGO in Pristina, Kosovo, June 2007 
4
 Activist D of a local peacebuilding organisation in Belgrade, Serbia, June 2007 
5
 Activist of a local peacebuilding organisation in Vukovar, Croatia, July 2007 
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Prejudices and stereotypes, […] fear and all kinds of prejudices that 
people after the war had, that people were murderers here, they were 
afraid to approach to the other side.6  
 
These stereotypes and prejudices came and come to the surface in multiple 
forms:  
The International Criminal Court in Den Hague, their legitimacy is 
disputed when they are dealing with our people, so to say. So in Serbia it 
is disputed when it deals with [indicted Serbs], but in Croatia it is 
disputed when it is about crimes committed by the Croat side. They don’t 
dispute the legitimacy when it deals with crimes committed on our side, 
that’s perfectly ok. And that’s a problem.7  
When Vukovar fell, it was like one platoon of these people, with beards, 
with a black flag, singing, the song is like “we will have meat, we will 
have meat, we will slaughter the Croats”. So this was the song. And 
[these symbols] were re-appearing to the present. And also in Croatian, 
[…] there is like, now it’s a band, but you can see the black, for example, 
black T-shirt or shirts, it’s symbol of the Ustasha, because they were in 
black. For example, right-wing party in Croatia, they were all, from the 
beginning, they were all in black. They will not openly say that they are 
like Ustashas, but to the other side, this looked very stress. Using these 
symbols just put up the flames; before the war, during the war, and 
                                            
6
 Activist C of local peacebuilding organisation A in Osijek, Croatia, May 2007 
7
 Activist D of a local peacebuilding organisation in Belgrade, Serbia, June 2007 
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maybe, for sure after the war the people are still speaking about what 
happened in Bleiburg.8 
There are a lot of myths that are present in the minds of the people, and 
to a large extent it is also being built into the education. They’re fostered 
through education into their heads, saying myths how Serbs love 
freedom and their freedom-loving nation, and they are always on the 
right side, and the Croats are like this and like that.9 
It’s not going better, it’s going worse. Probably two weeks ago, one week 
ago in [X], it’s a pretty big city, about 35000 people there, they beat two 
Serbs, they beat them, it was ugly to see their faces in the newspaper, 
only because they are Serbs.10 
A pop-singer, he has been around for quite a while […] He sings not only 
anti-Serb-songs, but anti-Semitic-songs, his supporters attend […] in 
black shorts [as a reference to Ustashe], give the Nazi salute or the 
Ustashe salute. […] He’s been here, he is extremely popular, nobody 
really does anything about him, they play his music on the radio all the 
time.11 
 
In the light of such animosities, territorial partition of the conflict parties might 
be suggested as a presumptive solution. Paris (2004: 181- 5) warns against 
this option since it sends wrong messages, i.e. it signals that living together 
                                            
8
 Activist C of local peacebuilding organisation A in Osijek, Croatia, May 2007 
9
 Activist D of a local peacebuilding organisation in Belgrade, Serbia, June 2007 
10
 Activist T of local peacebuilding organisation C in Zagreb, Croatia, July 2007 
11
 Activist of a local peacebuilding organisation in Vukovar, Croatia, July 2007 
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is impossible, thereby entailing that people are forced out of their homes. 
Along these lines, an activist argued that additional secessions (discussing 
the case of enclaves in Kosovo) might instigate further upheavals in the 
region. The alternative suggested by this activist, and by the norms of 
peacebuilding, is multiethnic cohabitation under the condition of mutual 
recognition.  
[Serbian enclaves in Kosovo] becoming part of Serbia […] is not a good 
recipe because this will just trigger another domino effect in the Balkans 
and Former Yugoslavia, it will not end with that. […] there is an Albanian 
community, majority living in the Southern part of Serbia […] If Serbs in 
the North decide to secede from Kosovo, this will trigger a reaction 
whereby Albanians of Southern Serbia will want to join Kosovo, and 
other secessions like this. So, the challenge of the International 
Community is clear. Trying to keep the boundaries of Kosovo as they 
are, by introducing and implementing a multi-ethnic culture, to make this 
project become alive. 12 
 
Corresponding to the aspects of enemy images outlined above, trustbuilding 
endeavours by the LNGOs can be described as aiming for at least one of the 
following changes: A) amend those assumption about characteristics or 
practices of the other group which imply that antagonism between the groups 
determines the only form of possible relationship, B) render intra-group 
diversities visible and foster the unearthing of personalising information, to 
challenge the perception of an homogenous outgroup, and to uncover 
                                            
12
 Activist of a local human rights organisation in Pristina, Kosovo, June 2007 
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deviations from prejudices; C) bringing commonalities with the opponent to 
the foreground, either by collaborating collectively on shared aims and 
needs, or by unearthing interpersonal overlaps e.g. common war-related 
experiences, feelings, and motivations; D) undermine the sense of the own 
side’s moral superiority by reflecting on war events and recognising the 
crimes and suffering inflicted by the own side. These aspects A to D will 
reappear – to varying degrees depending on the field of LNGO activities – 
within the subsequent section I.  
I) Improving intergroup relations by reducing enmity and by 
challenging dichotomous group categorisations 
The NGO activists’ experiences suggest that the reduction of intergroup 
mistrust can be mediated by multifarious routes, which will be re-
encountered across multiple LNGO measures presented in this major 
section. As just mentioned, LNGO measures which will be encountered can 
be categorised in the following way: Creating encounter settings in which the 
initial interaction context redefines or reframes the interaction in the direction 
of more cooperative interaction patterns than suggested by the interaction 
norms of the past; reduction of dichotomous categorisations by 
personalisation, by the perception of commonalities such as group-
overarching/superordinate goals or similar war-related experiences and 
feelings, by challenging the perception of the own group’s moral superiority, 
by rendering commonalities visible which cross-cut group memberships, and 
by shedding light on the internal heterogeneity of the groups.  
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One commonality between LNGO projects that are working towards 
intergroup trustbuilding is that they comprise a redefinition of group 
interaction patterns by ‘setting the tone’ at the initial stage of project-related 
interactions, in the form of a framework which is conducive to norms of 
respect, understanding, and cooperation. The approaches introduced above 
as ‘1a)’ to ‘1e)’ comprise two central aspects: the creation of a more 
respectful, cooperative atmosphere is created by setting a communicative 
framework oriented on listening, transparency, and exchange in order to 
encourage recognition and understanding, plus a focus on ‘connectors’ 
instead of ‘dividers’ (to borrow the terms of Anderson, 1999). While some 
activists stressed the significance of addressing most contentious or ‘hot’ 
issues as well, discussions of these contentious issues were preceded by 
trustbuilding measures.  
The following sub-sections will look at specific trustbuilding approaches in 
more detail, covering ways via which LNGO activists attempt to buttress 
change in the direction of improving intergroup relationships by breaking 
down enemy images and building trust. 
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I.A) Improving intergroup relations by projects on the 
community/municipality level 
1) Approaching local residents with respect and transparency, with 
an emphasis on listening towards their experiences, needs and 
interests, to impart a sense of recognition, which also could 
promote trust in the project as a basis for following intergroup 
encounters 
Some LNGOs conducted laborious projects around common interests and 
needs, which were initiated by laborious needs assessments in local 
municipalities and refugee or IDP settlements of Kosovo and in multi-ethnic 
communities in Slavonia (Eastern Croatia), the latter having been selected 
by the NGOs predominantly due to the strained intergroup relationships there 
in the past. The activities in these municipalities commenced with lengthy 
house-to-house visits, during which the residents’ aspirations and 
expectations were elucidated.  
In the case of the activities conducted in the area of Kosovo, where the 
belongingness to ethnic groups is easier noticeable than in Croatia, it was 
taken care that the teams contacting the municipalities were heterogeneous, 
thereby ensuring that on a superficial ethnic level similarity between activists 
and residents was granted, in order to easing initial contact building.  
During these house-to-house visits, the conversations were centred on 
listening to the residents’ feelings and aspirations, asking about experiences 
in the past, about the present situation and the outlook to the future. The 
activists’ enactment of openness and acceptance was already setting an 
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atmosphere of respect and recognition for feelings and concerns, probably 
also conducive to establishing trust in the project.  
[Going from house to house, listening] was very useful first of all for 
getting down tensions in this very early post-war period between peace-
worker and peace community members and inside the community’13 
Before we made an interview, we ask specific questions, different topics 
like – our general questions – like how people lived before the war, how 
they lived, spent their time during the war, and now, today, how life is 
there. […]first you have a first contact with the people, and you try to 
listen to them. And then they are ventilating everything, like emotions.14 
So we visit the receiving community on the ground, but we also visit 
refugees and IDPs in the camps or other places where they work. […] 
We have spent quite a lot of time in working with both communities to 
gain their trust, so it was mainly family visits and discussion with the 
community leaders and talking with them, so after some time now we are 
quite well accepted by both communities, so now it's going much easier, 
and we have their trust, so they are willing to take part in our process.15 
it was from the point that we met, to try to understand what happened 
and what we can do. So it was from this, to listen what happened to the 
other side and to everybody, to listen to personal stories, and not to 
judge, to be open to understand and to listen to what happened to them. 
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Where they are now at this moment in their lives. How it was for them 
before; and how it is now.16 
 
The strong emphasis on listening during this initiating phase also comprises 
refraining from (or at least deferring) judgements about past actions of the 
recipients. (This element reappears in section B1a, which portrays how 
activists emphasised the importance of approaching ex-combatants with an 
attitude of respect, without blaming them for their decisions to join former 
wars, while believing in their possibility of changing.) 
it was more the questions that would enable us to understand exactly 
[…] to listen to personal stories, and not to judge, to be open to 
understand and to listen to what happened to them.17 
 
Establishing initial contacts is possibly less complicated when the activists 
approaching the local residents are of mixed group affiliations, thereby 
functioning on the one hand as a role model of intergroup cooperation, and 
on the other hand offering different local groups points of initial identification 
or connection via a shared group membership with some of the activists. 
it was a very, quite mixed coordinator team, and it was very successful, 
because the municipality officials accepted us as a partner who 
implemented this18 
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the most important thing is that in the trainers teams or organisers team 
is mixture, as well. So for example, if we are organising some event 
were people from different sides will be present, then the trainer team 
has to be mixed. So we often asked our colleagues and activists from 
former Yugoslavia to join us in these training teams.19 
 
This project-related trustbuilding is of course easier when it relies on pre-
existing relationships or pre-existing networks, to the effect that organisations 
tend to try to build their activities on their established contacts when possible. 
We just came, went to them to visit, what are they doing […] We just 
visited them all […] we are all from [X], people know us, and we know 
people. And one of our colleagues used to live in that neighbourhood. 
So, that's where she went, and talked to them. Mostly it was informally.20  
The first phase was the delivery of some questionnaires. […] Actually, 
before delivering these questionnaires […] And there were about 280 
villages selected Kosovo-wide, from five implementing partners, in all 
these villages then we created some groups of interest for the villagers, 
they were mostly existing structures, like village leaderships or whatever, 
and then we informed them about the purposes of the project. And then 
these groups of interest between villagers helped us to deliver the 
questionnaires.21 
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 227 
But in the places where we work, everybody knows our staff. And they 
know what we are doing and the idea.22 
Two or three people would go. […] They would first go, and talk to some 
people there and see from those people who would be interested in 
gathering as a group and talking about problems that they are facing in 
[X] […] we contacted […] some people we knew from before there.23 
 
A variety of this approach consists of working at the outset in less 
controversial fields within a community for an extended period of time in 
order to establish rapport, before initiating projects which touch on topics of 
more delicate nature. 
we started these smooth projects. We really didn’t dare in the village to 
say, we were even careful ourselves not to say that we work with Serbs, 
in order not to be accepted. Gradually, gradually we just developed at 
first just small initiatives: We supported, we gave some money for 
culture, sports, and for children activities. After two years we managed to 
bring Albanian kids there to work together, play each other’s music.24 
 
These direct visits to residents in Kosovo and Croatia did not only contribute 
to building relationships between residents and activists and building trust in 
the projects, but were also designed to investigate local interests and needs, 
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which could then be addressed by searching for mutually accommodating 
arrangements or by cooperative projects, as outlined in the following section.  
 
2) Initiating intergroup projects based on common needs and 
interests: conducting a pre-analysis of specific needs and 
interests, on whose basis an interaction can be fostered, in 
order to initiate intergroup projects to address common 
interests and needs within a cooperatively defined framework; 
this renders cross-cutting nominal group memberships 
obvious, enables personalisation of the group members, and at 
the same time manifests respect through taking people’s 
inclinations serious 
 
The interests and needs expressed during these visits and interviews formed 
the ground from which the search for future arrangements or further activities 
were started. Depending on the context of the project under consideration, 
different approaches for addressing these differences and needs were taken. 
In those projects in Eastern Croatia and Kosovo which were striving for the 
improvement of intergroup relationships within communities, the expressed 
needs and interests were the starting point for the planning and 
implementation for the cooperative activities.  
Importantly, activists emphasised that the endeavour of connecting groups of 
former opponents is necessarily of a long-term nature, as the past wars left a 
legacy of deeply tensioned intergroup relationships. The expectations on 
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peacebuilding projects should be correspondingly set by adopting a long-
term and multi-issue perspective, instead of pressuring towards change. The 
speed and direction of the process depends on the preferences of the project 
recipients:  
something we learned in our proposal to non-violent conflict resolution 
which also has to do with all of this is that it is […] a very long-term 
process25 
Going directly to them, telling them what we do and telling them what is 
our idea, inviting them to our seminars, having discussion, not imposing 
anything and not expecting anything, I think this is very important 
because what happens as a mistake in several people initiatives is that 
there is something expected from participants and this is a post-conflict 
region, so it's natural that relationships are not good and it might take 
much more longer time for relationships to improve […] we do have 
expectations, but we don't push people to fulfil our expectations. So we 
are there as a support to them and they will be the one to lead the 
process. So the process will go in a direction that both sides decide to 
go.26 
we will definitely have to adapt […] to their needs[…], so we have to be 
adaptable and not push it from our side, but see is it that what they really 
want, not what we want, because sometimes as peacebuilders we tend 
to push what we think people would, I mean [youngsters] are easy to be 
manipulated with, but again if it’s not sustainable and it’s not natural, it’s 
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 Local activist of international peacebuilding organisation A in Mitrovica, June 2007  
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not really what they want, then we successfully have that. That’s why we 
tend to not push the process ourselves, but be flexible and see what kind 
of activities really or projects or what kind of income-generating projects 
could be […] our main methodologies of [name of organisation] is to not 
really push, because in peacebuilding we do understand that’s a 
process, you cannot really have cheap results in a matter of a week or a 
month or a year, it is a process, it depends on the local context, or 
constellation, or the issue that you are working on. […] we discovered 
through our analysis, it was unbelievable how much issues youth on 
both sides share […]we had a joint conference with all secondary 
schools from Mitrovica, and we took the school youth counsel 
representatives in this meeting, and the whole idea of the project was 
come up with a joint project together.27 
 
The significance of providing settings for intergroup encounters was 
emphasised by some activists, referring to a recent past characterised by a 
low level of interest in contacts or contact opportunities, which was in some 
areas of Kosovo contingent on the security situation.  
our facilitation is there to provide [children from the different parts of 
Mitrovica] with a neutral, friendly and safe space, because Albanian 
children can’t walk on their own in Mitrovica North, and vice versa 
Serbian children can’t walk to Mitrovica South. 85% of Mitrovica North 
Serbian population didn’t cross the bridge as of 1999 […] 
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Here they printed out a list of the Serbian people from that village which 
are not living in the village presently, but they are keen to return […] out 
of these 33 names we have people which died in ’97, they were not even 
alive. […] they are saying, if they return, they will be killed.28 
people can exchange all this and they have the information from the first 
hand. And many people haven't ever met other people from the different 
side. For example, someone never met someone from the Albanian side, 
or some people have never been in a Muslim town, because our 
trainings take place in different parts of Bosnia and Montenegro. So 
some people have never seen a mosque, for example.29 
 
The first chapter of this dissertation indicated that mere intergroup contact is 
not sufficient for the reduction of animosities. As mentioned, former studies 
(cf. Brown, 2000; Kassin et al., 2008; Sherif et al. 1961) suggested that an 
element which increases the prospects of an improvement of intergroup 
relations appears to be cooperative intergroup work on common interests. 
Projects of the NGOs investigated in the present study covered a wide range 
of activities on common interests and needs, comprising the provision of 
sports facilities, sports clubs, cultural events, media projects, educational 
programmes, skill trainings, or income generating projects. All these projects 
were designed as community-wide projects, (re-) introducing group-
overarching activities. These projects bolstered the tangibility of an 
overarching/superordinate community identity, e.g. through interethnic sport 
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clubs which carried the name of the entire community and were open for all 
citizens, or media which explicitly attempted to address topics of interest for 
all groups of the community.  
Those activities which support interaction of a personal level can have the 
additional significant effect of personalising members of the respective 
outgroup, even when the initial motivation to join an activity was an interest in 
the activity per se. Personalised encounters around a common goal, in turn, 
can not only render intergroup commonalities visible, but also assist 
“decategorisation” (Brown, 2000), i.e. reducing the prevalence of group 
categorisations which are related to prejudices, while fostering a perception 
of the participants as individuals instead of as members of a disdained 
group. Examples of activities on joint interests are:  
they also submitted a petition to the Mitrovica municipality department 
for youth and non-resident issues about the problem of lack of extra-
curricular activities, especially with the use for sports facilities at it is the 
sports hall that across here that you can see 30  
Especially in culture, in sport, […] we were running first cabaret, also we 
were running the first newspaper […]we were running the radio 
Mitrovica, working in the media, and after that we go with TV. […] we 
established with support of […] basketball club Mitrovica31 
And through the magazine we managed to change quite some things 
and manage to bring lots of people together; we had like white and black 
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page that works in the South better than in the North, and in that way 
people were consulting each other32 
What we do in this regard is, we do some social activities, like education 
programmes. And we for example invite female doctors to talk about 
pregnancy, let’s say. And then we invite Serb and Albanian and Ashkali 
females together, and then they will come […] But then, indirectly you 
will help that they talk with each other. So this is an indirect way of 
connecting them. And this is the best possible, like you have to organise 
football or games with Serbs and Albanians, the direct purpose is not 
that they talk with each other, but the game, but in the meantime, of 
course, they have to talk, and you know, so this have this creative ways 
of linking people. 33 
 
The process of analysing interests and needs which can function as a bridge 
for intergroup cooperation constituted in some projects an extended phase in 
itself, which partially consisted of lengthy workshops, partially of laborious 
house to house visits.  
So this [listening in house to house visits] was our main tool for 
approaching community members and also to, how to say it, gather the 
ideas and to start some activities and gather volunteers and include 
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them in our work. […] then you bring them to a level of generating ideas, 
how to do some things.34 
Try to find in one village what is common for all.35 
there are so many commonalities and joint issues that we can work on 
together. So, for two years we provided them with technical trainings on 
peacebuilding and youth, advocacy, peacebuilding related topics. We 
also paralleled that at that time with mini-grants. And that was also 
interesting, because we had similar mini-grants that they proposed to do, 
like they have school magazines on both sides, we have radio stations 
on both sides, there were commonalities […] actually they decided they 
want to form a multi-ethnic party, which is called “the city-wide […]”36 
We ask specific questions, different topics […] and ideas of some kind of 
activities that can help the community prosper […] gather the ideas and 
to start some activities and gather volunteers and include them in our 
work.37 
Based on the needs and the issues that are propagating their 
constituency within the school, so “what are the problems”, so after they 
gathered all the data, they prioritised seven issues that they felt that they 
can have impact or work on them, solving them. So the issues like 
school tidiness, security, lack extra-curricular activities, lack of cabinets, 
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lack of libraries, those were the issues that they prioritised to address 
them jointly.38 
 
One approach for identifying common needs and interests was to induce in 
the respective communities the development of a vision for the future, 
reminiscent of the suggestion of Boulding (2000: 373-5; cf. Lederach, 1997, 
2003), thereby supporting the articulation and awareness raising of own 
priorities and delivering as a guiding image, enabling the creation of 
strategies for change. This practice of envisioning the future was partially 
preceded by a process of providing a space for the participants to get 
acquainted with one another.  
stakeholders would go to some place outside their place, for four, five, 
six days, and then they would go through some kind of workshops, they 
would have activities of meeting each other, knowing more about each 
other, and about their own, their community, and slowly, trying to think 
about the future of their place, what they would like or to look like in ten 
years or so. And then in the end they would have this picture or plan, 
what they would like their community to look like in ten years. And of 
course some of them would then also commit to working on some of 
these things.39 
Before going to the debate, [we asked what their dreams are], and we 
used these words during the debate to touch them on their dreams, not 
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to destroy their dreams, but to judge the support to fulfil their dreams, but 
on a realistic way.40 
it was useful having dialogue and planning, and implementing joint 
community actions […] very useful was dialogue on participatory 
planning of a common desirable future. It is a methodology: through 
dialogue to a desirable future. This method was very useful; not only 
method, but really this approach to involve people in dialogue about how 
they see the common future in which they can agree about common 
future. They are doing things together.41 
 
Planning and implementing projects on common needs and interests on the 
one hand renders similarities more tangible, thereby challenging 
dichotomous stereotypic thinking, while at the same time these planning and 
implantation phases constitute a framework in which inter-ethnic cooperation 
can take place (cf. Kassin et al. 2008 on superordinate goals). This 
buttresses getting to know the other during ensuing interactions, and 
recognising that the members of the former enemy group can be of 
assistance in the realisation of the own goals. This realisation can help to 
disseminate the recognition that cooperation can, at least in limited areas, be 
conducive to win-win outcomes (cf. Deutsch, 1973; 2006).  
And also [X] has organised to clean some rivers, […], like Albanians and 
Serbs together, I think in Mitrovica, it was also very successful. You 
know, you work but sometimes you have to say something to your 
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person who is nearby you, so these are really some creative ways […] if 
you mix [it’s] really successful.42 
it’s an activity which is not focused on just reconciliation, for when to 
speak about reconciliation, this is not a good activity to have people who 
are really very much different. But, any kind of community activity that 
both sides think is contributing to them, when they have an interest just 
to participate, is good. So you just have to determine what this is. It can 
be learning English, it can be computer skills, it can be cleaning the 
waste, it can be some kind of education. So, it’s just giving a chance for 
people to meet people, to know each other on a normal level, not to put 
first, “OK, I’m a Serb, I’m a Croat”, but to have a chance for them to 
know each other before putting these labels in front.43 
including like core people to do some project together. To write a project 
together. To share responsibilities, like “you will write this, I will write this, 
you will do this”, so, like make a team.44 
 
3a) Improving the material conditions by intergroup income 
generating projects for economic well-being, thereby imparting 
new perspectives and opportunities 
A remarkable class of activities conducted by some LNGOs are income 
generating projects, which on the one hand improve the local economic 
situation, while at the same time cultivating interethnic cooperation. The 
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concern for the material basis was shared widely by communities in whose 
areas the LNGO projects were situated, which is not too surprising 
considering the strained overall economic situation in these areas.  
Common for [the communities] was something related to really good 
living, meaning having possibilities for earning money, for good living, 
with unemployment, economical depression […] this existential. 45 
or people would generally speak about societal problems, like in Croatia, 
like unemployment and low wages and this kind of stuff.46  
the main problem is the economical situation47 
You are helping people to start thinking about their common future, if you 
improve their everyday life, immediately after the conflict.48 
They said, “we need first [a place for intergroup contact for those who 
are already willing to meet]” and then said, "do some income generating 
project"49 
 
The strong potential of economic projects to function as an intergroup bridge 
or as a field for cooperation was indirectly illustrated by the following 
indication:  
All the time, before the war and during the war and after the war, before 
the NGOs’ activities, we had a lot of black market activity […] They did 
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not stop the contact through, Serbian-Albanian contact. All the time, 
before the war, in the time of the war and after the war. Small business. 
And we must follow up that business, enormous need, through the 
economy more.50 
 
Given that the motivation of locals to participate in LNGO activities is most 
likely a function of the degree to which these project resonate with the life 
world of the local residents, the need of economic well-being imparts to 
projects addressing these needs special relevance. Examples of projects 
which were designed to contribute to the improvement of the local material 
basis, while at the same time hosting the potential of intergroup cooperation, 
were e.g.: sewing and tailoring courses51; the dissemination of greenhouses 
and training in cultivation methods52; basic training in economy and project 
management coupled with the offer of mini-grants.  
we tend to not push the process ourselves, but be flexible and see what 
kind of activities really or projects or what kind of income-generating 
projects could be, are they doable, if not, then it’s fine, I mean, we will 
have to continue separately, but at least we tried in bring some bridges 
and some natural relationship with them.53 
by the end of the internship processes, we demand from youth to submit 
us some small business plan, and [name of organisation] in partnership 
with [name] provide some kind of small grants donation to them, to 
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create some small income generating projects, so it’s pretty much for the 
youth on both sides of Mitrovica, projects are strongly encouraged to be 
of multi-ethnic origin, linked54 
 
3b) Improving the material conditions to reduce frustration as a 
potential source of scapegoating, and to impart new 
perspectives and opportunities for the future 
The relevance of the economy for the conflict dynamic was indicated by 
activists who see a precarious economy as one of the contributors to 
hostility, mediated by the degree of frustration precipitated by unemployment. 
Correspondingly, it was argued that an improvement of the economic 
situation would reduce frustration and give a future perspective, thereby 
reducing the susceptibility to nationalism and scapegoating. This points to 
the significance of quickly improving the economic situation in a post-war 
context, to reduce further processes of radicalisation and to build the 
fundament for the improvement of intergroup relationships. 
You are helping people to start thinking about their common future, if you 
improve their everyday life, immediately after the conflict. […] The fact 
that you still have so many young people unemployed and with so much 
free time, that they can use in one direction and one direction alone, 
conflicts, hostilities. I’m also saying you haven’t created a fruitful 
                                            
54
 Local activist of international peacebuilding organisation B in Mitrovica, June 2007 
 241 
economic ground for their employment, because they wouldn’t be 
unemployed, if you invested heavily and adequately in the economy.55 
maybe more important than the status [of Kosovo] is the economical 
situation, because the situation where people are very bad economically, 
there is a huge potential of lead the mass in one or in another direction 
and usually is very human that it’s quite easy to accuse the other side for 
the problems that people are having, even the economical ones. And not 
having jobs and not working also somehow, people can think more about 
having protests or not being satisfied with others as much, like that. So 
the life itself normalised, they are not working and they don't know what 
will tomorrow bring before the status is not decided. So, all of this 
abnormality is blocking the re-building of the relationship. 56 
there is a lot of hatred, and there is a lot, Kosovo situation again: If the 
economic situation is better and everything is living better, he is not 
going to think if he is a Serb, or he is or that. He has his life and 
everything is ok. But when nothing is ok, you are not working, there are 
lot of war veterans, they are not working, you know. What can they talk 
when they are drinking, they are nice places, what, who is guilty for this, 
Serbs, so. We can see in the last, eighty five I think, I’m not going to see 
my statistics now, but eighty five cases of minority crimes in 2006, eighty 
five. And 2005 and 2004 about forty. So it raised, you know, especially in 
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this hinterland [name], last year much more these ethnic crimes, than 
two years before.57 
the economy, the poor economy of Kosovo even makes it worse, 
especially in the case where Kosovo is right now, I mean, people do not 
really see any hope, they are frustrated firstly, because of the general 
situation, the economic situation, and then of course everybody just 
blames the others for not having this economic prosperity.58 
The following indication about the conflict fuelling effects of a deterioration in 
the economic situation is reminiscent of Collier’s (2000; Collier et al., 2005) 
reference to the centrality of changes in the economic well-being:  
From the richest region we went to the poorest region of Kosovo. And a 
lot of frustration here was concentrated.59 
Equivalently, economic deterioration was also referred to in Eastern Slavonia 
as a central factor involved in the current problematic constellation.60  
The hostility reducing function of an improvement in the economic situation 
was partially depicted as stemming from the effect of distraction arising from 
the creation of jobs.  
There is some place for factories, for bakeries, for something, if you 
work, you don't have time to think, who you are or what you are like61 
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economy can be one of the keys, by improving the economy I believe 
people will tend to have less time to think about the past, they will be 
more focused, oriented to creating their own future.62 
 
The positive side of the coin is that a growth of employment can entail a 
change in the perspective, increasing work-related opportunities, while re-
orienting the outlook more towards the future, thereby reducing one source 
of scapegoating. It was pointed to the function of building intergroup bridges 
which an overall improvement of the economic situation can have, by 
increasing the opportunities for economic cooperation. 
You are helping people to start thinking about their common future, if you 
improve their everyday life, immediately after the conflict.63 
Economy should be globally as one of the quite effective tools in 
introducing inter-ethnic dialogue as everyday practise in conflict areas. 
Improve the everyday life of the groups in conflict, while improving that, 
they will along time and quite short period of time find some common 
links which are economical, and on their own, on their own […] they will 
find their own joint common interests, in further developing the 
economical situation64 
Mostly offer them to work and you will not have a problem. Really, they 
just said, first they said we need first something to meet and then said 
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"do some income generating project" […]we will not fight definitely if we 
work together65 
 
In summary, an improvement in the local economic situation can influence 
intergroup dynamics via multiple routes, i.e. by directing the outlook more 
towards the future which could reduce the orientation on past grievances, 
increasing economic opportunities which provide an alternative to a fixation 
on competitive nationalism while countering frustration as a source of blame 
allocation, and creating options for intergroup cooperation. 
 
4) Projects of intergroup interaction in the form of cooperation and 
of spending leisure time together, which are at the same time 
signalling to newcomers and to the outside that living together 
is possible 
The potential beneficial effects of activities which encourage in some way 
interethnic cooperation are not limited to those directly participating in the 
projects, but can extend to a wider constituency via these participants. This 
can happen by rendering the option of living together visible and tangible, as 
well as by participants functioning as intermediaries between the (former) 
opponent group and the more prejudiced individuals within their immediate 
social network.  
Presenting the alternative of joint intergroup activities provides a role model 
which demonstrates to newcomers and to the public the lived alternative of 
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intergroup collaboration. In addition to the projects of working on common 
community interests and needs (such as economic needs), activities 
comprised e.g. youth projects based on intergroup socialising. In the course 
of such youth projects, youngsters could function as informal mediators when 
informing their less intergroup-oriented parents about the ease of this 
informal way of intergroup cohabitation.  
When the [youngsters] who come to the Youth Club to spend their free 
time […] the first time they came, they saw a lot of, I mean they didn’t 
see, but through the talking with the people, […] they see you have 
several nationalities at one spot working together, playing together, 
talking together. That was like a good first step, because then they 
realise that there is not any problem of being together. […] When they 
saw all that, then they changed themselves, like, “look, they are all 
together, they are not fighting, they are drinking beer together, […] 
sharing everything, eating together, listening music together, talking 
about music, talking about video games”, some basic stuff, and then 
they changed a bit. […] 
travelling together to another country, and then they see how the kids 
react there, how they don't have these prejudices, and everything, so 
they see it in front of them, they see it that's possible, they need to see 
an example, to feel it, and then they change their thought. […] 
You invite people on a barbeque, to come to eat and like drink a glass of 
beer, to talk and then, slowly, step by step. I believe that this exchange 
was one of the best ways, I believe now, like when they have examples, 
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how do young people react in another environment, then they see that it 
is possible here also.66 
 
It was described how those participating in practice examples of intergroup 
collaboration and socialising can accomplish successes as intermediaries, 
influencing the opinion within their social network.  
And then they started to ask their parents, because, some of the people 
who were coming here, some of the members, some of the volunteers, 
were coming here, their parents didn’t know that they were coming here. 
And then we found out that it was like terrible for us, like “why didn’t you 
say to your parents that you are coming” “you know, I am a bit afraid 
because my father is nationalist.” And then with the time, you know, then 
the person became older and older[…] then they started to talk with the 
parents, start to change them. And we were so happy, because some of 
them succeeded.67 
 
Another example for signalling that intergroup cooperation is a real option 
was encountered above in the description of projects analysing community 
interests and needs. As mentioned, when the interviewing and organising 
team of these community projects was of mixed nominal ethnic group 
membership, they functioned as role models of intergroup collaboration.  
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it was a very, quite mixed coordinator team, and it was very successful, 
because the municipality officials accepted us as a partner who 
implemented this68 
the most important thing is that in the trainers teams or organisers team 
is mixture, as well. So for example, if we are organising some event 
were people from different sides will be present, then the trainer team 
has to be mixed. So we often asked our colleagues and activists from 
former Yugoslavia to join us in these training teams. 69 
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I.B) Working with people who were very seriously affected by 
the war 
In this section B the following major aspects of LNGO work with war 
wounded individuals will be repeatedly encountered: Setting communicative 
frameworks which promote listening and exchange of idiosyncratic 
backgrounds of participants for personalisation, cultivating the expression of 
emotions and enabling reflection as a step towards individualisation of group 
members, understanding of the ‘other’ and understanding of the past war 
dynamic; this exchange promotes the perception of commonalities in war 
experiences and roles between the own and the other group(s), and 
promotes via empathy the recognition of the opponent’s humanness; based 
on a reflection on the past, the self, and the other, setting new aims for an 
orientation towards the future is encouraged. 
Creating a framework in which norms of listening and exchange are 
emphasised, in order to enable an individualisation of the group members, is 
a way to initiate direct intergroup interactions. The similarity to the 
approaches focusing on common goals and interests – outlined in preceding 
sections – is that in all of these cases a redefinition of the relationship is 
aspired to, attempting to reduce the mistrust and competitive interaction 
norms which are entailed by enemy images, through undermining enmity.  
Personalisation can therein work in various ways: On the one hand, 
personalisation can render intra-group diversities more visible, challenging 
the pre-conceptions of homogenous groups, fostering understanding for 
differences, and challenging some of the stereotypes. On the other hand, 
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(analogously to an approach focusing on common needs and interests) the 
process of personalisation can bring more attention to commonalities, 
thereby reducing the fixation on dividers; for example, similarities can be 
brought to the surface when a space is provided in which listening to the 
other’s suffering supports the empathic recognition of the humanity in the 
other.  
Importantly, these exchanges do not replace the dealing with the ‘hot’ 
conflictual issues. They can either be trustbuilding steps to prepare the 
ground for these sensitive issues, when the latter are deferred to subsequent 
stages, or can constitute the modality by which sensitive issues are 
addressed, i.e. by focussing on personal experiences instead of engaging in 
confrontational debates. 
The work with war victims and ex-combatants can be classified into three 
elements which aim at a transition from intergroup mistrust to mutual 
understanding, and comprise the setting of new aims as a last step. The 
activities of the LNGOs by which they are working with war victims and ex-
combatants will be presented in the following sections correspondingly as 
classified into the following three categories:  
1) Setting communicative frameworks which promote listening and 
exchange of individual backgrounds of participants (/getting to know 
the other) for personalisation, so that the heterogeneity of the outgroup 
can be recognised, and intergroup similarities become visible 
2) Understanding the other’s behaviour in the past; understanding the 
past war dynamic; understanding the past suffering of the other, so 
that the moral superiority of the own group becomes challenged 
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3) Based on a reflection on the past, the self, and the other, setting 
alternative aims for an orientation towards the future 
 
 
1) Setting communicative frameworks which promote listening and 
exchange of individual backgrounds of participants (/getting to 
know the other) for personalisation and imparting a sense of 
respect, so that the heterogeneity of the outgroup can be 
recognised, and intergroup similarities become visible 
1a) approaching ex-combatants with an attitude of respect, without 
stigmatising them for their decisions to join former wars; 
believing in the universal capacity of people to change 
The importance of imparting a sense of respect to the individuals with whom 
one is working was already addressed in section A1 in the context of 
intergroup projects on the community level. In the case of work with ex-
combatants, this respect encompasses abstaining from stigmatising them 
due to their choice of fighting in past wars, combined with the conviction that 
everyone has the potential to change. This avoidance of blaming people is 
related to the norm of avoiding the classification of people – a norm central to 
peacebuilding work:  
For me it has to do something with my understanding of nonviolence, 
avoiding to put people into categories, saying you are good or you are 
bad, or he is bad, just because he has done something. I believe that 
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people should be made accountable for what they do and responsible for 
what they do, but give people a chance to change, and this is a mistake I 
think, committed also by many people engaged say in human rights work 
or peace work, that they consider even whole groups of people, not only 
individual, they are judged upon what they have done in the past.70 
if you have this approach of rejecting anyone with minuses, with certain 
characteristics, not liking, or something like that, it’s discrimination, and 
of course, you can tell yourself that people with whom you want to work 
at the beginning will reject you 100%, it’s a very painful and slow 
process, but the very necessary thing is your own integrity, the respect71 
The belief in the changeable nature of people can be buttressed by the 
assumption that the behaviour of people is highly context specific, and by the 
assumption that everyone has some sense of righteousness:  
one thing is that, as I said before, this identity […] people change roles in 
the situation, somebody can be in certain situations a hero, and that very 
somebody can be a killer in a different situation. People can, the same 
very individual, can be really an honest and heroic person, Dr Jekyll and 
Mr Hyde situation […] In all human – even very black – personalities, 
there is a safe place.72 
Instead of categorising people based on deeds, the belief in the possibility of 
change translates into an potentially empowering emphasis on activities in 
the present and future:  
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despite of my conviction as a war-resister and conscientious objector, I 
do not blame those people or feel on any higher moral ground than they 
are. I was not in that situation […] it is about how we deal with things 
now. 73 
 
One of the factors influencing the capacity for change – from war related 
animosities towards a future cooperative orientation – is possibly the 
association of hostilities with emotional discomfort and distress. In this 
direction point statements which indicate that even those with very hostile 
attitudes have a potential for change, not least due to the uncomfortable 
emotional position entailed by the feeling of hatred. The feeling of hatred 
appears often to be traceable to sources such as fears, wounds, and needs, 
to the effect that addressing these sources can erode the basis of the hatred. 
These references suggest that even with so-called extremists there is a 
chance for change. 
when you come with let’s say “extremists”, you just need some time to 
convince them that they are not so extreme. For example, just to use 
some phrases, “all Serbs” or “all Croats are bad” “they disgust me”, for 
example, and you can call this person an extremist. But really in 
everyday life maybe he is not so extreme, […] this feeling of 
aggressiveness, it’s not a good feeling, and you don’t feel comfortable if 
you are always angry; no, people don’t want to feel like that. But you find 
a support, spend some time with them to understand why they are 
speaking like that, and then, for the other half of their being to go front. 
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It’s like mad Max, I will be mad Max outside, but inside I’m something 
different. 74 
And [ex-combatants] don’t have the hatred, they have a fear, and it’s a 
different level. If you have a fear, you can work on de-grading this fear. 
You can see where it comes from, you can look at the sources, and 
hatred is often irrational, and I don’t think that many people hate, 
because first of all it’s difficult for them, it’s difficult to live with that […] At 
the moment, when they feel or hear something or do something that 
emotionally really hurts them, then probably yes. But, it is not an attitude 
or ideology they would stand for.75 
 
1b) Personalisation/Getting to know the other 
The initial phase of the intergroup contact is characterised by getting to know 
the other, which consists of exchanges on the personal background, 
personal expectation, perspectives, and emotions. This initial concentration 
on the individuals imparts at the same time a sense for the importance of the 
individual and opens opportunities for perceiving cross-group similarities. 
The procedures for personalisation of the in- and outgroup members lay the 
ground for subsequent work on the more sensitive issues related to the war 
past.  
In the beginning it is like this: the gathering of the group, getting to know 
each other. So we are doing in this order, people are getting to know 
each other, and then the topic; we want to express by this, that it is very 
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important for us who the people are, the people are important for us; not 
only the level of facts, but the people. And then this thing with asking for 
expectations follows, and then these group rules. Like this, "which rules 
can help us, so that everybody in the group feels good, and that we are 
working satisfied."76  
there was a lot of talking going on, on dialogue, and different exercises 
that supported, and also a lot of small exercises that would encourage 
talking about yourself. So that people could get to know each other 
better […] I know what we did was to, I think, with many groups, about 
their identity. […] At the beginning also [...] the thing is that you think 
about yourself who you are, what are all of your roles, and then to share 
with the group what you want from this. So, for example, “I am a 
mother”, I was then a wife, I was a peace-worker, so people felt it is also 
national identity and religious what they then would talk about. So, this is 
also an opportunity to say, “I’m a...” you know, to say more about 
yourself and to a sort of prepare for difficult topics. To say something 
about your religion or about, your nationality, to say that, you are a 
Croat, you feel like a Croat, or you feel like this, or you don’t know how 
to feel because you are from a mixed marriage and this war made things 
difficult, and this is the things to say, sometimes you don’t feel accepted 
by any group.77 
The first step was introducing to each other, “I am …”, and after that the 
rules, the first step usually has been my identity. […] Everybody listened 
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to each other. So, I am really a human being, I have value, “I am a 
farmer”, “I am a professor”, “I am a carpenter”, “I didn’t finish primary 
school”78 
we have an introduction, we want to hear their expectations, we talk 
about rules and talk about that programme, we talked about health, but 
using some creative way of expressing, some games, just for people to 
relax. So that was that first one.79  
at the first phase of this local training you need to open the space for 
people to talk about something and to create safe space for them; to feel 
safe to express what they want to. [A safe space is created by talking] in 
my name. It means I will talk about my feelings, about how I see the 
world, about my perception […] 
This is a kind of storytelling. So, at the beginning of the training, people 
tell their stories. It doesn't last long, but they can, if they want, talk about 
their past, what happened to them, and other people hear them and then 
they approach the others with a different perspective. For example, 
when they hear I was refugee, or I spent some time here or there, they 
will understand me better.80 
we also took them somewhere aside, where they had their own time, like 
one day or two days workshop, they would be completely committed to 
that.[…] We are really careful to facilitate to give space to everyone. 
They would be mixed in the group, so in pairs on, interchangeably, so 
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they have chances to get to know each other and hear each other, and 
understand each other, it helped. And I think the complete system of that 
thematically focused interaction, that the individual is important and the 
group is important, and all the philosophy of our work, everyone is 
respected and that they can pick and recognise that.81 
 
The importance of creating a safe space for exchange and listening is 
illustrated by the observation that exchanges on these sensitive issues are 
even rare in those places where members of nominally different groups live 
side by side, as was mentioned in a preceding paragraph: 
When people from Sarajevo come, they already have encountered 
others, but still, they do not talk about this in everyday life […] they do 
not talk about values over a tea, or about attitudes, or like we start in the 
day during the course.82 
people can exchange all this and they have the information from the first 
hand. And many people haven't ever met other people from the different 
side. For example, someone never met someone from the Albanian side, 
or some people have never been in a Muslim town, because our 
trainings take place in different parts of Bosnia and Montenegro. So 
some people have never seen a mosque, for example. So, all this is very 
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important for them: to have people from different sides and to talk about 
some issues.83  
 
1c) Seeing the internal heterogeneity of the outgroup by recognising 
multiple identities and multiple internal perspectives 
The exchange on the personal background and personal experiences 
demonstrates that the opponent group is not as homogenous as 
presupposed, by bringing multiple characteristics or identities to the fore. 
Seeing this internal heterogeneity appears to be of special significance in a 
post-war context, after national or ethnic identity has been massively 
intensified by escalation dynamics of the war, to the effect that identity has 
been narrowed down.  
Another characteristic is that [identity] has been very manipulated by the 
media. It’s been filtered down into ethnic identity rather than a wider 
concept of identity which you would get, let’s say, in the West, which 
would include personality, which would include religion, which would 
include profession, which would include some sense of personal 
spirituality and so on and so forth.84 
 
When becoming aware of the multiple roles and self-assigned group 
memberships of individuals, the dominance of categorisations based on 
ethnicity or nationality are challenged. Fostering personalising exchanges on 
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multiple identities can thereby render internal group heterogeneities visible. 
The following example, which was mentioned above, illustrates such an 
exchange on multiple identities.  
the thing is that you think about yourself who you are, what are all of 
your roles, and then to share with the group what you want from this. So, 
for example, “I am a mother”, “I was then a wife”, “I was a peace-
worker”, so people felt it is also national identity and religious what they 
then would talk about.85 
 
In addition to rendering multiple group memberships of the same individuals 
visible, the perception of the heterogeneity of groups can also be buttressed 
by challenging the assumption that a political attitude or ideology is shared 
within a certain group. During exchanges on personal experiences and 
motivations related to the war past, political orientations of the participants 
can shine through as inherent parts of personal motivations and 
assessments of the broader social-political contexts. These exchanges on 
the respective personal backgrounds and motivations can also foster the 
recognition that not only the other groups, but also the own group is more 
heterogeneous than has been assumed. 
expressing our disturbance, our standpoints and reasons for that, is the 
way bring it out […] these confrontations arise also within the people 
who have been in the same army or are of the same ethnic group, and 
this is something which then clearly breaks the picture of them as being 
all one. They have different opinions. One thing that also fosters 
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breaking up this image “they are all the same,” is that they speak of 
motives to join the war. These motives are very different. How it all 
happened. […] What they have gone through, you cannot look at them 
as a “they are all the same”. […] it’s not a problem to break this picture 
when you bring them together. […] when [ex-combatants] experience 
[ex-combatants from the opponent side] in real life, they go through it 
very quickly, because they look at them as members or say supporters 
of certain ideologies, those are the images. When they meet them and 
hear them, and hear their personal emotional stories, they understand 
that they are honest, and they understand that they are not all quite one 
ideology or that probably not at all of that ideology that they have seen 
them as being a part of.86 
 
The perception of the outgroup as a homogenous mass can also be 
challenged by directly shattering the assumptions which are part of the 
respective stereotypes. This challenge can either take the form of getting 
direct feedback on these stereotypes from the respective group, or by 
questioning the moral superiority of the own group when recognising the 
victimisation of outgroup members brought about by the own side.  
bring out, also talk about these prejudices, which exist in our societies, 
write them down. “What are the Albanians like, what do you hear?” Write 
them down in a purely Serbian group, and a purely Albanian group on 
the other side. And then talk a bit, and when people hear, they get 
offended, they get really, sometimes aggressive about it. And it is a 
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shock, it is also a shock for these that have written, because for them 
they hear it all the time in their environment, and now somebody from 
the other side hears it and is certainly totally offended. They are totally 
unaware how others perceive this […] It is really not that much bad 
intention, it is just that, say some sick climate, which is still holding on 
from the war time, that people do not really question.87 
we had some moments where somebody from Croatia would say “oh, I 
never knew that this is how people in Serbia think or how they see us, 
we thought we are the victims in this war, now you hear that there are 
other victims as well, you’re not” situations like this.88 
This latter point of undermining homogenous group images and challenging 
the perception of the own moral superiority by perceiving victims of the other 
group will be deepened in the course of the following section and in section 
B. The focus in the following section will be on personal encounters, which 
provide the opportunity to understand the past behaviour of the other better, 
whereas section B addresses societal processes on a more general level.  
 
2a) Exchanges on past experiences and past sufferings for a better 
mutual understanding 
After this phase of getting to know the others during which some level of 
mutual trust was able to develop, explicit or implicit norms manifesting a 
communicative framework, which emphasises exchange instead of 
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confrontation, are conducive to understanding the experiences and emotions 
of the former opponent.  
This better understanding of these motivations for the former adversary’s 
past behaviour, in turn, can be conducive to insights into the dynamics of the 
past war. Activists indicated that the attitude with which participants are 
approached should be characterised by respect and a belief in the power of 
reflection. Correspondingly, the activists’ task is to provide a framework for 
exchange and reflection, instead of trying to change opinions by blaming 
participants and pushing for change.  
You must not teach them, but inspire them to use their heads, of course 
emotions, [...] you must give them an opportunity to educate themselves, 
and you must, through this process, you must explain them, what the 
dealing with the past is. And this is not putting a finger towards any war-
veteran and saying, “you belong to the war veterans and you are 
responsible for war crimes.”89 
If they are not ready to talk or participate, they can be, if they are ready, 
they can be, we give them time, so I think, that’s what they need.90 
you can stop [the organisation’s programme] any time that you want [...] 
we are not trying to change somebody’s opinion in that way, but give 
people the possibility to work on themselves and to listen what those 
teachers and the teachers have to say, and to share some information, 
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knowledge and so on [...] small steps are sometimes bigger steps than 
big steps.91 
 
(Under some circumstances, respecting the local emotions and needs can 
even mean that planned projects with potential recipients are downsized and 
partially deferred:  
in one village where lot of Croats were killed during the Serbian control, 
when they came back in the first year, so there were really incidents 
between some of Croats coming back and some Serbs there, a really 
tragic one with a killing of a person. So, when we listened to all families, 
it was not many, maybe 60, 65, so there was a need for mourning, so 
Croats used to say: “Just let us alone.” “We came back, we found our 
houses empty, destroyed, we found out that this of my neighbours and 
that one and that one is killed or missing. And what we need now is just 
being let alone. We are sad, we don’t hate anyone, we need some space 
for being sad, mourning.” At the same time, they expressed a need for 
young people, particularly for children, that they would need support, that 
giving them a possibility to have a better quality of life.92) 
 
When recipients are ready to participate in a communicative engagement 
together with members of the former opponent group, the provision of a 
space directed towards exchange and reflection is needed for dealing with 
emotional wounds related to the war. Such a space can be manifested 
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through informal interaction norms oriented on listening instead of mutual 
condemnation, enabling the openness of expression, thereby imparting a 
sense of cooperative interaction.  
They need someone to really listen, not to judge,[…] they need space, a 
safe surrounding, [without] judging93 
When I said communication, I think really an element of compassionate 
communication, non-violent and compassionate, [in the sense of] 
listening with empathy, active listening with empathy. Recognition and 
expression of emotion94 
I see that among the group […] people are more and more open and 
cooperative, and willing to learn from each other and do things together. 
[…] some people knew each other from before, and this is their surprise 
how some of them are open, even though they have had a lot of traumas 
from the war. I think we have a high level of trust in the group.95 
The behavioural norms which manifest in listening and an open exchange do 
not necessarily have to be formulated on an explicit level, but can be 
introduced implicitly by a focus on expression, after some initial cooperative 
framework has been built.  
we have an introduction, we want to hear their expectations, we talk 
about rules and talk about that programme, we talked about health, but 
using some creative way of expressing, some games, just for people to 
relax. [….]  
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They did not blame anyone […] not because of the rules, but, we don’t 
lead the workshop in that way; we give space for people to express 
themselves, but not to discuss or argue or whatever. And what they said, 
they said that they are very satisfied that there are people who can 
facilitate that, that’s why they feel secure and open. And they said they 
think they need it, because they [carry] some really hard feelings96 
This atmosphere of a cooperative interaction conducive to trustbuilding is 
presumably the precondition for the open expression of emotions related to 
war wounds. This exchange in turn appears to spawn empathy in the form of 
mutual understanding of the other participants’ grave experiences. This 
process of enabling the perception of the others’ sufferings on the one hand 
embodies individualisation as de-categorisation; on the other hand it 
addresses the sense for human similarities via rendering commonalities of 
emotional reactions across groups tangible, supporting a sense for the 
suffering of “fellow human beings” (to borrow the term from Ramsbotham et 
al., 2005: 244), so that empathy can unfold.  
Empathy seems to entail that, when former adversaries describe their 
suffering from acts of brute violence inflicted upon them, the justification for 
violence against the former enemy becomes undermined. Empathy with the 
outgroup members and the recognition of the other as a ‘fellow human being’ 
seem to be thereby interrelated. 
we discussed their own hurts and their own wounds […] we asked them 
for their own personal experiences, it was a very tensed atmosphere, 
because all people started telling their deep hurts[…] Just as a whole 
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group we were there, we listened, we cried together, when people told 
their different stories, and we just processed that, we let them say, 
where are the hurts […] We also had a big space of time for just wherein 
the hurts go on, and I think the trainers, and also the group, they were 
very compassionate, so I think it was a very healing experience when 
they did see that other people also cried and that they all feel. […] we 
give space for people to express themselves, but not to discuss or argue 
or whatever. […] they said that they are very satisfied that there are 
people who can facilitate that, that’s why they feel secure and open.97 
[members from a peacebuilding organisation] constantly have 
workshops on Dealing with the Past, and it’s amazing when women from 
“both sides” – quotation marks – from different situations, national, 
situations of other parts of the region and sides, sit together […] how 
they change, not so much their thinking, their opinions, this pure 
humanity that’s comes out98 
Someone said “I have been raped”, “I have been beaten”, “I lost my 
family, because my mother, father, or children have been killed”. Both 
had a problem that this happened, and everybody of them said their own 
opinion about this99 
we had some moments where somebody from Croatia would say “oh, I 
never knew that this is how people in Serbia think or how they see us, 
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we thought we are the victims in this war, now you hear that there are 
other victims as well, you’re not” situations like this.100 
  
2b) Understanding of the behaviour of the other in the past; 
understanding the group interaction in the past war 
When interactions between members of the different groups comprised 
aspects which signified antagonism, entailing emotional irritations, directly 
expressing frustrations about past interactions appeared to be helpful, 
provided this exchange occurs on the basis of previously established trust. 
Addressing concretely past interactions which ensued hurts appears to be 
conducive for mutual understanding. An improved understanding of past 
behaviours of the other can constitute the foundation for apologies and for 
expressing disagreements with the past behaviour of ingroup members.  
we listened to them and tried to give them some empathy and also to 
give them the opportunity to describe what is going on with them at the 
moment; and people from the “other side” would then react and also say 
how they felt and why; and how this affected them, so it was a kind of 
healing to open this, for them to hear each other. That is was difficult for 
both sides. And how they felt and why and in what situations. Like for 
example, when the other person saw him or her on the street and turned 
the head at the other, they didn’t want to say “hello”, and stuff like that. 
And then they would say, how they felt coming back there and didn’t 
know what to expect and felt pressure from their group, and stuff like 
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that. So, kind of they explained why they acted the way they acted, and 
what it meant for them. That it was also difficult for them in this situation 
to choose and to do the right thing.[…] people felt hurt, and at the 
beginning they didn’t have enough trust to ask questions that were 
bothering them. So it was kind of important to get to know each other 
better in the group, then to build some trust and then to ask questions, 
“why did you leave”, “why this, that”, and to tell each other how they felt 
when they were from this or that side, and what bothered them.101 
they [carry] some really hard feelings […] some people are surprised by 
someone else’s feelings and they say “well, I’m sorry, I didn’t know that, 
but I don’t think I was like others”, so things like that, people try to 
apologise to each other, […] people try to clarify why they felt like that 
and things like that, but it’s not that they blame each other 102 
A further aspect in need of being addressed is the perception of the role of 
the opponent’s group within the war dynamics, since the pre-war and war 
dynamics usually entail that the adversary is seen as having been driven by 
motivations which were far inferior to the motivations of the own group, and 
since war actions of the opponent are assessed differently from similar 
actions of the own group.  
As was mentioned in an earlier section of this chapter, within each group 
which was a war party there appears to be a wide-spread tendency to 
perceive war motives of the own group as firmly located in the pure interest 
of defence.  
                                            
101
 Activist Y of local peacebuilding organisation A in Osijek, Croatia, May 2007 
102
 Activist I of local peacebuilding organisation A in Osijek, Croatia, May 2007 
 268 
If you ask the Bosnians, they will say the Serbs were the aggressors, 
they didn’t defend, they attacked something. But if you ask Serbs, they 
will say, we were defending our people, we were afraid that the same 
thing would happen as in World War II 103 
A Croatian will say “somebody attacked us first so we retaliated”. Serbs 
will say, we are not blame, because we were trying to defend 
Yugoslavia.104  
Serbs are declaring that they were defending Yugoslavia. Croats say 
that they are defending their country, their right for independence. And 
Bosnians are saying that they are defending their own lives, because 
Croats and Serbs attacked them. […] Every single ex-combatant will say 
to you “I went to war to defend” something. 105  
[All sides] take the attitude that […] they were victims 106 
 
After a phase of personalisation has built a basic ground of trust (as depicted 
in preceding section 1b), the homogenised picture of the own side as 
defending and the other side as aggressing can be challenged by creating 
the framework conditions for an exchange in whose process the disparate 
perspectives of the various sides can emerge. These various perspectives 
appear to have the capacity to induce a process of reflection which erodes 
formerly held dichotomous and internally contradictory views.  
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everybody felt they were defending […] the things that we organise and 
provide space for can foster [ex-combatants] to help themselves […] 
They see ways of getting out of their roles, they discover things, they 
understand some things that were not clear to them. Basically, they find 
material to sort their distorted pictures in their heads, to put the puzzle 
together, in a way which makes sense. Most often, what they have in 
their head is this puzzle, it’s violently put together, it doesn’t really fit, and 
somehow they feel it. Going through this experience helps them to put 
this puzzle together 107 
[Towards the end of a workshop series an ex-combatant said:] “At the 
beginning, I was very afraid of what will happen, I was very against any 
new information and I was fighting inside of me, and during this 
programme, I found out that my responsibility is to share my experience 
that I have deep inside, and experience of education that I got here, and 
those puzzles that I put together, and I want to be an activist.”108 
Helpful in the process of challenging formerly held hostile images of the 
adversary might be to recognise that the own perception as well as the other 
side’s perception had been distorted by the government and/or through the 
media.  
People are, I think, starting now to see the others not only as enemies, 
not only as blood enemies, but as humans who are also manipulated by 
the media, by the governments, by some causes 109 
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A better understanding of war dynamic of can also be promoted when ex-
combatants have an exchange on the process of being imbued by the logic 
of war. Feelings of guilt and being imbued by the seemingly inevitable 
automatism of fight series appear to entail that combatants’ opportunities for 
reflection during war were minimised. When ex-combatants have an 
exchange on this perceived automatism, the recognition of the similarities in 
experiences can widen the perspective on the past war events. This way, the 
previously exclusionist allocation of guilt on the opponent for the war 
dynamic can be questioned.  
Many of them are feeling the guilt that they survived, because many of 
their friends died. And many of them went during the war through the 
phase of wanting to get killed, to get killed in combat; for afterwards, 
when this comes to that, when you cannot adapt to civil life. […] when 
this madness grips you, it goes on and on, and you don't have time for 
anything else […] Madness of war: travelling, sleepless nights, fights, 
losses; you cannot distance yourself from what is all going on, what you 
are doing, what others are doing.110 
 
One significant aspect for an improved understanding of the past war 
dynamic regards the interpretation of the other side’s nationalism. This 
interpretation is of special relevance when assuming that antagonistic 
exclusionist rhetoric of the opponent constitutes part of the heart of an 
escalatory dynamic. When all sides recognise, however, that nationalist 
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exclusionism has its roots partially in fears, hurts, and perceived needs, 
space is opened for dealing with these aspects.  
There are some nationalist ideals, Great Croatia, Great Serbia, Great 
country, tall Serbs inside, or with tall Croatians inside, but there is a 
pretension. Some territories, also the crimes which were happening, 
some people are still hurt, still have a pain deep inside themselves, and 
they don’t talk about that. The great thing is to talk about that to give the 
pain out, that’s why the other side will see what are the real needs and 
are the real thoughts of me, for example, and then we can start to talk. 
Until the period in which I put under the carpet my deep fears, my deep 
needs, my visions, and not to go transparent to the other side, with 
always danger of conflict.111 
 
An integral element of the endeavour of breaking the perceived homogeneity 
of the outgroup consists of establishing individual responsibilities for war 
crimes, so that one of the sources for perceiving the outgroup as inherently 
and homogeneously bad in character is challenged.  
individualisation of guilt, in this sense would help them a lot. To say, “yes 
there were war crimes, and these and these people are responsible for 
that”. And of course in general, politics, but for their situation in their 
village, or their concrete case, is that war crime trials are very important 
for those people as well, so they can get some kind of satisfaction if the 
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perpetrator, at least that he is known and he is convicted, at least by 
public, if not by court.112 
 
A pivotal process in the assessment of war events is the removal of double 
standards. Group members seem to have a tendency to evaluate the war 
actions inflicted on the opponent group by a different standard than the 
actions perpetrated by members of the own group. Solely bringing these 
double standards to the surface of consciousness seems to have the 
capacity of inducing a shift in the assessment, as will be further discussed 
below.  
people justify violence depending on the context. If you would just ask 
them for a situation: “There is a military intervention. The army from one 
country liberates the territory, which was held by rebels. 150 000 flee. 
Thousands of houses are burnt. Do you consider this violence or 
justice?” They will all say "violence". But when they project it onto their 
country, then they call this "legitimate action". And the point of the 
training is actually to remove this context and to make people look in a 
fair, judge by the same criteria, whatever you judge. It doesn't matter 
whether it's Albanians, Serbs or Croats or whoever. You must have the 
same criteria, because it's human beings. And they get ashamed 
actually, when they realise this. And withdraw, and it changes some 
things.113  
                                            
112
 Activist Y of local peacebuilding organisation A in Osijek, Croatia, May 2007 
113
 Activist D of a local peacebuilding organisation in Belgrade, Serbia, June 2007 
 273 
3) Based on a reflection on the past, the self, and the other, raising 
awareness for basic priorities or values, in order to set 
alternative aims for an orientation towards the future as a form 
of empowerment 
Assisting people with war wounds in clarifying their basic priorities and life 
orientations is obviously an aim it itself, while at the same time constituting 
another component of the LNGOs’ endeavours of improving intergroup 
relations. After some basic trust towards the former opponent has been built 
and a better understanding of the past war dynamic has been achieved, a 
(partial) orientation towards the future becomes more likely. When assisting 
victims in being more future orientated, connections and commonalities with 
members of the former adversary groups can become visible, contributing to 
a fundament for more cooperative future interactions. 
An aspects which appears to motivate a movement in the direction of 
change, away from group enmities towards more cooperative orientations, is 
constituted by an interest in aspects of more peaceful alternatives as an 
answer towards the grave war experiences. 
[We] give people some theories and workshops, a way of dealing with 
violence and speaking about peace, teaching about peace, human 
rights, so they are very curious […] And they have so strong 
experiences, and then, after the war, when they have so much trauma 
and experience about war, they are very curious what actually is peace 
 274 
movement and peace theories. And I can see, this motivation here is 
very strong.114  
 
This willingness towards changing the own aims in the direction of more 
peaceful cohabitation seems partially to be grounded in a motivation to 
contribute towards the wider well-being of society. (The latter of the following 
quotations, referring to the motivation of contributing towards the well-being 
of society, was already cited above in a different context.) 
If we would approach them with an idea, oh now you should do this or 
that with them, they would ask why. Why would we do that, they are 
enemies, we don’t want to do that. No, meet them and make your own 
decision and I seriously mean it, because it makes no sense that nobody 
joins in unless they do have the proper motivation to do it, unless they 
really feel it, and when these responsibilities are re-awaken or a way to 
handle is re-discovered, then it is the right thing, and then they really 
change habits, and this helps them, because they feel happier with 
themselves, they feel, they are not did something good, everybody 
wants to do something good.115  
[An ex-combatant:] “during this programme, I found out that my 
responsibility is to share my experience that I have deep inside, and 
experience of education that I got here, and those puzzles that I put 
together, and I want to be an activist.”116 
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For individuals who have experienced the dark abysses of war, alternative 
ways of cohabitation seem to possess an inherent attraction, with the 
potential of imbuing individuals with a liberating perspective of hope. These 
alternative perspectives of living and cohabitation can either take the form of 
being presented as a societal vision, or can be more directly related to the 
local everyday life of the respective participants.  
And it’s a progress on human rights and progress in rights in general and 
these theories of peace and war and, peace in general, what is peace, 
what is war, and I am completely emotional when I see this progress in 
these people; how this educational progress – cannot cure them, of 
course, because it’s so a big trauma inside - but it’s a little easier to live 
for them, and explain themselves something, and to believe in some 
other possibilities of theory and practise 117 
people told their different stories, and we just processed that, we let 
them say, where are the hurts, and then of course we make a break and 
calm down and relax. And then we continue with more positive things, 
where they can see the other side, the hope 118 
 
The workshop interaction itself can therein function as an alternative role 
model of collaboration, when openness and cooperative elucidation of a 
problem are practiced.  
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I see that among the group […] I see that people are more and more 
open, and cooperative, and willing to learn from each other and do 
things together. […] they are very surprised, some people knew each 
other from before, and this is their surprise how some of them are open, 
even they have had a lot of traumas from the war. I think we have a high 
level of trust in the group. 119 
 
When addressing the everyday life of emotionally wounded participants, one 
route for transformation – from a fixation on the past towards an orientation 
on a more cooperative future – appears to consist of envisioning ideal 
perspectives of their daily life. As a form of empowerment, building on this 
envisioning of desired daily lives, new identity aims can be developed, when 
participants are supported in distinguishing chosen vs. non-chosen parts of 
the identity, for the identification of areas of influence. This support can take 
the form of assisting reflection processes on understandings of a healthy life, 
or of raising awareness for basic priorities or values which can give 
orientation for future societal activities, potentially aiming at the improvement 
of intergroup relationships, while reducing the fixation on the past.  
While supporting people with war traumata in clarifying their basic priorities 
and life orientations is obviously an aim it itself, it also constitutes a 
component of the LNGOs’ endeavours of improving intergroup relations. By 
assisting victims in being more future orientated within an intergroup settings, 
focusing on visions and priorities, connections with the other groups become 
visible and new relationships can be established.  
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In these interethnic settings a common exploration process can take place, in 
the process of which participants become aware of their multiple identities, 
reflect on their priorities, and develop more explicit orientations for their 
future lives. Awareness for the multiple identities can be raised by the 
following process:  
Just to be aware that some identities are, that it’s very complex, it’s not 
simple, you are Croat, or whatever […] They make their own posters, 
showing their identity. And they said it helped them because they 
realised what things are important for them, various parts of their life. 
And some people said they don’t even know what their identity is, they 
are still searching for it. But it’s helping them to, like some refugees who 
were somewhere else and they just returned to [X], and they still don’t 
know what to do and how to organise their lives, so they are trying to 
figure it out […] what is their chosen identity and what is was imposed on 
them, they couldn’t chose, like being unemployed120 
For empowerment, it seems to be helpful, as mentioned when participants 
reflect on the question which parts of their identities are chosen, and which 
were imposed by outside conditions, in order to prepare the grounds for 
reconsidering priorities, so that the own energies can be directed into those 
spheres that are transformable:  
talking about health, and then we discuss, we try to define what health 
is, and what contributes to a healthy person, and of course they define 
that for themselves, what they would like to see and experience, what 
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kind of healthy life […] and then little by little, we touch the topics they 
have problems, […] through the workshops we try to exercise with them, 
from being hurt, how they can practise and then try to be more assertive, 
fight for their needs, for example […] For some people the identity is that 
they are members of families whose members are lost, or they 
disappeared. […] then they try to see how some things that they haven’t 
chosen […] how they can accept that and some things are chosen, so 
they can maybe work more on things they can choose, be encouraged, 
try to live a healthy life through healthy food, and develop friendships or 
whatever. We just encourage them to be aware of their identities and 
identities of others121 
When working towards everyday interactions of participants, the perspective 
is needed that the process of changing the routine patterns should be 
conceived as long-term in nature. 
They discussed about their own personal things, where they tried to use 
the skills they learnt on. But as they recognized, and I think we 
recognized, it is the process. They cannot just have it like that. They try 
and then they have feedback, and then they try. But at least now they 
know some other ways how they can react on hurts, on lack of 
communication or whatever. So I cannot brag that they know everything 
and they are wonderful learners, but I thing they are struggling to use 
that. And it’s going to be a process.”122 
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On a more general level, focusing the attention of victims on capacities by 
looking at past achievements and current strengths is conducive to 
empowerment.  
it’s quite important that people begin to get that kind of a picture of 
themselves, that they see themselves as successful in some sense […] 
make them aware of their own internal resources; both psychological 
and knowledge, skills and so on, and to build on that […] To getting them 
to look at themselves, encouraging them to look at who they are, to look 
at what they accomplished and to look at that, to look at that in a positive 
way, if that’s possible […] The whole point is self-reflection, the whole 
point is looking at strengths, looking at inner resources and building up 
those 123 
 
One possible element of empowerment is disseminating skills of 
communication which entail mutual listening and the articulation of needs, 
visions, and emotions like fears and pains. As mentioned, bringing fears, 
pains, and needs, which partially are at the root of intergroup enmity, to the 
foreground, enables more constructive engagements with these sources of 
animosities. At the same time, disseminating communicative skills which 
facilitate the expression of needs and emotions are integral to an 
empowerment process. Part of this empowerment process consists of 
awareness raising for own priorities, visions, and needs, in order to escape 
from being trapped in the past and in images of fixed identities. This 
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awareness for needs and change wishes is the precondition for being more 
assertive and proactive in striving towards the own aspirations.  
When I said communication, I think really an element of compassionate 
communication, non-violent and compassionate, [in the sense of] 
listening with empathy, active listening with empathy. Recognition and 
expression of emotions and needs.124 
The great thing is to talk about that to give the pain out, you know, that’s 
why the other side will see what are the real needs and are the real 
thoughts of me, for example, and then we can start to talk, until the 
period in which I put under the carpet my deep fears, my deep needs, 
my visions or something, and not to go transparent to the other side with 
always danger of conflict.125 
through the workshops we try to exercise with them, how they can, from 
being hurt, how they can be assertive, how they can practise and then 
try to be more assertive, fight for their needs, for example. So, in 
different topics, like identity, how can they affirm their identity, and still be 
cooperative with others to, how they can be tolerant. And still don’t lose 
their own identity. And some things are very important for them, so they 
share, they discuss, they have a chance to process things in the group. 
[…] 
we did teach them some skills of acknowledging their own feelings, 
acknowledging their own needs, and asking for what the need is, without 
saying ahead of time, there are perceptions, without saying, well, I think 
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you are a bad person, but they will say, well, I have a feelings of this or 
I’m afraid of this and my need is this and when I’m asking you or saying 
this or that, and then on the next workshop, we just continued in that 
direction and we taught them assertiveness, in a way how they can, 
again, say what they need without, so it was like they had the chance to 
practise several times 126 
this is only one bit of the training we want to talk about, at the end of the 
training say of, what would they want to change? Why? What do they 
think can be done? And we try to point them out that personal example 
and courage is very important. That maybe you cannot move hills with 
your actions and change governments and the total policy, but what you 
can change definitely, if you want, is your behaviour. And your behaviour 
at work, your behaviour in your family, so not only when you meet the 
others, but change your attitude. Start from yourself 127 
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I.C) Challenging enemy images in the wider public 
by presenting examples which deviate from stereotypes, by 
presenting role models who have learnt from the war 
experiences, and by raising awareness for the suffering inflicted 
by members of the own group 
While the preceding sections .A and .B covered LNGO projects focusing on 
war affected communities or on war affected individuals, this section 
addresses the mechanisms through which changes can be effected on a 
more general societal level. Although this section also draws on projects 
which primarily focused on war affected individuals or communities, the main 
orientation of this section is on more general processes of change in the 
wider society.  
 
1) Challenging enemy images in the wider public by presenting 
examples which deviate from their stereotypes, by presenting 
role models who have learnt from the war experiences 
Amongst the projects addressing a wider public are public forums with ex-
combatants from different former warring groups. In the framework of these 
forums, a panel consisting of ex-combatants from different sides of the 
former war are presenting their war-related experiences and views. Due to 
ex-combatants’ conspicuous former taking of risks and bearing sacrifices for 
the “national” or “ethnic cause”, their stances possess special legitimacy, 
thereby potentially serving as role models.  
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You [as ex-combatants] have a great power and legitimacy in society to 
change things, because you cannot be stamped as traitor as easy as I 
can. You have given maybe a part of your body or five years of your life 
for your country, and somebody calls you a traitor; it's a bit tough. That's 
why they are so important.128 
 
During the process of these forums, homogenous pictures of the nominal 
groups are undermined in front of the eyes of the audience, when the 
audience recognises the individuality of the ex-combatants’ views, through a) 
seeing deviations from the expectations towards the outgroup(s) in the form 
of individualising accounts; or through facing ex-combatants who b) describe 
how they learnt from the war and c) engage in self-criticism. The following 
quotation illustrate each of these points:  
a) There was a series, we called them four views, because we wanted 
to avoid the situation to have one combatant from each side, so they 
would think they are representatives of this side. […] they spoke in 
their own name. They are not representative of a nation, they are not 
representatives of their former combatant formation or army. They 
speak for themselves as someone who has been in war. 129 
b) These forums basically went in a way that we spent about an hour 
on: four of them telling their stories of how they perceived things 
when the war started, why they went to war, their motivation, and 
how they see things now, a self-critical view is very important. So not 
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pointing of the finger on the other, speak for your own community. 
And it has been on television shows, it has been on newspapers, 
radio and stuff like that, they were also several extra TV shows where 
they were invited as guests and stuff like that. And within the forums 
we used the opportunity to have about an hour for these personal 
stories and interaction with the audience 130 
c) And then the audience receive something, which they don't expect 
[…] When they see a group of ex-combatants, they expect they 
would be spitting on each other, on each others side. When they 
don’t get it, they initiate, normally, not always, not 100%, normally it 
initiates the process of self-reflection.[…] And when they hear the 
story they see something that they totally don't expect, and they get 
confused 131 
 
Creating spaces which allow the expression of views which are oriented on 
peaceful cohabitation is obviously of special significance when the wider 
public discourse is dominated by radical nationalistic voices. When there is 
an over-representation of radical voices in the public discourse, which is 
likely to be a wide-spread characteristic in situations of intergroup conflict, 
promoting the expression and dissemination of other views could be a crucial 
ingredient to the endeavour of changing public perceptions.  
there is a clear, an absolute majority of people who are pro-peace 
oriented, there is potential for that, but you have to approach them in the 
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right way, to encourage them, and to give them a chance to join in. And 
often it means that it is a minority of, say, extreme radicals, which is 
loud. And this is the picture that we get of each other's societies: very 
negative. Ordinary people are afraid of radicals, or they are afraid of 
being rejected […] many people are afraid that whenever they state their 
opinion, which differs from nationalistic, that they will be attacked, that 
they will have embarrassing or difficult situations, […] you have a loud, 
very nationalistic minority, extremists, that are basically shying in the 
silent majority. The silent majority is afraid of them. And we have a 
different, a wrong picture, actually, without the reality of each others’ 
countries. If you would ask an average person in Sarajevo, Bosnia, he 
would probably think that half of Serbia are Chetnik, Fascistic, want to 
kill all Muslims and stuff like that and vice versa, which is totally rubbish, 
it simply doesn’t correspond to the reality. 132 
 
2) Recognising the victimisation of members of the opponent group 
by the hands of members of the own group 
The recognition of victims within the opponent group can be buttressed by 
the following steps, undermining the feeling of the moral superiority of the 
own group and promoting empathy and the humanisation of the other. These 
steps are not necessarily sequential, but the former is likely to be easier 
achievable than the latter. 
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2a) Hearing first hand reports, either directly or via the media, from victims of 
war crimes which were committed by the own side and violated jus in bello. 
This can break down the ‘good’ vs. ‘evil’ aspect of enemy images. 
2b) Hearing first hand reports, either directly or via the media, from victims of 
war actions which were committed by the own side and did not necessarily 
violate jus in bello, to recognise the suffering brought about by members of 
the own group, and to increase understanding. 
 
2a) Hearing first hand reports, either directly or via the media, from 
victims of war crimes which were committed by the own side and 
violated jus in bello. This can break down the ‘good’ vs. ‘evil’ aspect 
of enemy images. 
An integral component for the process of challenging the dichotomous group 
categorisations, underlying enemy images, consists of the recognition that 
the war actions did generate innocent victims not only within one’s own 
group, but also on the enemy’s side. This can raise awareness for the 
injustices inflicted by the own side’s actions, challenging a “good vs. evil” 
view. On a group level, the process of undermining the perception that one’s 
own side solely defended itself with justifiable means can be classified into 
several steps, even though these steps do not necessarily occur in a 
chronological sequence.  
One potential first step is constituted by the recognition that actions classified 
by international jus in bello as war crimes were not exclusively committed by 
the former enemy, which requires the recognition that certain acts are war 
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crimes irrespective of which side committed them with which justification. 
Such recognition can be assisted by several approaches. One process 
reaching wider parts of the society (compared to the limited number of 
people participating in direct encounters within LNGO projects) is constituted 
by court proceedings, which increase publicity for war crimes. As the ICTY 
suffers from a lack of recognized legitimacy in the public, national courts who 
are prosecuting own citizens are of particular significance, especially when 
members from the own group are indicted. 
International Criminal Court in Den Hague, their legitimacy is disputed 
when they are dealing with our people, so to say. So in Serbia it is 
disputed when it deals with the Serbian war. But in Croatia it is disputed 
when it is about crimes committed by the Croatian side […] there is a 
lack of acceptance of this most important truths […] the Hague tribunal 
has collected a lot of evidence on various crimes, but only some of them 
have been pursued by Hague, but the collected evidence is now being 
transferred to the national courts who will continue on this process, and 
it’s a very good thing […] it is also important that most of these 
processes are led against people who are their citizens, which means, in 
Croatia most of the processes, not only, but most, are against those who 
have committed crimes against Serbs; this is very good for the Croat 
society. In Serbia most of the processes are against Serb citizens, 
Serbian citizens, who committed crimes, either in Bosnia, Croatia or 
Kosovo. […] And this is much, much less disputed. Some Fascistic 
forces are of course always trying to discredit, but it is much less 
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disputed than the Hague tribunal, and it is much more present, and it is 
our country. It’s much more right. This is a very good thing.133 
 
The procedures during these national and international court proceedings 
are followed and documented by some NGOs, in order to ensure that the 
comprehensiveness of the criminal investigations corresponds to high 
standards. At the same time, the reports on these proceedings render more 
visible that crimes were committed by members of the own side as well.  
we have actually drafted a report on transitional justice for the last year 
[…] And there we will look how things with criminal prosecution of 
suspected crimes either in our countries Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, or in front of international criminal institutions, being the 
international criminal court for war crimes in Former Yugoslavia […] 
When you look at courts, it is very important to ensure that there is on 
the one side monitoring of war crimes trials, independent monitoring of 
war crimes trials, and I guess civil society organisations can provide 
monitoring and are as far as you can get in declaring that this is 
independent monitoring. You know, how can it be 100% independent 
when war crimes matter to all of us? You cannot say that human rights 
organisations can be 100% independent, because we really believe that 
these trials are important, and that makes us maybe very keen to see 
perpetrators prosecuted134 
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And I think that Croatian civil society association took the standpoint that 
criminal process is important. Why, because there was no awareness 
that war crime against civilians, women, wounded persons or prisoners 
committed in war from Croatian soldiers is a crime. The public opinion, 
supported or built by key-politicians or by key-persons in the judiciary 
was that Croatian soldiers were not able to commit war-crimes, because 
Croatia was in a defensive war. So, in that situation, in you would like to 
have a Truth Commission or Reconciliation Commission, the first we 
should recognise our own role in that and then you could do something. 
Our reasons were that we should first insist on changing this perception 
and really acknowledge that war crime is war crime.135 
One element of this work on ensuring high standards of court proceedings is 
offering assistance to (potential) witnesses prior to the court proceedings. 
This work is especially relevant when individuals are testifying crimes which 
were committed by members of their own identity group, as these witnesses 
are likely to play a crucial role in encouraging broader parts of the society to 
concede that crimes were perpetrated by fellow group members. These 
witnesses are thereby in a position of being conducive to breaking the 
perception of ingroup homogeneity and of the own group’s moral superiority.  
The other thing is support to witnesses in particular victim witnesses, 
because it's very difficult to speak up about crimes committed by their 
own side in the war, and I would say that the environment for this kind of 
testimonials might be hostile and very unfavourable, so witnesses need 
support in order to actually get the courage and speak up also in front of 
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the court about what they have seen, what has happened, how it was, 
because war crimes trials can go on only if there are material proofs in 
actually witnesses are able to speak up […] you need to prepare a 
person, how to testify in court, role play, present the whole situation, 
what she will be exposed to, and to have a lawyer with her all the time.136 
 
The recognition of war crimes perpetrated by members of the own group is 
an essential step. However, even when it is recognised that war crimes were 
committed by the own group, this does not necessarily imply that 
responsibility for these crimes is assigned to the perpetrators of the own 
group. Instead, a process of scapegoating which shields the self-image of 
the own group can take place, consisting of attributing the primary 
responsibility of the own group’s crimes to the crimes of the (former) 
opponent.  
“ok, that happened, we did that thing, but they have also done that thing 
to us”.137 
I heard about many places in Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia that people 
talked about the crimes and in what way they talked about. […]"yes, 
happened”, but of course, there is this "but". […] "ok, we killed them, but 
how many they killed of us", in this way.138 
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Correspondingly, a normative stance needs to be fostered which classifies 
certain actions as not acceptable, to effect that responsibility for own actions 
and thoughts is taken, irrespective of others’ actions.  
Serbs are declaring that they were defending Yugoslavia. Croats say 
that they are defending their country, their right for independence. And 
Bosnians are saying that they are defending their own lives, because 
Croats and Serbs attacked them. […] And if you hear that you will 
conclude that in the region of ex-Yugoslavia all wars were defending 
wars. But it’s a mechanism to approve war. When you say “it was 
defending” it was automatically approving that, “I was only defending 
myself”, “I killed the other people, because I needed to defend my own 
life”. Everybody is defending that. So it’s some kind of mechanism, in 
which people are trying to approve violence, approve legitimacy to war. 
And we are fighting against that […] to try to create an atmosphere in 
which every side will take responsibility for their own acts, for their own 
thoughts139 
And one step, first was, “that happened in my country? – no”, we avoid 
that, that is what is happening, denial. The second step is “ok, that 
happened, we did that thing, but they have also done that thing to us”, 
you know. And I think the truth that we can do, it’s to concentrate on 
what happened in Serbia for example. […] What happened in my 
country, what did my government, what did my army, my police, all the 
people which did some war crime in the name of my people and exactly 
under my name, I need to deal with that. I don’t care what happened in 
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Croatia. I care from a human point of view. I need to know also. But I 
don’t use these things as an approval or justification for what I am doing. 
And then we start cleaning in front of our neighbourhood, in our houses, 
then we can go further […] The third step is that we learn to make a 
judgement, banish the crime as it is a crime against a human being, not 
a crime against a Croatian, a crime against a Muslim, but to think that 
every crime against a human being is a crime that will punishment. 
That’s it. No matter on which side, from whom to whom.140 
Drawing public attention to war crimes, as constituted by investigations in 
court proceedings, is one of the elements by which awareness for crimes of 
the own group can be raised. Another element is the reduction of double 
standards, mentioned shortly in preceding section B. The reduction of double 
standards can be supported by inducing participants to evaluate past crimes 
in the abstract; i.e. by abstracting the controversial actions from their context 
and comparing the assessments of these abstracted actions to the 
assessment of the same actions in particular contexts. This means 
comparing participants’ evaluations of crimes in the abstract to participants’ 
evaluations of crimes which were perpetrated by members of the own group.  
On the abstract level, there appears to be a far-reaching convergence on 
which actions are judged as unacceptable, whilst group members appear to 
be partially blinded by enmity when assessing actions perpetrated against an 
adversary. The possibility of removing double standards seems to grounded 
in this concurrence of judgements when actions are evaluated in the 
abstract. These common standards entail that discrepancies to the 
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evaluation of concrete actions become visible when the context is restored. 
By raising awareness for double standards, the dissemination of quasi-
universal assessment criteria can be cultivated, and reflection processes on 
societal ideologies can be supported.  
 
people justify violence depending on the context. If you would just ask 
them for a situation: There is a military intervention. The army from one 
country liberates the territory, which was held by rebels. 150 000 flee. 
Thousands of houses are burnt. Do you consider this violence or this 
justice? They will all say "violence". But when they project it onto their 
country, then they call this "legitimate action". And the point of the 
training is actually to remove this context and to make people look in a 
fair, judge by the same criteria, whatever you judge. It doesn't matter 
whether it's Albanians, Serbs or Croats or whoever. You must have the 
same criteria, because it's human beings. And they get ashamed 
actually, when they realise this. And withdraw, and it changes some 
things. […] 
When it comes to specific contexts, because of ideology or because of 
born in identities or influences, we will differ, because somebody will 
justify, I don’t know, violence against Albanians, but if you don’t mention 
it is Albanians, if you talk just about people being in that position, 
suffering that kind of action, they will say “yes, this is violence”. […] You 
start in the abstract, so don’t put into a local context, you start always 
from the abstract.[…] But then, immediately get back to the local context. 
Don’t stay in the abstract. Because if you stay in the abstract, nothing 
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will change. Bring it back and reflect, looking “what does it mean in our 
society, what we live, with the situation we live in.” What is glorified in 
our societies, in our countries. 141 
Related to this work are activities which directly address a broader audience, 
trying to raise the sensibility of the public for double standards in the 
evaluation of war crimes, in order to foster the unbiased application of quasi-
universal norms.  
there was no awareness that war crime against civilians, women, 
wounded persons or prisoners committed in war from Croatian soldiers 
is a crime. The public opinion, supported or built by key-politicians or by 
key-persons in the judiciary was that Croatian soldiers were not able to 
commit war-crimes, because Croatia was in a defensive war. […] we 
should first insist on changing this perception and really acknowledge 
that war crime is war crime.142  
war veterans were asking with a petition for this abolishment of the war 
crime [as a chargeable offence, when a general of the own side was to 
be prosecuted,] and then at the same time we organised ourselves from 
different peace and civil society organisations, in the action “a crime is a 
crime is a crime is a crime, whoever did it”, and that was the most, 
10,000 people were at the main square at one point at the demonstration 
against this law that was tried to be passed on, and with the request that 
war crimes should be prosecuted whoever did it143 
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I’m attempting in my work to give people a chance to make up their own 
decisions. I will never tell anyone, this should be done or this is wrong. 
Let’s discuss it, let’s look at it from different perspectives, and then your 
sense of justice will tell you what to do 144 
 
2b) Hearing first hand reports, either directly or via the media, from 
victims of war actions which were committed by the own side and 
did not necessarily violate jus in bello, to recognise the suffering 
brought about by members of the own group, and to increase 
understanding. 
A further step on the journey towards breaking down enemy images is 
formed by the recognition that suffering was caused also by those war 
actions which were not necessarily violating international jus in bello. For this 
to occur, it is essential that the humanity in the former enemy is recognised 
to some degree, so that suffering ceases to be perceived as contingently 
“deserved” and can be acknowledged. Such a process of re-humanising the 
other side can take many forms, being facilitated for example by the 
recognition of similarities between the own and the other side.  
The discovery of similarities can wherein happen in different ways: either 
during personal encounters – such as those described above, enabling the 
perception of similarities in aspirations, needs, personal war stories, and 
values – or mediated by reports of victims’ suffering, which might, via 
empathy, enable the recognition of a common humanity. Reports of victims’ 
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suffering, in turn, are potentially disseminated on the one hand by national 
and international court proceedings, and on the other hand by the “oral 
history” project. During this project, individuals from different parts of the 
region are visited, and their war experiences are documented. 
What is also important is truth about missing persons and also I think 
that people have a need for acknowledgement of their own experience. 
How they feel and what they have been passing through during the war. 
And this is not – even during war crime trials – these needs are not really 
fulfilled; because, a judge or court needs just to approve certain things 
on a level of is the person guilty or not. And really how people felt or 
what each of the victims went through, is not really the mission of a 
court. So, it is not enough, and I think that this needs many publications 
on Croatia from different associations about testimonies what happened 
to people, so it is going, this kind of oral history, writing down and 
collecting or expressing. That is also what is needed and it’s good to 
have it145 
This process can be regarded as a overlapping with some aims of a Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission by its focus on multiple perspectives on war 
experiences, suffering and traumata. It thereby gives the previously 
anonymous or unknown victims of the opponent’s side a tangible human 
appearance, which can buttress the process of rehumanisation, and promote 
a deeper apprehension of the consequences of the own sides’ action.  
Now, there are some experiences in Bosnia, they had this trust 
commission for Srebrenica […] So we started in Croatia this oral history 
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as a kind of truth saying mechanism, and I think that probably this kind of 
smaller commission for different locations could be one of the 
approaches, and a kind of regional approach which will take into account 
different measures and also what is important, this next step after truth 
commissions 146 
 
A further context in which hearing the war-related suffering can occur was 
mentioned in section B, wherein personal encounters between victims of 
different sides were described. When hearing the war experiences directly 
from the victims in these personal settings, the suffering brought about by 
war actions is expressed, so that empathy can entail the corresponding 
moral evaluations of war actions precipitating such losses:  
we had some moments where somebody from Croatia would say “oh, I 
never knew that this is how people in Serbia think or how they see us, 
we thought we are the victims in this war, now you hear that there are 
other victims as well, you’re not”, situations like this.147 
Someone said “I have been raped”, “I have been beaten”, “I lost my 
family, because my mother, father”, or “children have been killed”. Both 
[sides] had a problem that this happened148 
An important distinction, however, should be drawn between improving 
relationships between groups and attempts of reconciling perpetrators and 
victims. All the activities discussed here focus on activities of the former 
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category, i.e. on measures which are aiming at reducing animosities between 
people who had not perpetrated acts of direct violence against other people 
participating in the respective LNGO activities. Whether ‘reconciliation’ 
between perpetrators and victims can occur is dependent on the individuals 
involved, and it might be far too much to be asked from victims to engage in 
such a process “on demand”: 
reconciliation was very hard word for them. Just to hear “now reconcile”. 
“Should I reconcile with the murders of my family?” or “family 
members?”, “no, no, please, no”149 
Correspondingly, when reconciliation is declared to be an aim of 
peacebuilding, it should chiefly be referring to the group level, in the sense of 
reducing enemy images as generalised animosities and prejudices. Amongst 
the steps towards this goal are those just outlined, viz. the recognition of the 
suffering inflicted by members of the own group, so that the belief in the 
moral superiority of the own side can become eroded. At the same time, a 
heightened awareness for the sufferings brought about by the past war casts 
doubt on the legitimacy of war on a general level, even when waged in the 
faith of defence.  
The following section will address how societal processes of reflecting on 
national histories of wars and cohabitation can inform the envisioning of 
future forms of cohabitation.  
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I.D) Learning from the past and planning for the future:  
creating spaces for joint intergroup reflections on the past of 
the societies; envisioning desired future societal states, which 
can support the discovery and development of common values 
 
Addressing past war events is not only essential on a personal level, as was 
covered in section .B, but also on a societal level. The preceding section .C 
focused on processes which support the recognition of others’ victimisation, 
as a pivotal element for undermining dichotomous group categorisations.  
This section further addresses societal mechanisms of dealing with the past. 
The section’s focus is on the importance of wider and more abstract societal 
reflection processes on the past. In such reflection processes, the 
perspectives for desired societal constellations can be sharpened. 
Envisioning the future can supplement these reflection processes, so that 
values for desired societal states can be discovered and developed. Central 
motivational forces underlying these reflection and envisioning processes 
are: a form of deterrence when repulsive sides of national histories are 
brought to awareness, and an appeal or attraction function of desired norms 
when societal states are envisioned.  
Engaging with the past is of course not only important for the aim of learning 
from national histories, but also for transforming those nationalist narratives 
which spawn intergroup animosities. Measures for raising awareness for the 
victimisation engendered by members of the own side – as presented in the 
previous section – are an integral part of this transformation of nationalist 
narratives. This section elucidates further measures which aim at 
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transforming nationalist narratives, while facilitating the possibility to learn 
from national histories. Bringing public attention to the malicious sides of 
national history and questioning nationalist self-serving myths, undermines 
enemy images by rendering the internal heterogeneity of groups visible, and 
by challenging the perceived moral superiority of the own group. 
Several activists warned against the dangers of neglecting to deal with the 
malicious sides of the own national history, as histories entail old fears and 
nationalist arrogance, which form the ground for hatred. Addressing the past 
of intergroup enmity is correspondingly of substantial importance for 
intergroup cohabitation, even in times when on the surface there are no 
immediate intergroup tensions visible.  
There are people who say “you should forget what happened all 
together”, I think that people should never forget what happened, but not 
on a way to get lost in the past, but learning from the past with a step 
forward. You have to really discuss what has happened and if you don’t 
discuss, sooner or later it will come again, because you just left it there, 
you didn’t discuss, always open questions, if you do not talk about what 
happened […] if you are not ready to listen, then it will never be a 
sustainable constellation, because people will say “ok, we are now 
reconciled”150 
when communists came, they had a method “we are all brothers and 
sisters, we punish the fascists, we throw them away, and now we need 
to forget what happened, because better to forget, better to not speak 
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about that ugly past, we need to build our country, to build our future on 
that.” 151  
maybe six months or a year before the war started, all sorts of issues 
from the past came un-ground. So this was the period when the 
atmosphere was pumping up with fear, with this kind of stories. There 
was “Ustasha” and there was “Chetnik” and again “Yugoslavia will fall 
apart” and “Croatians will be Ustasha, and they will redo the crimes to 
the Serbs that they did in the previous war.” and “This is what has 
happened in NDH”, this independent Croatian state during WWII, “They 
will do that”. This was just the period before the war, when this was very 
intensive […] When Vukovar fell down, it’s like one platoon of these 
people, with beards, and with a black flag, like singing, a song like “we 
will have meat, we will have meat, we will slaughter the Croats”. […] And 
these kind of symbols were re-appearing to the present. […] you can 
see, for example, black T-shirt or shirts, it’s like the symbol of the 
Ustasha […] for example, the right-wing party in Croatia, they were all, 
from the beginning, they were all in black. […] using these symbols just 
put up the flames; before the war, during the war, and for sure after the 
war the people are still speaking about what happened in Bleiburg.152 
I think it has to be realised that Eastern Croatia and pretty much all of 
Bosnia and Kosovo, as far as that’s concerned, all are powder kegs, 
waiting to explode. If they don’t explode today, they will explode in ten 
years, or 25 years, or 30 years time, if nothing is done. […] This was not 
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dealt with after the Second World War, this region; Tito swept the ethnic 
issues under the carpet, did not confront them, at the psychologically 
from the point of narratives, that’s one of the causes of this here. The 
evidence is when we seeing it now that precisely the same is happening 
now. This is a repeat of what happened after the Second World War. 
And to me it’s very worrying to watch it, extremely worrying. 153 
As nationalist narratives and intergroup hostilities appear to be still 
widespread in the societies under consideration, a process of transformation 
towards more collaborative intergroup cooperation is potentially long-term. A 
transformation is likely to require efforts on multiple levels of the societies, 
i.e. the climate would be ideally changed by grassroots activities as well as 
by supplementing top-level national policies.  
I think that politicians are a bit hostages of their own nationalistic politics. 
Because they don't allow them to make moves in the pro-peace direction 
or pro-cooperation direction, because they are afraid of the climate that 
they created themselves. […] [Politicians] are afraid of […] distancing 
themselves from nationalistic policy; so they are very cautious about, 
gradual, even those who want this, are very careful. There are some 
who don't want. And it's a process, it's a very slow process. But we can 
help them, because we can change the climate which allows more 
space, and they can help us. 154 
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The appalling aspects of national histories and the grave corollaries of past 
wars can have the function of deterrents, when a learning process is initiated 
which comprises thorough reflections on the societal pasts. These sides of 
the history are frequently ignored in a self-serving manner. Correspondingly, 
one of the basic preconditions for a learning process is to unearth the 
appalling sides of national histories, in order to counter the distorted self-
serving narratives.  
black sides of Croatian history were overshadowed by nationalistic 
euphoria and nationalistic self-advertisement or self-propaganda.155 
bringing of facts and truth about things that happened, and working on a 
different kind of social memory […] There are a lot of myths, that are 
present in the minds of the people, and too a large extends it is also 
there being built into education, there fostered through education in their 
heads, of saying myths how Serbs love freedom and their freedom-
loving nation, and they are always on the right side and the Croats are 
like this and like that, it's a kind of stupid generalisation how all nations; 
and I think it is very present still. And then a very important point I should 
have mentioned: de-victimisation. Because the process of victimisation 
is something which has grasped us all, really, all of our societies. All of 
the societies deal with victims. And if you are a victim you need help, 
and it is powerful role; because you can only bid. 156 
There is a so-called hegemony of nationalistic self-understanding, it is 
somehow a state of autism, lacking of contact with real historical and 
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political world, and that lack of responsibility, that lack of ability, that lack 
of political competence ashamed the Croats as a nation. And in that 
sense it could be told of a collective responsibility, not guilt, but I believe 
in collective responsibility.157 
that’s a very important thing in dealing with the past, because to put 
aside mythology, that’s one of the most important things […] why should 
we look into the past? Because it’s very necessary for us, because of 
our presence, to know what to do in the very short future, or long-time 
future, not only for the prevention of war, but to make us constructive 
and stable societies, healthy. […] all nations, all states have these black 
years in several parts, and if you leave them there, they will always be 
there. We need to face ourselves with our legacy, which is very rich, for 
example European, but also face ourselves with our bad things in our 
European history […] make a proper way of interpretation of me and 
past at all, and build on a healthy basis the society. And on that, you can 
build relations, individual groups, NGOs, civil society, and so on. But 
avoiding this processing makes us repeating the former mistakes.158  
 
Part of this engagement with the dark sides of history is bringing the 
destruction and sufferings, entailed by war events in general, to the surface, 
to induce a reflection on war on a general level. 
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[Members of an organisation whose relatives were killed in the war] lost 
everything, and they devote their lives now only for working on 
themselves, on dealing with the past, and sharing this mission of “it 
shouldn’t happen again.” […] to share this experience with other people 
and help other people. […] the mission is “a different world is possible”, 
“we have to stop”, “it mustn’t happen again”.159 
these forums basically went in a way that we spent about an hour on: 
four [ex-combatants] telling their stories of how they perceived things 
when the war started, why they went to war, their motivation, and how 
they see things now, a self-critical view is very important.160 
[young activists] were preparing the theatre of the oppressed throughout 
the whole training, and then they performed the “theatre of the 
oppressed” on the main square in [city] and lots of tourists and other 
people from Croatia were there, asking “what is this, what’s going on” 
and then they realised that these were the youth activists from all over 
Croatia trying to send a message about how war is stupid and silly and 
how it ruins the lives of everybody 161 
 
Another obvious requirement for a fruitful learning process consist of gaining 
a better understanding of past societal dynamics, by increasing the 
knowledge about events of the past as well as connections. On a more 
abstract level, learning from the past can occur by comparing the 
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experiences of the own country to that of others, and also by reflecting on 
values and practices of cohabitation during different historical periods of the 
own country.  
We have such a bad historical experience that there is actually so much 
to learn from it. 162 
talk about even collective: what can we do together, how can we 
approach this together, how can we look at the past […] “learning from 
the past and going toward the future”163  
I would say that what is also important is that in the human rights 
discourse, what might happen is following the justice for victims path, 
and that path has complementary spheres, so that one part is the human 
rights path, and part of justice for the victims, but the other part is 
understanding causality. Historical causality. What is actually before and 
what is after. What are causes and what are the consequences. So this 
has to be a complex process.164 
how we compare our private, group and national stories and histories 
with the groups and nations we are neighbouring with. That is the crucial 
point why I can't accept any kind of national history as valid and fruitful 
and justified in itself. I think that the danger of an auto-referential context 
of interpretation has the danger of being idiotic, of being without 
reference in context. Let us learn. […] There is half a sentence and half 
a joke, that we had a better past, and I think that there is a lot of truth in 
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such a sentence. We, as a nation, really had a better past, but that past 
was developing within an unthinkable broader geographical context. […] 
I can't see that we as a nation can properly cope with our political 
problems of so-called European integration not to keep in mind the rich 
or more fruitful part of our political heritage. […]  
many important – even crucial – parts of our recent history were not 
enough – in the sense of “factography” – known.165 
 
Some of the potential measures through which these self-serving narratives 
can be addressed were already encountered in section .B, when the 
importance of understanding the other side’s perspectives on the war was 
outlined. An exchange of perspectives seems to be an essential ingredient 
for dealing with the past, under the condition that former trust-building has 
taken place, so that the source of the alternative perspective is perceived as 
sufficiently credible. The necessity of such an exchange of concurring 
perspectives is illustrated by the previously used example of the disparate 
views on the motivations for past wars. More generally, after initial 
trustbuilding has occurred, the exchange on different perspectives held in the 
past war can impart lessons on common dynamics of war.  
their motivation, in 95% or more probably, was to defend something. If 
you ask the Bosnians, they will say the Serbs were the aggressors, they 
didn’t defend, they attacked something. But if you ask Serbs, they will 
say, we were defending our people, we were afraid that the same thing 
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would happen as in WWII, and it was violent act that Bosnia has become 
independent, because the referendum for example was boycotted by 
Serbs […] So, if this would have gone on, you know, people have seen 
in this way, or they will say, well, I was just mobilised, I didn’t want to go 
to war at all. 166  
 
As argued in previous sections, exchanges on personal experiences of war-
related violence can raise awareness for shared values, when the direct 
exposal to victims renders the consequences of violence tangible. Empathy 
is related to a sense for the moral implications of certain war events, when 
the victimisation of the other is recognised, like in the process of exchanges 
on personal sufferings discussed in previous sections. 
 
One significant way of learning from the past can be found in activities, 
presented in the preceding section, which are discussing past war actions by 
comparing the assessment of war-related actions in the abstract to concrete 
war actions in context, in order to remove double standards. Questions of 
justice as well as questions of moral rightness were not very controversial 
when discussed very abstractly, as mentioned, but much more controversial 
when discussed in the concrete context of actions of named conflict parties.  
The relatively low level of conflict in terms of abstract principles compared to 
the deep disagreements about concrete conflict situations might indicate that 
processes of emotional dismay and dehumanisation of the former enemy are 
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more decisive for the phenomenon of disagreement about the past than 
disagreements about abstract concepts of rights and justice. In other words, 
the problem seems to be more the selective application of principles of rights 
and justice, than the acceptance of the principles themselves. The own 
interests and the past suffering of the own side seem to contribute to an 
exclusion of the other side from these principles. The ethical principles 
themselves are potentially very similar.  
And when we talk of the sense of justice, 95% of the people will find that 
it is very, very similar. 167 
the potential for peace which is a huge alliance and pro-peace energy in 
the society. So if you ask people “are you for war or peace” 95% will say 
“peace” 168 
 
Another potential source for discovering a common value ground is 
constituted by the Abrahamic religions present in the region. This work is of 
special relevance when considering how differing religions can feed the field 
of contestations within evolving conflict dynamics. While religion was not 
necessarily at the heart of the conflicts in the Balkans, the fact that religious 
affiliation largely coincided with ‘ethnicity’ indicates that religion plays a role 
in the self-definitions of the respective identity groups. The religious 
differences might have functioned as mediating catalysts by deepening the 
cleavages between conflict groups and thereby contributing to escalation, 
without forming the primary field of contestation. 
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Due to this conflict-fuelling potential, religious differences deserve special 
attention within the domain of peacebuilding, which can be addressed by on 
the one hand increasing mutual understanding and respect for differences, 
and on the other hand by raising awareness for similar values:  
Not arguing about what is the best and who is right, but just being open 
and sharing my own values, and trying to hear, what are your values. 
And finding what values we have in common, what values are different, 
but still with respect. And we did work or research for aspects of 
nonviolence in our own religious background. And it was very helpful, 
because we all found tools in our faith for nonviolence. […] So we are 
now very much deeply rooted in that awareness that our personal faith is 
connected with non-violence from religious background.169 
 
Building on values which are shared amongst adherents, or ideally 
representatives, of religious communities, the awareness of a broader public 
on these fundamental commonalities can be raised by information 
campaigns:  
[T]he whole campaign was developed, which was running through 
stations, by promoting respect, by highlighting the commonalities that 
religions have, Catholic, Islam and Orthodox Church, especially on the 
topics of peace and tolerance. All of the religions do promote tolerance, 
                                            
169
 Activist I of local peacebuilding organisation A in Osijek, Croatia, May 2007 
 311 
by respecting the others, issues that they’re really highlighting in these 
media campaigns.170 
 
Some activists expressed a relatively high level of trust in the moral sense of 
the societies in terms of assessing the moral implications of violence and 
societal activism, which is indicative of activists’ trust in the broad 
dissemination and appeal of values conducive to a more peaceful 
coexistence.  
I will never tell anyone “this should be done or this is wrong” […] your 
sense of justice will tell you what to do […] And when we talk of the 
sense of justice, 95% of the people will find that it is very, very similar 
[…] then these responsibilities are re-awaken or a way to handle is re-
discovered, then it is the right thing, and then they really change habits, 
and this helps them, because they feel happier with themselves, they 
feel, they are not did something good, everybody wants to do something 
good.171 
One of the important aspect is that one does not take the events like "the 
things had to occur as it occurred", but to see, how I do something, and 
that, I would say, I have always a stomach, even if the situation for 
choice is very narrow - the final situation is that I either give my life, as 
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the most extreme, or I take this other life - this is also a choice. To put it 
very extremely.172 
 
The centrality of a discovering and developing a joint value basis – for the 
assessment of the past and as an orientation for steps into a common future 
– points back to the role of civil society as a value based enterprise.  
Civil society is deeply connected with respectfulness of so-called 
universal human values, traditionally connected with leading world 
religions, with the dignity of every human being, of life as a whole.173 
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II. Dealing with differences 
 
A few of the mechanisms which were outlined in previous sections are not 
only relevant for the reduction of intergroup animosities, but are also 
conducive to nonviolent processes of dealing with conflicts and differences in 
general. A central commonality of these spheres is that both require 
communicative practices which cultivate in-depth exchanges on experiences 
and needs for a better understanding of the other.  
Whereas the previous main section I covered mechanisms aiming for the 
reduction of generalised intergroup animosities in relation to past wars, this 
section II focuses on dealing with conflicts in general, and on dealing with 
those differences on a group level that persist even when the removal of 
animosities and intergroup trustbuilding were successful.  
Section .A addresses general mechanisms for dealing with conflicts, focusing 
on communicative practices and on the analysis of the conflict situation. 
LNGOs attempt to disseminate these mechanisms in their endeavour of 
building capacities for nonviolent ways of dealing with conflict. Section .B is 
directed towards dealing with those differences between groups persisting 
independently of the war past, by elucidating similarities and differences, by 
searching for common values, and by considering options of cohabitation.  
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II.A) General mechanisms for dealing with conflicts  
This section presents communicative and analytical practices for addressing 
conflict situations, spread by LNGOs in their attempt to build capacities for 
dealing with conflicts, in order to counter the societal roots of forceful ways of 
conflict handling. These practices are disseminated during a variety of 
activities of LNGOs, whose main topic stretches across e.g. inter-religious 
dialogue, forums on community problems, leisure programmes for 
youngsters, or mediation in interpersonal problems. Underlying some of 
these LNGO measures is the rationale that a thorough societal presence of 
these skills would ideally substitute the occurrence of violence as a means 
for addressing conflicts.  
this peace work happens during times of peace; now, when there is no 
war. Now I am doing the exercises, now I am fortifying myself, when I 
calmly train my composure by skills. Since, when a critical situation 
arises, then I have rehearsed steps, like in case of, I don't know, Aikido 
or something like that […] This is also the case for trainings for non-
violence. I am practising now in times of peace, and not "now there is no 
war, now no problem” […] Then these various political quarrels are 
arising; then, when it is going too far, then suddenly the people take 
knives or arms. Also for violence, everyday, in the traffic, in companies, 
oppression and so on, and that is "yes, one has to" and that's it. It has 
not to be.174 
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It was emphasised, however, that a societal – and even an individual – 
change in communicative practices should be conceived as a project with a 
distant time horizon.  
for nine months we cannot give the culture of the debate, the culture of 
education or something like that. […] But we think that we did a very 
good job with that project, but we must have in mind that it’s not good to 
stop this kind of work with the people.175  
when you are a little bit relaxed, you don’t [engage in learnt nonviolent 
practices for dealing with conflicts]. I want that to be an integrated part of 
me […] I think that really you need much experience, […] because, when 
you grow up, you just have a kind of patterns imposed to you. […] it’s a 
way of life that I’m still learning and would like to accept fully, because 
it’s just opening the doors to a different kind of world that we are now 
living in. […] I can’t say you just learn mediation 176 
 
Amongst the principles which are taught during some of the LNGO activities 
is an integral principle which is reminiscent of – and partially referring to – an 
element of Lederach’s (2003, 2006) “conflict transformation”, i.e. the principle 
to approach conflicts with the attitude that conflicts are an inherent part of 
human interaction, which should be approached with a problem-oriented 
mind-set, instead of defining the co-conflictant as a threatening problem.  
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we have some rules of communication, “we will not attack the person, 
but the problem” […] avoiding the term conflict resolution because 
conflict is encountered in everyday life 177 
We state times and again that our vision is not to drive away the conflict, 
but to transform the conflicts. And the conflicts in turn are always new 
possibilities to start something together; so, not "you are the problem" or 
"I", but that "we" have a problem. And it will always be like that, in the 
future. But what do I do, what do you do in the future, that's what is 
important; explain or act anyhow. In this direction, that a conflict is 
approached without fear, […] approaching it without 
judging/condemning.178 
 
Emphasised as significant for dealing with conflicts in general were (similar 
to the principles when having exchanges on severe war experiences 
mentioned in section I.B): Establishing a communicative framework with an 
emphasis on listening and I-messages as parts of “non-violent 
communication” (as partially inspired by Rosenberg, 1983). This can be 
conducive to exchanges on personal perspectives and to the expression of 
wishes and needs, as a precondition for mutual understanding and 
subsequent cooperative problem solving. In dealing with conflicts which 
involve disagreements about concrete events or arrangements, the analysis 
of underlying interests and needs can facilitate the search for 
accommodation. 
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nobody should interrupt anybody, we should all raise our hands in order 
to speak up, I should talk from my own shoes, in my own name, trying 
not to use “we this, we that, we think, we should”, but talking from the I-
perspective, “I would like to do this and that” […] we teach active 
listening […] “I”-speech-messages, […] empathy […] As long as we think 
and use this methodology of nonviolent communication, we can 
transform conflict, so it's really connected. […] What are our needs 179 
[when consciously working as an LNGO activist on conflicts,] I listen 
better, and I try to speak non-violently, ask open questions, everything 
that I learnt. […] Focus [...] on what she wants to tell me, what if she is 
angry, what needs are behind180 
we are working on the communication and repeat times and again "it is 
not only important, what you want to say, but how you say it, so that it is 
received what you want to say."181 
Three elements [of peace education]: How to deal with strong emotions 
and trauma, communication and theory of conflict transformation. When I 
said communication, I think really an element of compassionate 
communication, non-violent and compassionate [in the sense of] 
listening with empathy, active listening with empathy. Recognition and 
expression of emotions and needs.182 
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The orientation on a analysis of aspirations and needs is of course traceable 
to Burton’s (e.g. 1990, 1997) idea that a conflict between interests can be 
solved when looking and underlying needs. LNGO activists, however, did not 
refer to a set of fixed “basic” needs, as conceived by Burton (1990, 1997; cf. 
Azar, 1986, Kelman, 1999), but were more open in their description of 
analysis.  
win-win approach, meaning to fulfil needs of both sides 183 
[a method in the process of mediation] often is summarizing and then in 
that way talking or making a list of needs and interests […] most of the 
time they have similar interests, in some cases, and that what is 
important for them, needs and maybe values that they would like to, they 
are also pretty much similar sometimes. And then when we go to 
solutions184 
working creatively with the conflict for us; that you are listening to the 
other, and then you are getting the ideas, that you are listening to 
yourself, what [B] is talking about, about needs, that you have a vision at 
all, that you can do something new, not only what you are used to, but 
you listen into yourself and you see "ah, I also have this option" 185 
 
Whether needs can be conceptualised as “basic” and universal – as opposed 
to individual or culturally idiosyncratic – is partially related to the level of 
abstraction on which needs are formulated.  
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you can formulate a need on different levels. All needs that can be said 
through words can be maybe put down to several basic needs, I don’t 
know, but I’m not writing on a flipchart just, I don’t know, security or 
recognition, just that. We are trying to use their words […] for example, “I 
have heard that you are really concerned about your kids, you are 
concerned about their security” or “their financial difficulties”. So I put it 
more in this concrete sense, related to the case, not just in general, 
need. […] “you have a need to have a good relationship with your ex-
wife and to be able to talk to your ex-wife”. It doesn’t have to be, “you 
need recognition from your wife”, but it can be. But it’s not just 
recognition or just, I wouldn’t write, human relations or, but I would make 
it more concrete. 186 
This statement points to a central ramification in theories of universal human 
needs. Burton’s (1990, 1997) “relationship needs” – i.e. “recognition”, 
“security”, and “identity” (amongst his “basic needs”) – are formulated so 
abstractly that they allow the subsuming of a very wide array of aspirations 
under these concepts. This abstract formulation renders the concept rather 
resistant towards falsification, while entailing that the meaning of the 
concepts becomes very diffuse or even empty. As was apparent in the 
community projects presented in section I.A2, as well as in the statement just 
quoted, LNGOs conduct laborious analyses of needs and aspirations, in 
order to find commonalities which are more concrete than those listed by 
Burton. Thereby doubt is cast on the usefulness of Burton’s reference to 
“basic needs”.  
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The approach of cultivating open communication for an in-depth analysis of 
needs and aspirations is obviously only viable when communication partners 
are willing to engage in an open exchange. This willingness can be limited 
due to emotional involvement in the topic and/or spirited attitude towards the 
respective other.  
we did set up this, but you know how it goes, I mean, in these things, 
when people are not so motivated for the process to end constructively, 
they then stop respecting rules at one point.187 
 
When the animosity between conflictants is primarily rooted in an enmity 
directed towards the outgroup, then trustbuilding measures as those 
presented across section I might be required. When, in contrast, the 
animosities are primarily related to the conflictants’ emotional involvement in 
the topic, calm and patient listening and directing conflictants’ attention 
towards a concrete wish for change might be helpful.  
[when encountering furious individuals] be calm 188 
[in such situations of hostilities] remain calm and try to talk to the people. 
I would ask them what is the problem and to tell me more about what 
upset them and trying to think out loud and I need trying to think with 
them what can be done 189 
There were sometimes moments when people were very angry, but then 
always the group gathered, and then tried to solve this problem […] “ok, 
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what is your problem? If it's something personal, let's solve that. What do 
you want to do, how do you to change?” 190 
 
When the cleavages between adversaries are very deep, it might be 
impossible to reach any kind of arrangement by a short-term approach. In 
such situations, it appears to be helpful when a mediation is conducted by 
individuals who are already situated in an intermediary position, i.e. who are 
possessing thorough pre-existing relationship to conflict parties. Additionally, 
some constellations might require long-term trustbuilding measures which 
are external to the actual conflict topic, to the effect that the actual conflict 
handling needs to be deferred to a later phase. (This approach has its 
parallels in the community projects, section I.A, and in the projects with ex-
combatants and war victims, I.B, as in all these cases trustbuilding measures 
are preceding the handling of the conflict’s core.) 
[there was agreement] that some young people will do a graffiti on the 
school walls. […] They did the graffiti, but then the school and the 
neighbours around didn’t like the graffiti […] so they wanted to paint it 
over. So there was a big fight […] We tried to have a real mediation, but 
it didn’t work out […] Then the parents were the main agents, key actors, 
in the process, because they were a kind of link between the neighbours 
and the kids […] this graffiti stayed, nobody touched it. Afterwards, it kind 
of came down. We did also some gatherings and public actions of 
cleaning the parks, and things around the area, so everybody was kind 
of calming down, seeing that kids are actually doing a good thing. […] 
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over the time, [the neighbours] kind of stopped looking at [the graffiti] as 
an enemy or anything, they stopped, and I think that parents talked to 
the problematic neighbours about it and trying to explain to them what is 
it about, I think this was the main thing. 191 
if you want to start dialogue with the a completely opposite group, 
effectively it is impossible to start immediately with them […] your 
message should be taken to them by this intermediate group, and then 
feedback should also, and intensifying this kind of process, then either of 
them will go into this mid-space of dialogue 192 
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II.B) Dealing with deep intergroup differences 
Even when measures aiming at the reduction of enmity – such as those 
presented in section I – have been successful, there can be intergroup 
differences which persist, and which cannot be sufficiently addressed by 
looking at underlying needs and aspirations. When dealing with cultural and 
religious differences, the following measures are possibly conducive to 
peaceful cohabitation:  
1) Fostering the exploration of intergroup commonalities and differences  
2) If disagreements remain despite a basic understanding of the differences, 
tolerating these differences in values, practices, and beliefs is one route 
towards cohabitation; this tolerance can be based on respect following from 
understanding the background of these differences, and on an acceptance of 
differing beliefs as equal in valence  
3) Discover joint values within intergroup exchanges to raise awareness for 
normative commonalities and for options of cohabitation with differences; 
disagreements which cannot be solved might be continued within an 
accepted communicative framework which is based on these shared values 
 
1) Fostering the exploration of intergroup commonalities and differences  
One family of measures aims to elucidate commonalities and differences 
between groups. An improved understanding of the intergroup contrasts and 
overlaps could ideally remove wrong assumptions/stereotypes about the 
other group and assist in the understanding of the details of differences in 
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values and practices. This could contribute to reducing alienation and 
encourage re-humanisation. 
Part of the exploration process on commonalities and differences between 
groups consists of raising awareness for the content of stereotypes and 
having exchanges on this content, in order to let the other stereotyped side 
correct misinformation.  
Knowledge and also exercises about personal, for example, cultural 
differences, or prejudices or, for example, hooks and triggers for me, 
what would trigger me into some reaction193 
talk about these prejudices, which exist in our societies, write them 
down. What are the Albanians like, what do you hear? Write them down, 
so purely Serbian group, purely Albanian group on the others or stuff like 
that. […] when people hear, they get sometimes offended or aggressive 
about it. And it is a shock, it is also a shock for those that have written, 
because for them they hear it all the time in their environment, and now 
somebody from the other side hears it and is certainly totally offended, 
they are totally unaware how others perceive this. It is really not that 
much bad intention, it is just that, say some sick climate, which is still 
holding on from the war time, that people do not really question […] We 
talk about it 194 
we can list what did you think about the others side, […] to let them first 
list the stereotypes, and then giving the other side the chance to explain 
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what it is, what was wrongly informed, providing the right data first hand 
for each other 195 
people can exchange all this and they have the information from the first 
hand. And may people haven't ever met other people from the different 
side. For example, someone never met someone from the Albanian side 
196 
 
Providing first hand information is not only useful to correct stereotypes, but 
also to foster an in-depth understanding of intergroup similarities and 
differences in the domain of culture or religion.  
 
you can talk about our differences, building trust, listen that I am 
Croatian […] I like these songs […] [show] our differences197 
finding what values we have in common, what values are different […] 
we did ask Muslim representatives about [Sharia] […] about marriage 
[…] We discussed and we asked questions, because it was new for us 
and we wanted to learn more about that, but it was interesting for us […] 
we discussed about trinity and other theological things, and then we 
realised from the Christian side that for [the Muslim side] it’s very strange 
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[…] they probably heard some misinformation about that, and we were 
glad that we asked and that we can say how. 198 
In this inter-religious encounter [….] “how do I express my problem and 
how do express what I appreciate on you” in an I-form. And then 
something follows which is called “the hot chair” […] that means, 
everyone can sit down on the chair, for example, I sit down, and 
everybody in the group may ask me something about my belief, what he 
is interested in. 199 
 
The subsequent sections will outline strategies for dealing with those 
differences between groups which remain after a deeper understanding of 
the positions, practices, and beliefs has been reached. 
 
2) If disagreements remain despite a basic understanding of the 
differences, tolerating these differences in values, practices, and 
beliefs is one route towards cohabitation; this tolerance can be 
based on respect following from understanding the background of 
these differences, and on an acceptance of differing beliefs as equal 
in valence  
For dealing with those intergroup differences in values or attitudes which 
persist or become apparent during intergroup dialogues, the normative 
framework of the encounter setting focuses on an exploration of the 
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differences, instead of on attempting persuasion. Apparently, a balance can 
be reached in which enraged debates are avoided while giving space for the 
expression of disturbances. By focusing on exploration, allowing the 
expression of disturbances, and avoiding a confrontational style, respect for 
each others’ positions can be implied in the communicative framework.  
if [tensions occur] within the workshops, then it is the topic. E.g. on the 
last day about this question, “is peace only the peace of Jesus”, it came 
up, the Muslims said “well, but this is a view which is sound for you, but 
not for me”; and then this exchange is supported by us, mostly by 
questions, until the different opinions are clear, and then by a 
summary.200 
trying to hear, what are your values, and finding what values we have in 
common, what values are different, but still with respect […] so we did 
disagree about some things, but […] we did not try to persuade someone 
that they should think like everyone else, we did give freedom for 
different opinions, tolerance. But we did have open discussion about 
everything we wanted to discuss. […] the workshop was not organised in 
the way of arguing, but in a way of sharing and asking question […] we 
did talk a lot, but we never fought 201 
And there are these hot issues. And then we discuss them, our 
perceptions of it. So not persuading each other that they are wrong, not 
referring to each other, but saying, how to I perceive things, and why. 
That's important. […] when we are fostering criticism and confrontations 
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in a constructive manner, not trying to persuade each other, but also 
trying to hear, but expressing our disturbance, our standpoints and 
reasons for that, is the way to deal, bring it out, put your cards on the 
table.202 
 
In some cases in which a disagreement in values remains, promoting 
attitudes of equipollency between values, i.e. disbanding the ranking of 
particular values, could be an option. This stance towards values and beliefs, 
regarding them as of non-ordinal valence, potentially enables to live with 
diverse values and beliefs, provided that the values and beliefs under 
consideration are regarded to be compatible.  
we were more focused on interreligious cooperation and dialogue [...] 
Not arguing about what is the best and which is, who is, right, but just 
being open and sharing my own values, and trying to hear what are your 
values. 203 
A similar principle, but more comprehensive in the valance implication, is the 
attempt during peace education with children to foster an understanding of 
differences while imparting to the participants a sense of full recognition of 
each person.  
you have a line of exercises were you are showing to the kids that we 
are all different but all important204 
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The position of accepting differing values and beliefs as equal can be 
encouraged by initiating reflection processes on the relative importance of 
these values and beliefs.  
when […] you say, "this is the best", then I can ask you or the group, 
"why is it so important to you, that you are in the superlative, why cannot 
you say, that it is good, why do you need the best?"205 
 
Another possible element for disseminating the equal acceptance of different 
values is constituted by awareness raising for the potentially forceful and 
narrow-focused nature of declaring one’s values as more important than 
others.  
It is often the case that they do not perceive this forcing of it on others; 
they are occupied so much by the fact that it is the choice for them, and 
they are so confident in their choice, that they do not take care of the 
other people, how is it received.206 
Even when an exchange does not precipitate an immediate acceptance of 
the valence of multiple values, there is some possibility that the auditing of 
new perspectives could lead to some change in the long-term.  
one person, times and again: […] “but after all truth is...” and so on. 
However, this is not like it was before, when he did not talk to anybody 
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about this, now we have various, several people, and then, by this 
interaction, he got new aspects; and he will then brood on it.207 
 
Having an exchange on the background of values, as on the reasons why 
certain values are important for the people concerned, might be able to 
assist in the acceptance of disparate values as not being suitable for 
rankings. As soon as the importance of the disparate values are mutually 
accepted, there is scope for planning on a future of cohabitation in which 
these diverging values can be accommodated.  
The answer would be tolerance […] when we discussed our theology, 
[…] all of us did have emphasis on some parts […] we don't comment 
your values. Each person talked about their own values, and then if you 
hear it from the person whose values they are, and how important they 
are for that person, you can only see that it is important for that person. 
208 
it happens easily that I take something which I see as positive, in order 
to force it on you, because it is good. On what we are working is “how 
can I stick to that which I find good, and follow that, and at the same time 
give some space to you, so that the things may occur, which are wanted 
by you.” 209 
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through the workshops we try to exercise with them […] how can they 
affirm their identity, and still be cooperative with others to, how they can 
be tolerant, and still don’t lose their own identity.210 
 
3) Discover joint values within intergroup exchanges to raise awareness 
for normative commonalities and for options of cohabitation with 
differences; disagreements which cannot be solved might be 
continued within an accepted communicative framework which is 
based on these shared values 
Section I.D discussed how common values can be discovered in a process 
of reflection on the past and when envisioning a common future of 
cohabitation. Such common values are particularly relevant when intergroup 
differences are remaining in spite of extensive exchanges aimed at mutual 
understanding. While raising awareness for commonalities on the one hand 
contributes to a reduction of alienation, it also potentially enables envisioning 
arrangements of living with the persisting differences.  
The principle possibility for finding common values amongst individuals and 
groups could be closely related to the appeal of values, which was already 
addressed in preceding chapters. It was mentioned previously that even 
some of those individuals described as extremists do not feel comfortable in 
their position of animosity. This can be interpreted as suggestive of a wide-
spread desire for peaceful co-existence. Other statements referred to shared 
values more directly.  
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Sometimes, when you come with a, let’s say “extremist” […] for example 
people just use some phrases, like “all Serbs” or “all Croats are bad”, 
“they disgust me” […] But really in everyday life maybe he is not so 
extreme, because he has one neighbour who […] when he was little that 
he was taking care of them and helping them and giving them candies, 
and he said “but (name) is OK” […] this feeling of aggressiveness, it’s 
not a good feeling, and you don’t feel comfortable if you are always 
angry; no, people don’t want to feel like that. But you find a support, 
spend some time with them to understand why they are speaking like 
that, and then, for the other half of their being to go front. It’s like mad 
Max, I will be mad Max outside, but inside I’m something different. 211 
I don’t think that many people hate, because first of all it’s difficult for 
them, it’s difficult to live with that. And it’s also with deflexed reality, that 
many people hate. At the moment it’s probably, when they feel or hear 
something or do something that emotionally really hurts them, then 
probably yes. But, it is not an attitude or ideology they would stand for. 
212 
the potential for peace which is a huge alliance and pro-peace energy in 
the society. So if you ask people “are you for war or peace” 95% will say 
“peace” […] and when we talk of the sense of justice, 95% of the people 
will find that it is very, very similar.213 
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Someone said I have been raped, I have been beaten, I lost my family, 
because my mother, father, or children have been killed. Both had a 
problem that this happened214 
I’m attempting in my work to give people a chance to make up their own 
decisions. [...] Let’s discuss it, let’s look at it from different perspectives, 
and then your sense of justice will tell you what to do, or what to change 
in your life, in your attitudes. […] when these responsibilities are re-
awaken or a way to handle is re-discovered, then it is the right thing, and 
then they really change habits, and this helps them, because they feel 
happier with themselves […] everybody wants to do something good.215 
these theories of peace and war […] peace in general, what is peace, 
what is war […] this educational progress – cannot cure them, of course, 
because it’s so a big trauma inside - but it’s a little easier to live for them, 
and explain themselves something, and to believe in some other 
possibilities of theory and practise.216 
These references to a wide-spread sense for common values – whether this 
common sense is regarded as cultural or as quasi-universal – is a potential 
basis for planning future societal arrangements, as discussed in section I.D. 
Common values which are discovered and developed by reflecting on the 
past and envisioning the future can function as basic principles for future 
cohabitation. These principles can then suggest arrangements for dealing 
with differences, such as value differences between religions. During LNGOs 
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projects on inter-religious dialogue, common values of tolerance, respect, 
and non-violence were emphasised, implying that these value commonalities 
are sufficient in terms of suggesting to deal with persisting differences non-
violently. At the same time, finding common values can hint at areas of 
collaboration, as is apparent in the following quotations (partially mentioned 
above), with the potential of reducing alienation and mistrust.  
And actually one comes back to this non-violence times and again, in 
order to liven up, activate non-violence in the inter-religious dialogue217 
we did work or research for groups of nonviolence in our own religious 
background. And it was very helpful, because we all found that the tools 
in our faith for nonviolence. So it was very interesting for me, very nice. 
So, I think it was very successful for all of us who participated, so we are 
now very much deeply rooted in that awareness that our faith, personal 
faith is connected with non-violence from a religious background. 218 
they also had [in school] this project, respecting the others’ religions, 
beliefs and customs […] It’s very interesting, because the graveyards in 
Mitrovica are in the opposite side. Albanians who are Muslims, that they 
have their graveyards on the North, while the Serbians who are 
Orthodox, the graveyard is in the South. […] Those graveyards are 
desecrated or not properly maintained, and the [youth initiative] actually 
developed a campaign by demanding from the local authorities to have 
much better care about the graveyards, by preventing the people to 
desecrate or destroy the graveyards, by ordering people to take actions 
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in cleaning the graveyards, by respecting the other ones’ beliefs and 
religions. […] the whole campaign was developed, which was running 
through stations, by promoting respect, by highlighting the 
commonalities, the promotions that religions have, Catholic, Islam and 
Orthodox Church, especially on the topics of peace and tolerance. All of 
the religions do promote tolerance, by respecting the others, it’s already, 
issues that they’re really highlighting in these media campaign. 219 
 
Even after a deeper understanding of intergroup differences has been 
reached, and even when there is an agreement that dealing with differences 
should be based on the principles of non-violence and mutual respect, some 
differences can persist whose tolerance can be hard for some individuals or 
groups. In cases in which the equal valence of different positions cannot be 
accepted because of stark incompatibilities inherent in these values, an 
option could be to continue the controversy non-violently in a framework of 
exchange, while bringing forward the own conviction.  
Previously cited statements suggested that such a communicate framework 
needs to be characterised by an emphasis on listening and expression of the 
own conviction, while refraining from directly endeavouring persuasion. 
However, there is no obvious border between attempts of convincing the 
other and expressing the own position and disturbances. Decisive is 
probably the form of communication, which should manifest sufficient mutual 
respect, so that the focus of the discussion remains on exchange within a 
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cooperative atmosphere, without sliding into an enraged debate. Defending 
the own challenged values was described by some LNGOs as part of the 
journey towards a more peaceful society, under the condition that such a 
communicative atmosphere oriented on exchange is created.  
people will really understand that your message and your attitude is 
nonviolent, human, strong, you will not allow anything, if you are with this 
group [of nationalists] “ah” [applauding], that is not respectful, that is not 
principled, moral, but if you create the atmosphere that you can with the 
opposition talk and discuss or even work together, knowing that there is 
an area for not only negotiation, but for quarrel 220 
we had a discussion on the action "storm", military action storm of 
Croatia […] So 150 000 people fled […] And I said, for me it's a synonym 
for violence; burned houses, murders of civilians, hundreds of thousands 
of refugees […] expressing our disturbance, our standpoints and 
reasons for that, is the way to deal, bring it out, put your cards on the 
table 221 
it is important for me to bear witness, why violence is not an option for 
me, but also to bear witness, that I do respect other options. […] 
However, at the same time, I understand my role, my activity, that I say 
openly and clearly, why violence is not an option for me.222 
These references to the activists’ readiness of defending the own 
peacebuilding values is indicative of their trust in this value foundation. It can 
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also be related to the wide-spread appeal of some values, on whose basis 
multiple peacebuilding activities appear to rest, as outlined above. Thereby, 
this readiness to vouch for the own value basis is reminiscent of one of the 
tenets of this dissertation, i.e. it is a reminder to the principle that any 
peacebuilding activity – by belonging to the class of activities striving for 
change – is inherently a norm-guided activity. The desired approximate 
direction of peacebuilding activities (and research) is thereby set in advance 
to the activity.  
The mechanisms leading towards these normative aims, however, are 
maybe not fixed, but must be investigated in interaction with the societal 
groups under consideration. Such investigations inform thereupon the factual 
assumptions on viable ways of peacebuilding. This dissertation contributes to 
this investigation by having examined the experiences of LNGOs activists 
whose factual assumptions on peacebuilding mechanisms developed in 
long-term interactions with their respective recipient groups. As argued 
above, human action without values would be void of direction, and without 
factual assumptions it would be void of a way. Values and factual beliefs are 
therefore forming jointly the inevitable basis on which action (and language) 
become possible.  
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Discussion 
Introduction 
Moving war-shattered societies from intergroup animosities towards more 
peaceful interactions, as a strongly normative vision of social change, is a 
long-term endeavour, requiring peacebuilding activities which involve 
manifold sections of the societies concerned. Most of the multiple activities 
presented in the previous chapter could only address a small proportion of 
the general population and could correspondingly be labelled as piecemeal. 
The experiences of NGO activists were, however, frequently formed in the 
course of year-long engagement with various communities and groups, 
thereby embodying cycles of action and reflection. Correspondingly, such 
experiences can provide points of departure for reconsidering classical 
theories of conflict resolution and peacebuilding.  
Like all locally and numerically bound studies, the presented research project 
can obviously not claim to engender sweeping conclusions in the form of 
general corroborated theories, since the local and historical/temporal 
conditions of the investigated contexts as well as the interview settings could 
have been peculiar. Some of the investigated activists’ experiences, 
however, cast doubt on some details of existent theories on intergroup 
relations and peacebuilding, to the effect that the study contributes some 
small building blocks to the wider circle of theory development and research, 
not least possessing heuristic value for future research on peacebuilding 
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practices by suggesting to pay some attention towards potential relationships 
between specified elements of peacebuilding.  
As presented, the research project was situated in the wider framework of 
peacebuilding, conceptualised as moving societies from intergroup enmity 
towards – ideally – peaceful cohabitation. The research foci were specifically 
looking at the following broad areas: I) Improving intergroup relations by 
reducing enmity and by challenging dichotomous group categorisations, and 
II) Dealing with differences. The link between these areas on the research 
agenda is that even after intergroup prejudices and mistrust have been 
reduced, there will remain differences within and between groups which are 
the potential breeding ground for further animosities with the danger of 
drastic escalation, as long as adversarial conflict handling styles continue to 
be wide-spread. On the normative side, the wider aims of peacebuilding, 
when understood as comprising the acceptance of the others’ possession of 
equal rights, imply that “solving” conflicts by the imposition of the more 
powerful is not an option. Correspondingly, the research project also 
comprised an investigation on potential mechanisms for dealing with inter- 
and intragroup differences.  
The following sections will discuss the implications of the produced research 
outcomes in relation to theory development, structured thematically. It will 
commence by analysing ramifications concerning theories on 
prejudice/stereotype reduction, followed by an examination of classical 
conflict theories in the light of the research outcomes, and conclude by a 
discussion on potential processes for dealing with deep disagreements.  
 340 
Improving intergroup relations by eroding enmity 
A frequently misunderstood foundational theory on the reduction of 
intergroup animosities is the so-called “contact hypothesis”, established by 
Allport (1954; reviewed in Brown, 2000, and Kassin et al. 2008). As 
presented in the first chapter of this thesis, the contact hypothesis was 
formulated at the time when the US Supreme Court’s ruling in 1954 
instigated the de-segregation of schools (Stephan & Stephan, 1996; Brown, 
2000). Initially, however, desegregation did not procure clear positive results 
in terms of intergroup relations (Stephan and Stephan, 1996: 78). This 
experience in combination with further studies led to scepticism on whether 
contact was useful at all in reducing enmity.  
The original contact hypothesis, however, does not assert that mere contact 
is sufficient, but contains conditions to be fulfilled for the intergroup contact to 
be successful, like “personal interaction” and “cooperative activities” around 
a “superordinate goal” (Kassin et al., 2008: 173), and a “prolonged” period of 
contact (Brown, 2000: 342). A classical study of Sherif et al., (1961) suggests 
that the cooperation around superordinate goals can indeed have some 
potential of improving even erstwhile hostile group interactions, and Stephan 
& Stephan (1996: 64) reviewed more recent studies which “provide strong 
support for the proposition that intergroup cooperation improves intergroup 
relations.” This potential effect of cooperation appears to be dependent on 
further framework conditions, as e.g. the cooperation has to be successful in 
the eyes of the participating group members (Schofield & Eurich-Fulcer, 
2004; Deutsch, 2000).  
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Extant theories of intergroup encounter settings for the reduction of 
prejudices reviewed 
Even if intergroup encounters are successful in reducing prejudices towards 
fellow participants, this does not imply that participants are in general less 
prejudiced towards members of the other group. “Even under the best of 
conditions, the changes in attitudes toward individual outgroup members 
brought about by cooperation may not generalize to the outgroup as a whole” 
(Stephan & Stephan, 1996: 64). As mentioned in the first theory chapter, 
Brown (2000) discusses four attempts of coping with this problem of 
generalisation, all of which “try to change the salience of existing group 
identities” (ibid.: 347), viz. “decategorisation”, “recategorisation”, a third 
approach relying on the salience of the problematic group membership 
during intergroup contact, and, as a variety of this third approach, the “dual 
identity approach” (ibid.: 347-60): 
The “decategorisation” approach tries to shape the intergroup encounter as 
personal as possible, so that the salience of the group membership is 
reduced. It is based on the rationale that when group members get to know 
each other as individuals, discriminatory behaviour towards outgroup 
members will be diminished, as the attention of the participants is supposed 
to be focused away from the group stereotypes to an interpersonal level. In 
this vein, Stephan & Stephan (1996: 66-7) claim that “considerable research 
indicates that providing people with information about the behaviour of 
individual group members influences judgments of those individuals and that 
social categories are de-emphasized in this process.”  
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The “recategorisation” approach shares with the former approach the idea 
that reducing the salience of the group memberships is beneficial for the 
intergroup relations. In contrast to the endeavour of “decategorisation”, 
however, which attempts to eclipse group categories, when aiming at 
“recategorisation” it is tried to induce among participants a feeling of 
belongingness to a common group. Kassin et al. (2008) for example claim 
that “the experience of intergroup cooperation increases the sense of 
belonging to a single superordinate group” (ibid.: 295).  
The fact that both decategorisation and recategorisation rely on the rationale 
of reducing prevalent group categories is seen by Brown (2000: 349) as 
problematic in terms of possible generalisation. When the tangibility of the 
group membership of participants is minimised, the chances for extrapolating 
positive encounter experiences towards outgroup members are likely to be 
diminished. Correspondingly, Brown (2000: 352-3) delineates a third 
approach – termed in this thesis “group membership salience approach”. 
This approach is supported by studies suggesting that cooperative 
interactions with outgroup members lead to more positive generalised 
attitudes towards the outgroup when the group belongingness of this 
outgroup still possesses some salience.  
This result in turn points to the possibility of a “dual identity approach”, in 
which it is tried to “[maintain] some degree of subgroup distinctiveness within 
a strong superordinate identity” (Brown, 2000: 356; original emphasis). This 
approach was investigated through special constellations which comprise not 
only that the original group identities remain visible, but also that each group 
or participant is able to uniquely contribute to the group effort by means of 
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individual knowledge or skills which relate to their original group membership 
(ibid.: 256-7). 
Discussing the relative merits of these approaches, Brown (ibid.: 354-5) 
indicates that the effectiveness of the decategorisation approach is 
questionable, as those studies supporting this approach “mostly employed 
ad hoc laboratory groups”. In “real intergroup contexts” (ibid.) group identities 
are likely to be much more significant for group members, so that the 
relevance of these studies for intergroup conflict situations is limited.  
The recategorisation approach is better supported by empirical findings 
(Brown, 2000: 355-6), but only as far as the reduction of prejudice towards 
those directly encountered is concerned. In contrast, the generalisation 
capacity inherent in this approach is weak empirically, and put in doubt by 
Brown (ibid.: 349-54, 356) on conceptual-logical grounds, i.e. due to 
recategorisation’s mentioned reliance on reducing the salience of the original 
group memberships. 
Based on the idea that reduced visibility of the group memberships is 
responsible for a lack of generalisation capacity, the remaining two 
approaches (i.e. the “group membership salience approach” and the “dual 
identity approach”) attempt to retain the tangibility of the original groups 
during the intergroup encounter. One of the problems with this suggestion is 
that intergroup encounters can be perceived as threatening, so that the 
encounter situation has a higher risk of being experienced as unpleasant 
(Brown, 2000: 345, 354). This could be especially detrimental, as the 
strength of this approach, viz. the generalisation capacity of encounter 
experiences, can turn into a serious weakness when severe intergroup 
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differences and antipathies appear during intergroup encounters, so that 
“negative attitudes can be generalized. Indeed, if the cooperative interaction 
goes wrong […] then structuring the interaction at the intergroup level could 
well make matters worse” (Brown, 353). Due to the intrinsic difficulties of 
every one of these approaches, Brown (2000: 360) concludes that “some 
combination of them” might be the best option, without specifying how such a 
combination could look like.  
The following section will discuss these approaches further in the light of the 
study underlying this thesis, indicating potential combinations of the 
mentioned approaches, accompanied by additional potential mechanisms for 
reducing intergroup enmity.  
 
Models for the reduction of prejudices reconsidered  
The NGO activities presented in the preceding chapter comprised a broad 
variety of measures for reducing intergroup hostilities. While some aspects of 
these measures coincide conceptually with the approaches just described, 
the projects as a whole embodied particular varieties and combinations of 
approaches, supplemented by further measures. In particular, several 
projects entailed a combination of the “group membership salience 
approach” with mechanisms from either decategorisation or recategorisation 
approaches, or both sequentially. From crossing aspects from the de- and 
recategorisation approaches with high vs. low group salience result the 
following additional categories, forming part of a more comprehensive 
taxonomy which does better justice to the NGO projects:  
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The personalisation approaches:  
 Classical Decategorisation approach: in the form of 
personalisation/“getting to know the other” combined with low group 
salience during an encounter setting, steering the attention towards an 
interpersonal level (Stephan & Stephan, 1996; Brown, 2000) to 
individualise the group members 
 Fragmentation/ Internal Heterogeneity approach: 
Personalisation/Getting to Know combined with high salience of the 
original groups, focusing e.g. on personal war-related experiences in 
order to individualise group members while their group membership is 
conspicuous, so that the internal heterogeneity of groups is more 
obvious. The difference to Brown’s “group salience approach” (2000: 
352-3) is that the emphasis in case of the “internal heterogeneity 
approach” is on the exchange on personal experiences, feelings and 
motivations, instead of relying on cooperative interaction around an 
arbitrary task.  
Both of these forms of personalisation provide personalised information, 
which can entail that commonalities which are cross-cutting the nominal 
group memberships can become visible.  
 
The “superordinate group” approaches:  
 Classical Recategorisation approach: offering a superordinate group 
identity which substitutes for individual group identities, with low 
salience of the original groups, attempting to support “the sense of 
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belonging to a single superordinate group” by for example “the 
experience of intergroup cooperation” on a shared goal (Kassin et al. 
2008: 295) 
 Multiple group identities approach: offering superordinate identities 
while the original nominal group memberships are salient 
o one variety of this approach corresponds to the “dual identity 
approach” (Brown, 2000: 356) from above; within this 
dissertation’s study, this approach is exercised when e.g. 
similar people (youngsters, ex-combatants, war victims) from 
various groups are joined while the nominal ethnic group 
membership is a topic of exchange;  
o another variety of this approach is the “manifold identity 
approach”, when original group memberships remain salient 
while exchanges unearth multiple cross-cutting commonalities; 
this variety can ensue from the “personalisation with high group 
salience approach” from above when the personalisation 
precipitates the discovery of multiple cross-cutting group 
memberships  
 
These mentioned approaches can be further differentiated by particular 
aspects they contain, whose degrees vary from approach to approach. 
These additional ingredients will be presented in the following section, being 
subsumed under the category “Redefining the intergroup relationship”.  
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Redefining the intergroup relationship 
This section comprises those aspects of approaches which change the 
conceptualisation of the intergroup relationship by either changing the self-
image of groups, or by changing the image of the relationship directly. The 
following categories form part of the taxonomy of measures aiming at the 
reduction of intergroup animosities.  
 
Cooperation on relevant commonalities 
As mentioned above, intergroup cooperation is one condition specified by the 
original formulation of the “contact hypothesis”. Cooperation is assumed to 
be a critical ingredient in encounters aiming at the reduction of intergroup 
animosities. Correspondingly, both the classical de- and re-categorisation 
approaches contain cooperation as a conceptually constitutive element. 
What the formulations of these approaches do not necessarily sufficiently 
address is the question of the quality of these cooperative tasks. Deutsch 
(2000: 62) suggests that severe intergroup animosities necessitate “mutually 
beneficial cooperation”, from which it could be assumed that the cooperative 
activity is required to possess a certain degree of relevance for the group 
members. 
This probable condition for cooperative interaction concurs with the practices 
of the NGOs’ practices investigated in this study. Whereas some of the 
studies on the de- and recategorisation approach mentioned above (Brown, 
2000) made use of comparatively arbitrary intergroup cooperation exercises, 
the NGO projects built on local needs and interests. As was outlined, these 
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projects e.g. consisted of activities on e.g.: interests in education and training 
(such as language or computer skills), needs (of war victims and ex-
combatants) relating to dealing with the past, income generating projects 
(agricultural or tailoring courses), or leisure time interests (e.g. sports, youth 
clubs). Importantly, projects working on community interests and needs were 
not initiated in a top-down fashion with an orientation on a preconceived list 
of activities, but were preceded by laborious local need assessments to 
elucidate relevant community priorities, so that the relevance of future 
cooperative projects was ensured.  
It is important to note that these cooperative activities precipitated direct 
intergroup contact, entailing opportunities for personalisation and 
decategorisation, while also providing options for recategorisation in the form 
of strengthening a community identity. The effects however can be multiple, 
while the substance of communalities might not always be sufficient for 
allowing the perception of a superordinate identity. As mentioned, 
personalisation renders internal heterogeneity of groups visible and can 
render multiple cross-cutting identities (“female”, “war victim”, “farmer”, 
“basketball player”, etc.) visible, while also intergroup differences could be 
noticed. A clear demarcation between de-, re-categorisation, or of another 
singular approach appears therefore to be impossible in such en vivo 
settings. 
Whether participants of cooperative intergroup activities perceive their 
commonalities as sufficient to form the basis of a superordinate category 
depends of course not least on the constitution of the group. On this 
background it is relevant that NGOs often work with relatively similar 
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individuals from the conflict sides, i.e. they convene from various conflicts 
sides for example ex-combatants, war victims, or youngsters. In such groups 
of relatively similar individuals, personalisation is likely to entail that 
participants get opportunities for perceiving themselves as belonging to a 
common category (such as ex-combatant, war victim, or the next generation 
of citizens).  
The aspirations of local citizens seemed to display a broad variation, 
depending on the time elapsed since the war, the history of the community 
under consideration and other context factors. A topic area, however, which 
kept reappearing in the reports of the activists from peacebuilding NGOs, ex-
combatant and victim organisations, regarded material scarcity and material 
injustices. Given the relevance of these material interests, projects working 
on these interests are of special interest. This area of material or economic 
factors will be elucidated in a separate section below, after addressing the 
symbolic function of intergroup cooperation by the next section. 
 
Signalling the feasibility of cooperative intergroup activities  
Intergroup cooperation on relevant shared interests or needs does not only 
provide participants with personalising information on the others, but also 
signals tangibly the possibility of a more constructive intergroup relationship 
compared to the relationship of the past. This way, the beneficial effects of 
activities which encourage in some way interethnic cooperation potentially 
extend to a wider constituency beyond the immediate participants.  
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Presenting the alternative of joint intergroup activities provides role models 
which demonstrate to newcomers and the public the lived alternative of 
intergroup collaboration. LNGO activities involving intergroup role models 
with the capacity for such a signalling function comprise: projects on 
intergroup community interests and needs, addressed in the previous 
section; youth clubs spawning joint leisure time activities, and youth councils 
coordinating city-wide youth interests; mixed teams of activists – consisting 
of individuals from “different” conflict sides – which initiate intergroup 
projects; mixed groups of ex-combatants presenting without internal debate 
their individual motivations and learning experiences related to the war past.  
Each of these practices of intergroup cooperation is likely to possess specific 
strengths in each particular context. Projects on intergroup/community-wide 
needs and interests can reduce tensions in the respective community by 
providing opportunities of personalisation, and by offering the community as 
a category for a superordinate identity. Providing community members with 
the opportunity to experience and observe that intergroup cooperation with 
mutually beneficial outcomes is possible, facilitates a redefinition of the 
intergroup relationship.  
Youth clubs and youth councils with participants from nominally different 
groups can analogously provide contact opportunities for personalisation, 
raising awareness for cross-cutting common interests, while youngsters can 
function as informal mediators when informing their less intergroup-oriented 
parents about the ease of this informal variety of intergroup collaboration or 
cohabitation. Mixed teams of activists asking local residents about their 
experiences and their current concerns can buttress rapport and trust by 
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providing contact persons from the same group and by enacting an 
introductory example of intergroup cooperation. Mixed groups of ex-
combatants have a special legitimacy in challenging nationalist discourses 
due to their past sacrifices to the “national cause”, so that their role-modelling 
of intergroup cooperation constitutes a conspicuous contrast on the 
background of conventional expectations, imbuing their reports of learning 
and their criticism of nationalistic policies with special significance. 
 
Material interests or needs as a potential source of frustration and as a 
common basis  
Of substantial interest in the context of intergroup cooperative encounters 
are those projects which are based on common economic interests, given 
the relevance ascribed to material interests by some theorists (e.g. Duffield, 
1997; Collier et al., 2005; Sambanis, 2005), as mentioned in the first chapter.  
Due to this potential significance of material interests/needs, and due to the 
nearly universal reference to material scarcity in Kosovo and Eastern 
Slavonia by the NGO activists (which is not very astonishing considering the 
precarious economic situation of these areas, especially in Kosovo), projects 
which are organising intergroup contact by working on common material 
needs can fulfil multiple functions. On the one hand, centring intergroup 
cooperation on material interests/needs ensures that high relevance is 
imparted to the cooperation. On the other hand, as mentioned in previous 
chapters, reducing material scarcity undermines one of the grounds for 
frustrations and tensions.  
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Interestingly, some activists emphasised how the economy in Eastern 
Slavonia and in some regions of Kosovo declined with the demise of 
Yugoslavia and that the local economic situation was still precarious, 
especially when compared to the development of other regions of Croatia or 
of the Former Yugoslavia respectively. It was also suggested that local 
residents faced with unemployment and material scarcity are more 
susceptible to ethnocentric leaning, inclining towards scapegoating, i.e. 
blaming other nations or ethnic groups for the precarious current condition.  
This interpretation of activists corresponds to the concept of “relative 
deprivation”: as Brown (2000: 233 et seqq.) indicates, the tendency of people 
towards rioting seems to be especially high when they behold their group as 
unjustifiably disadvantaged relative to other groups. Moreover, it points in the 
direction of a factor figuring in the analyses of Collier’s (2000, Collier et al, 
2005), viz. the deterioration of the economic situation as a violence fuelling 
aspect. These indications, which are resonating with the mentioned 
perspectives of activists, suggest that the material well-being of locals as well 
as the local economic development demand special attention. Activities 
supporting cooperative interaction around an economic project, as conducted 
by some NGOs, can correspondingly not only have the potential to reduce 
animosities among the respective participant, but can at the same time 
improve the local material well-being, thereby countervailing a potential 
breeding ground for scapegoating and relative deprivation. 
The references to scapegoating and frustration provide an interesting basis 
for reconsidering Collier’s (2000, Collier et al., 2005) discussion on the 
relative role of economic opportunity vs. deprivation factors. If economic 
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deterioration per se is able to create frustration and scapegoating, then a 
correlation between economic deterioration and violent conflicts suggests an 
interpretation different from Collier’s. Collier (ibid.) points to a correlation 
between violent conflicts on the hand and economic decline, high proportion 
of uneducated young people, plus the availability of “lootable” resources on 
the other hand. Collier interprets this finding as indicating that the opportunity 
for self-aggrandizement is much more decisive in inciting violent conflicts 
than grievances related to economic inequalities.  
In the first chapter it was indicated that this interpretation is dubious, not least 
because Collier’s studies did solely include measures of vertical instead of 
horizontal/intergroup inequality (Sambanis, 2005). The suggestion that 
economic deterioration can entail scapegoating and frustration adds another 
aspect, as the decisive mediating factor could be frustration about economic 
injustices, even when the degree of inequality is comparable to other – more 
stable – regions. Economic deterioration could thereby function as a catalyst 
for the outbreak of unrest. This interpretation would be compatible with the 
finding that e.g. natural resources do not seem to be so much at the root of 
war onsets, but that their role appears to be mainly based on their function of 
enabling the conflicting groups to sustain their struggle (Sambanis, 2005: 
309-10).  
The combination of these findings suggests a scenario in which both 
horizontal inequalities (Sambanis, 2005) in combination with economic 
deterioration (Collier, 2005) are virulent factors for inciting violent conflict, 
while Collier’s (2005) remaining “opportunity” factors are more decisive in 
rendering prolonged fighting feasible. Such a scenario would also explain 
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why at any given point in time it is much more likely to find ongoing violent 
conflicts in which “opportunity” factors are involved.  
As argued, the likely conflict fuelling capacity of economic scarcity and 
economic deterioration imparts special significance to income-generating 
projects of local NGOs, functioning at the same time as opportunities for 
intergroup cooperation with high motivational potential. These NGO projects 
are of course very limited in terms of economic impact. The better option 
would obviously be an improvement of the economic framework conditions 
on a much larger scale, potentially fostered by direct international 
investments into economic growth programmes. In the preceding chapter the 
assumption was cited that an improvement of the general economic situation 
would precipitate strong economic incentives for further areas of economic 
intergroup cooperation, with the potential to improve intergroup relationships. 
A combination of local intergroup projects with large-scale economic growth 
programmes would of course be the most desirable option.  
In summary, increasing opportunities for economic intergroup cooperation 
could have the following effects: 1) conflict-fuelling frustration could be 
reduced, 2) encounter opportunities for the reduction of prejudices would be 
created, 3) visible examples of intergroup cooperation could gradually re-
define the intergroup relationship by manifesting the possibility of mutually 
beneficial interactions, while 4) rendering individual anticipations of the future 
living conditions less bleak.  
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Correcting directly the characteristics ascribed to the opponent 
While the projects mentioned in the preceding sections change the image of 
the former opponent largely indirectly by providing opportunities for getting to 
know the other better, and by rendering commonalities as well as the 
possibility of cooperation visible, other measures are addressing prejudices 
more directly. Amongst these measures are exchanges amongst war victims 
and ex-combatant on war-related issues. When e.g. ex-combatants perceive 
similarities between themselves and the former enemies in terms of 
motivations and war experiences, those enemy images become questioned 
which define the other side as purely motivated by aggressive agendas 
directed from the outset at the subjugation or even destruction of the own 
side. Similarly, when community inhabitants exchange their perspectives, 
e.g. by expressing their motivations for unfriendly behaviour in the past, 
material is provided that can change potential past misattributions.  
Even more direct are measures which induce ex-combatants to list the 
content of stereotypes and present these lists directly to the stereotyped 
group, so that the target group can react directly to these stereotypes, can 
provide corrective background information, and express their emotional 
dismay about the content of the stereotypes. Analogously, during some 
interreligious encounters assumptions about the other denominations were 
expressed, misinformation corrected, and background information provided.  
The image of the opponent as bearing the responsibility for the atrocities 
inflicted in past wars, while the own side is depicted as having behaved 
morally appropriate, can be undermined when the suffering of the other 
inflicted by the own side becomes visible, as frequently mentioned in the 
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preceding chapter. The element of undermining the perception of the own 
side’s moral superiority is presented in the following category-stipulating 
section. 
 
Undermining the pretension of Moral Superiority of the own side 
An important role in societal conceptions of the intergroup relationship is 
obviously played by the self-images of the respective groups. Glasl (1997) 
argues that during the process of escalation the conflicting parties perceive 
the respective other side to an increasing degree in a negative way, forming 
the contrasting background on which the own side appears in brighter 
colours. During stages of high escalation, the social identity of one group 
tends to contain the “denigration of the Other” (Zartman, 2005: 50) as a 
constitutive element, so that the members of the own side are seen “as 
superior to the other side’s members” (Kriesberg, 2005: 69).  
For the redefinition of the intergroup relationship it is correspondingly 
significant how the own group and other group are perceived in terms of 
moral standing. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a wide-spread 
assumption on each side of the past war(s) was the conviction that the own 
side was in a position of defence, this way implying moral righteousness, 
since the war was conceived as forced on the own side by the offensive 
moves of the enemy. Under this premise of seeing the own side as pulled 
into the war by the opponent’s actions, the losses inflicted upon the own side 
are likely to be perceived as conspicuously unjust and outrageous, while 
being attributed to the malicious characteristics of the opponent (cf. Bar-Tal, 
2000; Kriesberg, 2005).  
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NGO measures which unearth the dark parts of the own group’s past seem 
to be a central route in challenging this image of the own side’s moral 
superiority. As presented in the preceding chapter, NGO activities with a 
potential to undermine this conviction of moral superiority comprise the 
following measures: 1) Monitoring and publicising the procedures of war 
crime trials, while assisting witnesses from the own side who are testifying 
against the own side, so that the own party’s violations of jus in bello gain 
publicity; 2) Supporting the perception of the own side’s crimes through 
reducing double standards, via eliciting assessment of war actions in the 
abstract in order to raise awareness for double standards 3) Disseminating 
stories of suffering inflicted on the opponent’s side through war actions which 
were not necessarily against jus in bello, e.g. on a societal level via the oral 
history project and on an interpersonal level by direct intergroup encounters 
with victims; 4) Broadening the societal perspective to include the more 
distant history of the own group in the public consciousness, by comparing 
intergroup relations across epochs and seeing brighter and darker parts of 
the own history, while gaining awareness for the costs of war more generally 
and for societal possibilities.  
 
Respect and recognition as a framework for intergroup contact 
A significant aspect of the work on intergroup encounters is the creation of 
an atmosphere of respect for participants inherent in the framework 
conditions of the measures. Imparting a sense of respect for the participants 
took various forms. Respect was manifested for example through activists’ 
enactment of openness and acceptance when approaching local 
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communities, signalling recognition by giving space for the expression for 
feelings and concerns. This attitude was ‘setting the tone’ at an the initial 
stage of project-related interactions, and appeared to be not only conducive 
to the building of rapport and to a better understanding of local concerns, but 
this recognition could also have been valuable for supporting the self-esteem 
of the participants.  
In a similar vein, the communicative framework conditions for inter-religious 
dialogues, as well as the encounter settings amongst war victims and ex-
combatants, were characterised by an emphasis on exchanges of personal 
experiences, hurts, and perspectives, thereby imparting recognition. As 
intergroup encounters can be perceived as threatening, entailing the high 
risk that the contact is experienced as unpleasant (Brown, 2000: 345, 354), 
the setting of framework conditions which support the self-esteem of the 
participants by signalling respect and recognition is likely to be essential.  
The sequence of NGOs to first focus on listening to concerns and 
experiences as steps for trustbuilding and for fostering the participants’ 
sense of being respected could correspondingly be crucial in enabling later 
intergroup discussions on more contentious issues. This sequence 
possesses some similarity to the approach of Bush & Folger (2005), who 
recommend to stabilise the self-esteem of participants as a precondition for 
mutual recognition.  
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Fostering an orientation towards the future 
The final aspect of the taxonomy – for classifying measures for the 
improvement of intergroup relations which contribute to the reduction of 
animosities – consists of fostering an orientation towards a more positive 
future. This development of visions for the future is partially interrelated with 
reflecting on the past. This process of learning from the past can be 
analytically divided into two principal domains, which consist of learning 
either through being deterred by some sides of the past which motivate 
avoidance, or through identifying valued elements of past intra- or intergroup 
interaction which motivate for the wider dissemination of these elements.  
Some community projects for example involved the practice, in the style of 
Boulding (2001), of envisioning a desired future for the community, to derive 
realisable concepts for change from these visions. In this vein, the work with 
war victims comprised exchanges which worked towards an improved 
understanding of past individual behaviour patterns and apprehension for the 
suffering of the other. This was followed by awareness raising for own 
priorities and those aspects of life which are amendable. This awareness 
raising for realisable aspirations formed the basis for envisioning new aims, 
enabling the individuals to be less fixated on those aspects related to the 
past which are unchangeable, and focusing more on the future.  
Analogously, in the projects with ex-combatants a session on imagining a 
desired future was included. In this context, the visions were developed 
through devising a societal or regional future. The development of more 
comprehensive visions was at the same time interacting with the awareness 
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raising for common intergroup values which manifested in these large-scale 
visions of desired cohabitation.  
The fundamental values emerging in such processes can either be values 
which the participants hold already, or could be values which have the 
potential to exert an “appeal” (Putnam, 2008) which could be recognised or 
felt by the participants, while “appeal” can refer to the values itself and/or to a 
larger framework in which these values are embedded, as discussed above. 
 
Concluding consideration on reducing enmity: A sequential employment 
of encounter settings for recognition and trustbuilding 
The idea of avoiding the most contentious aspects during the initial phase of 
intergroup contact, manifest in the activities of the NGOs, can be found in 
numerous workshop approaches. Burton (1990), in contrast, proposes to 
initiate intergroup contact by a joint analysis of the conflict, ascribing to this 
discussion a trustbuilding function. The early phase of workshops in the style 
of Doob, on the other hand, consists of analysing the interaction styles of the 
group participants (Fisher, 1997). Both of these classical approaches might 
be problematic in situations characterised by intergroup animosities: 
Doubt is cast on Burton’s approach of initiating the encounter situation by 
analysing the conflict constellation when considering Ramsbotham’s (2010) 
indication that in situations of intense conflict the parties do not have a 
detached perspective on the conflict constellation, to the effect that conflict 
parties can become infuriated by the opponent’s view on the conflict right 
from the start; “It is the fact of the outrage that immediately elicits indignation 
and the steely will never to rest until the wrong is righted” (ibid.: 126; original 
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emphasis). Due to this highly emotional charge which can be intertwined with 
several aspects of a conflict constellation, it is dubious whether basic trust 
amongst disputants can be built through a Burtonian initial phase of conflict 
analysis.  
The workshop philosophy of Doob, on the other hand, which relies on an 
initial phase of working on personal and group interaction styles, explicitly 
puts up with the regular experience that this initial phase is characterised by 
“confusion, anxiety, and anger being expressed at the lack of structure and 
the lack of discussion about the conflict itself” (Fisher, 1999: 40). While this is 
not seen as much of a problem by the proponents of this approach (ibid: 39-
43), Brown (2000: 254) reviews studies which indicate that anxiety within 
encounter situations has detrimental effects on intergroup relations. An 
additional shortcoming of this approach is that the transfer from the initial 
work on group processes towards the work on the conflict constellation can 
be limited, even when the initial phase manifested some basic level of trust: 
“[A]lthough the [early] group activities involved candor, mutual learning, and 
creativity, there was little transformation of participants’ attitudes and 
attachments to the problem itself, and the exercise came to naught as 
national prerogatives asserted themselves” (Fisher, 1999: 42).  
These limitations of the classical sequence of workshops, initiated either by 
an analysis of the conflict constellation or by working on interaction styles, 
point towards the benefits of the presented approaches taken by the NGOs. 
These NGO approaches possessed relevance for the participants so that the 
interest in the group activities was sustained, as activities were based on 
common needs or aspirations. As mentioned, activities imparted respect and 
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engaged in trustbuilding by e.g. 1) listening to personal experiences and 
needs, 2) creating projects on joint community aspirations, 3) inducing 
dialogue on similar war-related experiences, motivations, and hurts, in a 
communicative framework manifesting respect by centring on listening and 
exchange.  
Activists’ enactment of openness and acceptance when approaching local 
communities, while giving space for the expression for feelings and 
concerns, appeared to be conducive to building rapport at an early stage, 
while possibly supporting the self-esteem of the participants. In a similar 
vein, the communicative framework conditions for inter-religious dialogues, 
as well as the encounter settings amongst war victims and ex-combatants, 
were characterised by an emphasis on exchanges of personal experiences, 
hurts, and perspectives, thereby imparting recognition for these experiences 
and convictions.  
By focusing on experiences, needs, and aspirations, the NGO activities had 
from their outset the potential of being perceived as relevant. At the same 
time, projects contributed to intergroup trustbuilding by personalisation, 
and/or by increased visibility of commonalities (of experiences, values, 
feelings, motivations) as well as a better understanding for the other sides’ 
experiences, while partially engaging with conflict-related topics, instead of 
taking the detour of teaching lessons in group dynamics, or instead of 
jumping into the conflict analysis without building some initial intergroup 
rapport. 
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Dealing with differences 
As argued in previous chapters, the very possibility of intra- and interstate 
war is dependent on the willingness of people to kill others (and to accept the 
killings of others) solely on the grounds of the perceived group membership 
of the ones to be killed. The reduction of dichotomous enemy images is in 
turn an inevitable stage on the route towards a more peaceful society in 
which conflicts are supposed to be solved through open communication and 
collaboration amongst the various sides. Even when, however, the reduction 
of prejudices and the building of some basic trust has been successful, 
differences between individuals and groups will remain.  
General Conflict handling mechanisms 
As perceptions of social categories will not altogether disappear, given the 
organisational structures of societies and widespread self-definitions related 
to history, some conflicts are likely to emerge from time to time. The 
assumption that conflicts are an inherent part of everyday life is part of the 
basis of Lederach’s (2003, 2006) concept of “conflict transformation”, which 
is linked to the suggestion to institutionalise mechanisms for dealing with 
these inevitably re-appearing conflicts. 
In the first chapter it was indicated that the understanding of being part of an 
intergroup conflict and the assumed distinctions related to these group 
memberships are likely to be mutually reinforcing. According to Deutsch 
(1973), a competitively understood situation of group interaction does not 
only precipitate an increase in the perceived difference assumed to separate 
the groups, but also has the capacity to precipitate mistrust and animosities 
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between the groups. This danger of intergroup differences to potentially lead 
to escalation implies that the availability of mechanisms for coping with such 
differences is crucial.  
Consequently, some NGO activities are aiming at the dissemination of 
conflict handling skills, while referring to or being reminiscent of Lederach’s 
(2003, 2006) concept of conflict transformation. Sharing the assessment that 
conflicts are an inherent part of human interaction, some NGO projects are 
trying to disseminate the attitude to approach conflicts with a problem-
oriented mind-set, instead of perceiving the co-disputant as a threatening 
problem. (This orientation corresponds to a recommendation of Fisher and 
Ury, 1999). This conceptualisation of conflict handling as problem solving is, 
however, somewhat deviating from Lederach (2003, 2006), who introduced 
the term “conflict transformation” precisely in contrast to the more 
conventional term “conflict resolution”, based on his emphasis on seeing 
conflict as a chance (or even “gift”, 2003: 18), which can induce reflections 
on, and changes of, relationships and structures. The activists’ description of 
conflicts as problems in contrast might be indicative of a less romantic 
conception of conflicts, conceiving them as troubles which acutely require 
remedy. The activists’ principle to disseminate an attitude of seeing the 
conflict as a problem, instead of seeing the other disputant as a problem, is 
closely related to this conflict conception. Given the acuteness of some 
conflicts requiring solution, reflected in the description of activists, it is 
dubious whether there is any need for Lederach proposed change in the 
nomenclature.  
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Lederach’s other argument for a terminological change possesses as well 
only limited substance: Lederach (2003) objects to the term “conflict 
resolution” partially on the ground that he sees it as implying quick fixes 
instead of deeper (relational, structural, cultural) changes. This contrast, 
however, is somewhat artificial, since Burton (1990, 1997), one of the central 
founding figures associated with “conflict resolution”, did conceive deep 
structural re-arrangements as sometimes essential for “solutions”. 
Correspondingly, there do not seem to be strong reasons for trying to 
establish “conflict transformation” as a standard term. 
Burton (1990, 1997) in turn argues that conflicts are best resolved by 
satisfying the “basic human needs” of all involved. According to Burton, 
“there are human needs more compelling in directing behaviours than any 
possible external influences”, and refers to “the individual’s need for identity 
and recognition, and these relate to the need for security” (1990: 33). It is, 
however, questionable whether this reference to basic human needs is of 
much relevance for the practice of conflict handling.  
As mentioned, the aspirations of local citizens displayed a broad variation, 
according to the experiences of LNGOs, depending e.g. on the time elapsed 
since the war, and the history of the participants’ community. Partially due to 
these differences, activists – working for an improvement of relationships and 
living conditions in communities – conducted the mentioned laborious need 
assessments, instead of working with a preconceived list of activities and 
needs. Also when describing their work with interpersonal conflicts, activists 
did not refer by themselves to a set of fixed “basic” needs, as conceived of 
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by Burton (1990, 1997; cf. Azar, 1986, Kelman, 1999), but were more open 
in their description of analysis.  
Whether needs can be conceptualised as basic and universal – as opposed 
to individually or culturally idiosyncratic – is partially a question of the level of 
abstraction on which needs are formulated, as argued in the previous 
chapter. Burton’s (1990, 1997) “relationship needs” – i.e. “recognition”, 
“security”, and “identity” (amongst his “basic needs”) – are formulated on 
such an abstract level that they allow the subsuming of a very wide array of 
aspirations under these concepts. This abstract formulation renders the 
concepts rather resistant towards falsification, while entailing that the 
meaning of the “needs” concepts become very diffuse or even empty.  
However, the principle of analysing interests and needs related to sentiments 
as a way for dealing with conflict was widely reported by activists as very 
useful, which was practiced within a framework of listening and I-messages. 
This indicates that the principle of deeper analysis seems to be productive, 
provided that the analysis is open instead of oriented to needs stipulated in 
advance.  
As outlined in the previous chapter, there might be situations in which 
cleavages between adversaries are too deep to enable the reaching of any 
kind of arrangement by a short-term approach. Some constellations might 
require trustbuilding measures which are not directly involving the actual 
conflict topic, to the effect that the actual conflict handling needs to be 
deferred to a later phase. This sequence of initiating the contact by 
trustbuilding steps is the approach typically taken by measures aiming at the 
reduction of intergroup animosities. The time horizon amongst measures, 
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however, differs. In the sessions with ex-combatants, war victims, and 
community members, personalising exchanges were followed within the 
same session series by the addressing of the more controversial topics. A far 
longer time perspective is involved in cases when disputants are not willing 
to talk to each other. As addressed previously, one possible route in such 
situations appears to consist of long-term trustbuilding measures, e.g. 
consisting of social activities which are initiated by one conflict party. Such 
activities, which are benefiting the community, indirectly contribute to mutual 
revaluation. This measure is ideally combined with informal mediation, 
conducted by individuals who are already situated in a middle position, i.e. 
who are possessing a pre-existing relationship to conflict parties.  
 
Dealing with intergroup differences 
Even when trustbuilding measures between groups have been successful, 
there can be intergroup differences remaining which cannot be sufficiently 
addressed by looking at underlying needs and aspirations. When dealing 
with cultural and religious differences, a contingency classification for NGO 
activities as possibly being conducive to peaceful cohabitation was proposed 
in the previous chapter; a summary of this contingency approach is 
presented in the following paragraphs.  
 
1) Fostering the exploration of intergroup commonalities and 
differences  
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A useful first stage for dealing with intergroup differences is constituted by a 
diagnosis consisting of an elucidation of commonalities and disparities. An 
improved understanding of these intergroup contrasts and overlaps has 
ideally the effect of removing wrong assumptions about the other group. It 
can support the understanding of differences in values and practices, which 
could help to reduce alienation. Removing wrong assumptions about the 
other group can take the route of raising awareness for the content of 
stereotypes and having exchanges on this content, in order to let the other 
stereotyped side correct misinformation. Analogously, an more in-depth 
understanding of intergroup similarities and differences in the domain of 
religion can be fostered by exchanges on these differences, which as well 
correct wrong assumptions and provide background information on these 
differences.  
The next two sections will address ways for dealing with those differences 
between groups which remain after a basic understanding of the positions, 
practices, and beliefs has been reached. 
 
2) If disagreements remain despite a basic understanding of the 
differences, tolerating these differences in values, practices, and 
beliefs is one route towards cohabitation; this tolerance can be based 
on respect following from an acceptance of differing beliefs as equal in 
valence, and on an understanding of the background of these 
differences 
After intergroup differences have remained or have become apparent during 
intergroup dialogues aiming at the correction of wrong information, some of 
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these (now more specified) differences in values or attitudes can obviously 
still be controversial. For dealing this these differences, a process of further 
exploration can be conducive to mutual understanding, while enabling the 
airing of reservations and disturbances. An important element for avoiding 
enraged debates appears to be that these disagreements are occurring in a 
communicative setting which focuses on expression and exploration instead 
of persuasion. By focusing on exploration, allowing the expression of 
disturbances, while avoiding a confrontational style, respect for each other’s 
positions can be manifested in the communicative framework, which might 
be an essential ingredient for keeping the exchanges topic-oriented without 
sliding into a relational battle.  
 
In some cases in which a disagreement in values remains, promoting 
attitudes of equipollency between values, i.e. disbanding the ranking of 
particular values, could be an option. This stance towards values and beliefs, 
regarding them as of non-ordinal valence, potentially enables to live with 
diverse values and beliefs, provided that the values and beliefs under 
consideration are regarded to be compatible. This position of accepting 
differing values and beliefs as equal can be encouraged by initiating 
reflection processes on the relative importance of these values and beliefs.  
These reflection processes consist of critically questioning the idea that the 
values under consideration can be ranked, while experiencing during these 
exchanges the diverging strong attachments to these different values. Even 
when an exchange does not precipitate an immediate acceptance of multiple 
values’ valence, there is some possibility that the auditing of new 
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perspectives could lead to some change in the long-term. Having an 
exchange on the background of values, as on the reasons for why certain 
values are important for the people concerned, might be able to assist in the 
acceptance of disparate values as not being suitable for rankings. As soon 
as the importance of the disparate values is mutually accepted, there is 
scope for planning a future of cohabitation in which these diverging values 
can be accommodated. 
  
3) Discover joint values within intergroup exchanges to raise 
awareness for normative commonalities and for options of cohabitation 
with differences; disagreements which cannot be solved might be 
continued within an accepted communicative framework which is 
based on these shared values  
It was previously discussed how common values can be discovered in a 
process of reflection on the past and envisioning a common future of 
cohabitation. These approaches for identifying common values are 
particularly relevant when intergroup differences are remaining in spite of 
extensive exchanges aimed at mutual understanding. Raising awareness for 
commonalities can contribute to the planning of arrangements of living with 
the persisting differences. The possibility for finding common values amongst 
individuals and groups is directly related to the presumed appeal of values. 
These references to a wide-spread sense for common values – whether this 
common sense is regarded as cultural or as quasi-universal – is a potential 
basis for planning future societal arrangements. Common values which are 
discovered and developed by reflecting on the past and envisioning the 
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future can function as basic principles for future cohabitation. These 
principles can then suggest arrangements for dealing with differences, such 
as value differences between religions. During LNGOs projects on inter-
religious dialogue, common values of tolerance, respect, and non-violence 
were emphasised, implying that these value commonalities are sufficiently 
suggesting to deal with persisting differences non-violently.  
Even after a deeper understanding of intergroup differences has been 
reached, and even when there is an agreement that dealing with differences 
should be based on the principles of non-violence and mutual respect, some 
differences can persist whose tolerance can be hard for some individuals or 
groups. In cases in which the equal valence of different positions cannot be 
accepted because of stark incompatibilities inherent in these values, one 
option is possibly to continue the controversy non-violently in a framework of 
exchange, while bringing forward the own conviction. Decisive is according 
to activists the form of communication, which needs to manifest sufficient 
mutual respect towards the other, for the focus of the discussion to remain 
on exchanges in a cooperative atmosphere, without sliding into an enraged 
debate. Defending the own challenged values was described by some 
activists as part of the journey towards a more peaceful society, under the 
condition that such a communicative atmosphere oriented on exchange is 
created. 
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The edge of reason: Intense conflicts as a challenge to 
peacebuilding 
Most challenging for approaches of conflict resolution in particular and 
peacebuilding in general are obviously situations when the differences 
between conflict parties are very deep, in terms of their contested factual and 
evaluative claims. To define the linguistic level of those conflicts that have 
appeared (so far) to be insensitive to any attempts of “settlement and 
transformation”, Ramsbotham (2010: 1; cf. 17, 253) uses the term “radical 
disagreement”. Ramsbotham (2010) argues that these “radical 
disagreements” have been under-studied and under-theorised. It is stated 
that “[t]here is no theory or philosophy of radical disagreement” (ibid.: 133) 
and that conflict resolution/transformation theories would not have proposed 
appropriate approaches for situations of “radical disagreement”.  
The conceptualisation of “radical disagreement” on an abstract ontological 
level is of course interrelated with the practical recommendations for 
addressing these differences. Before examining this conceptual question 
abstractly further below, it is now discussed under which conditions particular 
approaches to dealing with these conflicts are conceivable, before combining 
elements from various approaches into an integrative model. 
Within the preceding section on dealing with differences, it was argued that, 
according to NGO experiences, exchanges on mutual differences can lead to 
higher mutual tolerance, when the background of these differences is better 
understood and/or differing beliefs are accepted as equal in their valence. It 
was also indicated that some disagreements might remain after the 
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background of mutual differences has been elucidated. In order to address 
these differences, the possibility was sketched to continue these unresolved 
disagreements in communicative frameworks oriented on exchange and 
manifesting mutual respect, within which also those values of peacebuilding 
NGOs activists can be advocated when challenged.  
 
Respect for the other as a prerequisite for dialogue work 
The first of these steps just proposed, namely the exchanges on the 
background of these differences to foster tolerance, is similar to conventional 
“dialogue and safe space” approaches. These approaches are criticised by 
Ramsbotham (2010: 80) as presupposing conditions which were not fulfilled 
in radical disagreements: “if we take radical disagreements seriously, my 
conclusion is that we cannot encompass it within the usual canons of 
dialogue and safe spaces work. A common rule in dialogue work, for 
example, is that each should listen to the other with mutual respect so that 
differences can be tolerated, if not celebrated. But we can see how, in radical 
disagreements, such conceptual/emotional space does not exists. […] we 
simply do not respect what the other says – or the other as sayer of it – in 
such circumstances” (emphasis added). If mutual tolerance for the contested 
differences is the aim of the encounter arrangement, then respect for the 
other and for what the other says is indeed a prerequisite. As was argued in 
theory chapter two, conversation does not automatically engender 
understanding. As was mentioned there, Bohm (1996) indicates that often 
the other side’s prejudices are regarded as responsible for the fact that the 
other does not agree with the own side. Correspondingly, the willingness of 
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attempting to understand the respective other is far from obvious when the 
other is not respected, which is characteristic for the context of highly 
escalated conflicts.  
However, an important analytical difference should be considered between 
“respect for what the other says” and for “the sayer of it” (Ramsbotham, 
op.cit.). Whereas a lack of respect for the other is likely to entail that the 
words of the other are not respected either, situations are well conceivable in 
which the disputants respect one another, but regard one another’s opinions 
on a particular issue absurd. An example of this latter situation might be a 
“family quarrel“ portrayed by Ramsbotham (2010: 8-13), which involved a 
deep disagreement between two family members; in this disagreement, the 
disputants found the opinion of the opponent utterly wrong and even 
offensive, while, hopefully, still respecting the other to a degree of “thick 
recognition” (Allan & Keller; 2006: 199- 201) – to use the term from chapter 
two – “[fully accepting] the humanity of the other” (ibid.). When recognition of 
the other is present, there might be willingness to understand the other in 
spite of the absence of willingness to respect the other’s position; but even 
when there is no apparent willingness to understand the other, there can still 
be willingness to convince the other, as displayed by the protagonists in 
Ramsbotham’s (2010: 8-13) “family quarrel” who were engaging in intense 
debate.  
Alternatively, there is still scope for searching for a modus operandi based on 
common interests. As the particular instance of the “family quarrel” in the 
example was ignited by the question of how to educate children, a central 
challenge of the dispute can be conceptualised as finding an option for 
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designing the environment for the growing-up process in such a way that the 
children could autonomously recognise the truth. If both disputants were 
really confident in the clarity and accessibility of what each of them defended 
as the truth, they should in principle be able to agree that the children should 
have the option to recognise the truth by themselves when growing up in an 
enriched and diverse environment. (Agreeing on the details of such an 
arrangements, however, is admittedly likely to be a long-term struggle, given 
the depth of the underlying disagreement.) 
In general, some degree of recognition of the other is a sine qua non for the 
engagement in a discursive exchange. If such a minimal recognition is 
missing, as is typical for constellations of violent conflict, the interest in 
discursive exchanges on mutual differences with an agenda of mutual 
understanding is likely to be absent. In these situations, Ramsbotham’s 
indication that “we simply do not respect what the other says – or the other 
as sayer of it” (2010: 80) fully applies, to the effect that the scope for 
tolerance is very narrow indeed. That is why the re-humanisation of the other 
through trustbuilding, which was covered at length in previous sections, is so 
essential for conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Only after the other is 
recognised at least to some degree, scope opens for dealing with 
differences.  
As in the “family quarrel” (Ramsbotham, op.cit.) just mentioned, dialogue 
between disputants can occur even when the other’s positions are regarded 
as unacceptable, provided that the other is respected as a person. In this 
constellation of respect for the other and a lack of respect for the other’s 
position, tolerance for the other’s position and mutual understanding is not an 
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immediate option, so that dialogue work in the form portrayed by 
Ramsbotham (op.cit) is indeed impossible: “A common rule in dialogue work, 
for example, is that each should listen to the other with mutual respect so 
that differences can be tolerated, if not celebrated.” Dialogue can, however, 
continue when disputants keep trying to convince the other, as mentioned 
above. This dialogue, in whose process own standpoints are defended, 
ideally proceeds in a communicative framework oriented on exchange and 
manifesting mutual respect, as depicted by NGO activists. The sequence of 
fostering mutual recognition as a basis, on which thereupon a space oriented 
on exchange can be built, is therefore central. Correspondingly, when the 
aim of the participants of dialogue work is towards convincing the other, 
dialogue work can be continued even when the other’s position is not 
tolerated, provided that solid respect for the other was already present or has 
been established.  
Establishing mutual respect is of course far easier said than done in 
situations of highly escalated conflicts. Especially when the border to killings 
had been trespassed in the past course of the conflict, animosities can be 
extreme, as was argued in previous chapters, to the effect that the reduction 
of enmity can be an endeavour with a distant time horizon. The NGO 
mechanisms towards trustbuilding discussed in this dissertation were for the 
most part situated in a post-war setting, after comprehensive violent 
intergroup confrontations had largely subsided.  
The situation is of course quite different when violent conflict is still in 
progress. In this context, it can be expected that the general willingness to 
engage in direct dialogue with the other is reduced, while the view is 
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widespread that a violent victory over the opponent is the required and only 
possible way to deal with the conflict.  
 
Strategic thinking in intense conflicts 
When war events have precipitated fury and wrath on both sides and have 
eroded mutual respect, the basis for dialogue work is weak indeed. At this 
stage of a conflict, attempts of dialogue between opponents are likely to be 
futile, meeting the mentioned characterisation of Ramsbotham (2010: 80): “in 
radical disagreements, such conceptual/emotional space [for listening to the 
other with mutual respect so that differences can be tolerated, if not 
celebrated] does not exist. […] we simply do not respect what the other says 
– or the other as sayer of it – in such circumstances.” Ramsbotham (2010: 
132) argues that there is no sufficient common ground for mutual 
understanding in cases of radical disagreements: “the phenomenology of 
radical disagreement shows that conflict parties are, not nearer, but much 
further apart than was supposed” (original emphasis).  
Due to these deep cleavages between disputants which define situations of 
radical disagreement, Ramsbotham (2010) concludes that  “dialogue for 
mutual understanding […] often proves premature in these cases” (164), and 
that “the practical implication […] is to abandon attempts at promoting 
dialogue for mutual understanding altogether. There is no point of persisting. 
There is no conceptual or emotional space for it yet” (ibid.: 166, original 
emphasis). For the engagement with radical disagreements, Ramsbotham 
(ibid.) introduces as an alternative to dialogue for mutual understanding an 
approach with a rather different rationale: “the main effort shifts to the 
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promotion of dialogue for strategic engagement, not less radical 
disagreement, but more. What is required is the strategic engagement of 
discourses”.  
One defining feature of this proposed approach is that the process for 
dealing with this form of intense conflict is initiated through fostering strategic 
deliberation within conflict parties: “The strategic engagement of discourses 
begins, not with dialogue between conflict parties, but with inclusive strategic 
thinking within each conflict party considered separately […] Only in the light 
of sustained inclusive strategic thinking within each conflict party, and as a 
natural extension of the logic of strategic thinking itself, can the process 
evolve into the strategic engagement of discourses between conflict parties 
that is made possible as a result. […] where there is strategic engagement, 
each party’s main aim is […] not to understand the other, but to win” (ibid.: 
168, original emphasis).  
 
Benefits of strategic thinking 
The evident rationale of Ramsbotham’s (2010) proposal to focus on strategic 
thinking is that the approach for engaging with radical disagreement must, of 
course, correspond to the disputants’ motivations. While little interest in 
dialogue can be expected when conflict parties are not respecting one 
another, their motivation to win is obviously compatible with the proposal to 
engage in internal reflection processes on aims and strategies. The hope 
linked to this proposal is that the extension of the discussion towards wider 
sections of the (intra-party) population, in combination with an emphasis on 
strategic considerations, leads to more rational and weighted decisions: 
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“Strategic thinking chooses the most appropriate strategic and tactical means 
to attain its overall strategic ends” (ibid.: 180); “[an inclusive internal strategic 
engagement of discourses] is more likely to lead to wise, flexible and realistic 
strategies for attaining transformative goals including back-up strategies in 
case first preferences fail” (ibid.: 202).  
There are good reasons for believing that a process of intense reflections 
about strategies and a discussion including large sections of the own party 
improves the quality of decision making. Thinking systematically about 
various strategic options and expected consequences renders, by definition, 
the decision process more reflected. Widening the discussion process by 
including various parts of the own group, on the other hand, is likely to 
reduce the dangers of “group polarisation” and “groupthink”.  
“Group polarisation” describes the phenomenon that opinions of group 
members within relatively homogenous groups can jointly become more 
extreme instead of moderating one another in the process of intra-group 
exchanges, i.e. “[c]onservatives become more conservative, liberals more 
liberal, radicals more radical”, etc. (Brehm & Kassin, 1996: 426-7).  
“Groupthink” is related to this potential homogenisation of opinions which can 
be engendered by intra-group discussions. The term “groupthink” refers to 
the idea that homogenous groups under time pressure for decision making 
and with little exchange with other groups are particularly prone to producing 
under-deliberated decisions (ibid: 428-30); as historic examples Brehm & 
Kassin mention “Kennedy’s approval of the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba”, 
and “Nixon’s attempt to stonewall the Watergate scandal” (ibid.: 428). 
Research results on “groupthink” are somewhat mixed, but indicate that 
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there is indeed a tendency for time pressure and isolation from other groups 
to lead to under-deliberated decision (ibid.: 430).  
Given these tendencies, it appears to be reasonable indeed to foster wide 
and reflected intra-group discussions on various strategic options in relation 
to expected consequences.  
 
Limitations of strategic thinking 
The quality of decisions, however, depends obviously on the premises on 
which the strategic deliberations are based. Unfortunately, a wide intra-party 
discussion is far from being a guarantee for the realistic assessment of the 
opponent’s intentions and expected reactions. In highly escalated violent 
conflicts, the views of conflict parties can be expected to be polarised and 
isolated to a large degree, so that strategic thinking does not necessarily 
entail realistic assessments and wise decisions, even when involving a wide 
inclusion of various sections of the same party. As mentioned in the first 
chapter, once the border to killings has be trespassed in the course of a 
conflict, the mutual perceptions can be extreme: “once the killing actually 
starts, irrational fears, suspicions and hatreds escalate to a point of near 
irreversibility” (Curle, 1990: 85). During the ensuing process of killings on 
both sides, the responsibility for the appalling development of the war is 
assigned to the “adversaries’ character, ideology, or leadership” (Kriesberg, 
2005: 77). 
This does not imply, of course, that all the fears, indignations, and reactions 
of war parties can be regarded as irrational. Once killings become part of the 
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conflict, the hatred on each side is a sufficient reason to be fearful of the 
other, while the negative perceptions and actions can be mutually 
reinforcing, partially in a self-fulfilling way, as argued in theory chapter one. 
What is essential for the question of strategic thinking, however, is the 
indication of Curle that within escalated violent conflicts the field of rationality 
is frequently left. As a consequence of the escalated violence, “the logic and 
arrangement of ‘normal’ life are abandoned for exaggeration and fantasy. 
The ‘reasonable’ fears and worries engendered by war and violence change 
into paranoid myths” (Curle, 1990: 87). “As the conflict intensifies, so does 
the bitter unreasonableness of the hatred. I remember how, during the war in 
Sri Lanka, the feelings of the Singhalese for Tamils grew increasingly 
exaggerated and grotesque” (ibid.: 90).  
When strategic thinking is based on such radicalised fears and prejudices, 
realistic assessments are thwarted. A realistic assessment of the opponent’s 
intentions and expected reactions is, however, a sine qua non for wise 
decisions. As long as mistrust, paranoia and hatred are rife, neither dialogue 
for mutual understanding, nor strategic messages or deeds as envisioned by 
Ramsbotham (2010), are likely to improve the relationship. There does not 
seem to be any possible roundabout way that would omit trustbuilding work 
on the journey towards improving intergroup relations.  
The dangers of strategic thinking in situations of escalated conflicts are 
illustrated by passages from an example of intra-party deliberations of the 
“Palestinian Strategy Group” (in Ramsbotham, 2010). As a product of 
strategic thinking, the group developed the following threat scenarios for the 
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case that the negotiations with Israel are not developing in the desired 
direction:  
“[Switching to] the elevation of ‘smart’ resistance over negotiation as the 
main means of implementation for Palestinians […] The central aim will be to 
maximise the cost of continuing occupation for Israel, and to make the whole 
prospect of unilateral separation unworkable” (ibid.: 172); “if current 
negotiations fail, Palestinians will be driven to replace the 1988 offer by a 
new strategy, not just rhetorically, but in reality. The negotiated two state 
outcome will then be definitely cancelled. […] Israel will have lost a historic 
and non-recurrent opportunity to end the conflict and to secure its own future 
survival on the best terms available for Israel. […] An empty threat is 
strategically no threat. A mere bluff does not work” (ibid.: 173).  
It is far from clear how these threats will contribute towards easing the 
intergroup relations. The danger inherent in these words is obviously that 
Israel will react in a way typical for escalated conflict situations, viz. taking 
the threats as evidence for the danger emanating from the opponent (Glasl, 
1997). As the threats of opponents are only perceived in terms of their 
intimidating effects while the intentions behind are not directly accessible 
(Kempf, 2003), mistrust and escalation are likely to be fuelled even if the 
opponent attempts, as envisaged by Ramsbotham (2010), to couple the 
threats with the communication of intentions. Looking at the Israeli side, in 
turn, it could be argued that strategic thinking is their default modus of 
operation for top-level policy decisions (with the known outcomes), as these 
policies are partially generated through a parliamentary procedure, and are a 
matter of wide discourse within the Israeli society.  
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Ramsbotham (2010: 194) does not claim that strategic thinking will always 
lead to an improvement of intergroup relationships: “there is no reason why 
[strategic engagement of discourses] should be conducive to positive 
management of peacemaking. […] dialogue for strategic engagement does 
not assume that more contact means more understanding. It may result in 
the opposite.” It is hoped, however, that the quality of decisions is increased 
by the mentioned methods of an intra-party discursive inclusion and strategic 
deliberation. “The process [of an inclusive internal strategic engagement of 
discourses] does not dictate which particular outcome will prevail. But it helps 
to ensure that the pilots are not flying blind and that the rapidly opening and 
closing opportunities for a safe landing are noticed in time (ibid.: 203).  
Strategic thinking and intra-party inclusion can indeed be expected to be 
better than ad-hoc decisions produced in small isolated groups, but when the 
underlying premises are based on “exaggerations” and prejudices, it is not 
clear whether “opportunities for a safe landing” will be spotted in the first 
place. Strategic thinking based on wrong premises can even lead to the 
maintenance and escalation of the conflict via the communication of threats, 
as insinuated above. The well-known security dilemma in turn is a reminder 
of how strategic “defence” actions can propel the spiral of mistrust and 
“counter-measures”.  
Consequently, fostering strategic thinking amongst conflict parties is likely to 
improve the quality of decisions (when “quality of decision” is understood as 
“conducive for the aims of the own party”) only under the condition that the 
opponents’ intentions, aims, and strategies are well known. Even if, however, 
the opponent is assessed realistically, strategic thinking does not necessarily 
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lead to nonviolent policies, of course. When a party does not care for the 
other party’s well-being and is convinced that the opponent can be kept 
under control due to a considerable power asymmetry, then the strategy of 
choice could well be the power option. Ramsbotham (2010: 200) indicates 
that a chief “challenge” of “third-party peacemakers” is to “[persuade] the 
conflict parties that their undefeated political and moral-religious aspirations 
are from now on best pursued non-violently.”  
Describing a concrete process of mediation (partially hypothetical, but mainly 
assembled from various real cases), Curle (1990: 65) illustrates how 
fostering the reflection on potential courses of action, in an attempt to 
buttress the nonviolent route, can look like: “I understood when we last spoke 
that you were interested in mediation because you felt that to go for a purely 
military solution was too costly. Also it wouldn’t be a good solution because 
you would be left with a sullen and rebellious population which would 
continue the struggle by sabotage and industrial unrest and perhaps later by 
a renewal of violence. I was proposing a solution that is more likely to stick 
and if you want that, you’ll have to do it together with W.” 
Importantly, Ramsbotham (2010: 200) indicates that the nonviolent route can 
be more conducive to the interests of a conflict party even if this conflict party 
does not believe in the immediate option of a settlement jointly developed 
with the opponent. Specifically, Ramsbotham points out that nonviolence can 
be more effective via increasing the own side’s legitimacy: “A key argument 
[…] is that a definite giving up of violent resistance will put more pressure on 
[the opponent] to shift in the desired direction, not less” (ibid., original 
emphasis). The prospect for success of such an attempt of persuasion is, of 
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course, dependent on the conflict parties’ assessments of relative power. 
Only if conflict parties recognise problems in the route of forcing the own 
preferred outcome on the opponent, they are likely to consider alternatives. 
Doubts about the use of force can, as insinuated, either stem from care for 
the well-being of the opponent, or, probably more typical for violent conflicts, 
stem from scepticism on the practical long-term feasibility of powerful 
repression or containment of the opponent.  
As far as violent conflicts are concerned, the question under which conditions 
the stage of seeing violence as not conducive anymore is reached, is the 
subject of the “ripeness” debate (Coleman, 2006: 550; Ramsbotham et al., 
2005). Curle (1990: 91) points to the plausible dependence of the choice of 
means – violence vs. bargaining – on predicted success. “Factions certain of 
victory over their opponents are most likely to reject mediation. […] It is only 
when they are less successful than they had expected and feel the cold 
winds of fear and failure, that they will countenance mediation.”  
In sum, the practical recommendations of Curle (1990) regarding third-party 
interventions in the form of mediation contain elements of both strategic 
thinking and reduction of prejudices. Strategic thinking, however, which is 
central to Ramsbotham’s (2010) approach of “strategic engagement” as well 
as to Curle’s (1990) approach to mediation, promises to reduce the likelihood 
of violence if and only if conflict parties are in a process of doubting the 
feasibility or desirability of the violent route.  
Correcting the basis of strategic thinking  
As was argued, inclusive strategic thinking can avoid the dangers of badly 
deliberated decisions, but needs to be based on an appropriate image of the 
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other. Outlining the task of reducing prejudices, Curle (1990: 64) points out 
that “[m]ediation has to go on struggling unceasingly with the profound 
suspicion, laced with fear and hatred […] Only by constant reiteration of the 
arguments and erosion of prejudices in different contexts, and by pointing to 
specific incidents that convey a different impression, can a slow, and 
perhaps only slight, change be wrought.” The correction of the image of the 
other is described as the endeavour “to change the perception of 
protagonists concerning each others’ motives, feelings and intentions. If they 
can be brought to see that these are less vindictive, implacable, irrational, 
bloodthirsty and aggressive than they had thought, they may decide to 
negotiate seriously, sensibly and constructively” (ibid.: 82).  
As an essential aspect of correcting the image of the other, Curle (ibid.: 86) 
points to the requirement that conflict parties acquire a better understanding 
of how the opponent’s motivations have developed in the course of the 
conflict: “It is of utmost importance that they should grasp intellectually and 
emotionally if possible, what is happening. For example, they should realise 
why their enemies are afraid of them and that much of their violence springs 
from fear rather than brutality. […] They should see how it is that the 
pressures of war make us all desperate and that in our desperation we are 
apt to become violent, vindictive, tunnel visioned and irrational.”  
Compatible with Ramsbotham’s (2010) focus on strategic thinking, Curle 
(1990) emphasises that a reflection on potential courses of action and their 
associated costs is a central ingredient of mediation. Curle, however, links 
this process of deliberation to the necessity of grounding this reflection on a 
realistic basis of information. For building a realistic basis Curle points not 
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only to the importance of correcting the image of the other, as covered 
above, but also indicates that parties need to reflect on their true interests. 
Only after the image of the other has been corrected and the own interests 
have been reflected, the process of weighting alternative routes of action in 
terms of their costs and benefits has a realistic basis. “Active mediation is 
also directed towards helping each protagonist to clarify and assess his or 
her objectives. How valid are their aims; what level of sacrifice is reasonable 
to achieve them? Such goals can easily obtain a sort of mythic sanctity 
completely unrelated to the true needs of a nation” (ibid.: 83-4). “The task of 
mediation, always, everywhere, is to find ways of reducing tension and 
enabling the opponents to stand back from the obsessive fears, suspicions 
and hatreds that have come to dominate their minds; to see each other and 
their dispute more rationally in terms of what is of real interest to them and 
others involved” (ibid.: 98).  
Seeing mutual hatred and distrust as essential in fuelling the conflict spiral, 
Curle (1990) indicates, as already cited, that prejudices need to be eroded by 
arguments and “pointing to [those] incidents” that deviate from the negative 
expectations. As such incidents can be rare in contexts of violent struggle, an 
enormous significance accrues to trustbuilding steps. While the examples of 
Curle (1990) are chiefly drawn from the level of main political decision-
makers, there are evident parallels to the rationale of trustbuilding and 
exchange endeavours by NGOs, presented at length above. On both levels, 
reducing enmity is arguably essential to render cohabitation an option that is 
conceivable for the parties, and is the precondition for collaborative 
measures and future exchanges.  
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Curle (ibid.: 78) describes through means of a conversation (partially 
hypothetical, but mainly assembled from various real cases) how a third-
party can try to convince conflict parties’ decision makers about the 
requirement of such steps: “the fact that both of you dislike and distrust each 
other so much makes [a confidence-building step] necessary, if you are 
really interested in a negotiated peace instead of continued reciprocal 
slaughter, to make a gesture of good faith.” When the option of initiating 
trustbuilding steps is considered, the third-party’s assistance to deliberating 
the consequences of alternative actions is pertinent. “[E]verything you do in 
war is risky, including doing nothing or making the automatic conventional 
response. But it’s really a question of odds. In this case you might lose a little 
if things went wrong. But if things went right, you might gain peace. So it 
could be a worthwhile gamble” (ibid.: 68). In the process of the ensuing 
deliberations of alternative routes of action, Curle described how a third-party 
mediator can attempt to accompany this deliberation by constantly assisting 
in considering the opponents’ likely reactions, through statements as: “your 
offer probably seemed more like a threat; something which could never be 
accepted without loss of face.” (ibid.: 65) 
Finding temporary settlements on the route towards solutions 
In the above discussion of Ramsbotham’s (2010) focus on strategic thinking 
in relation to Curle’s (1990) recommendations of mediation, four categories 
of constituents for dealing with intense violent conflict have been 
encountered: Fostering inclusive strategic thinking on the alternative routes 
of action, under consideration of their costs and likely consequences; 
correcting conflict parties assumptions about their opponent; reflecting on the 
 389 
true interests of the own side; and encouraging disputants to venture 
trustbuilding steps in order to demonstrate to the opponent the own side’s 
willingness to sound jointly the scope for a solution.  
To these four constituents of third-party intervention a fifth one is added by 
Ramsbotham’s analysis on the requirements for a aspired (intermediate) 
settlement. Ramsbotham (2010: 200) indicates that “the challenge” of “third-
party peacemakers in relation to the two chief components of any future 
settlement”, is constituted, on the one hand, by the mentioned attempt to 
convince “conflict parties that their […] aspirations are from now on best 
pursued non-violently.” Interrelated with this requirement is a similar task, 
consisting of finding a settlement in the form of a “political framework” (ibid.) 
which can convince the parties that this settlement, even though it cannot 
address all of their interests, is a useful step towards a more comprehensive 
fulfilment of their aspirations: “The settlement is not itself the terminus or end 
of conflict. The conflict – and the radical disagreement that goes with it – 
continues. The precious gift that third-party peacemakers have to offer is 
hope” (ibid.: 201). This fifth constituent or task of third-party intervention 
thereby consists of trying to find a intermediate solution to the conflict 
constellation which signals to the involved conflict parties that momentum is 
kept or created towards their desired state of affairs.  
This constituent roughly corresponds to the recommendation of Burgess and 
Burgess (1996; in Coleman, 2006: 550), who propose, in the words of 
Coleman, “creating [in a situation of intractable conflict] a process of 
confrontation that disputants find to be both effective (in terms of minimizing 
the negative costs of the conflict and maximizing the benefits) and fair or just 
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(in terms of broad moral concerns).” Coleman (ibid.) points out that this is 
“[t]o a large extent, […] what emerged with the Good Friday peace 
agreement in Northern Ireland, where a political process was established 
(home rule and a power-sharing arrangement between the communities) 
whose agenda it was to tackle some of the substantive problems associated 
with the conflict”.  
Shifting from the idea to find a comprehensive settlement to an approach 
which conceptualises settlements as intermediate stations on the way 
towards a more complete solution has also a further, maybe most decisive, 
advantage. While a conflict constellation can consist of competing 
aspirations which are too contradictory to be accommodated in any potential 
settlement, Michels (1994) indicates that a partial settlement can change the 
aspirations themselves. Michels (ibid.: 36) claims that it is unrealistic to 
expect that the convictions of conflict parties can change through 
negotiations, arguing that “changes […] must seem to take place outside 
negotiations and within acceptable limits set by national [desires]”.  
Correspondingly, Michels (ibid.) praises the Oslo agreement for “wisely 
[postponing] negotiations that will require significant alterations in Israeli or 
Palestinian [convictions], and modestly [striving] to provide a stepping-stone 
for further agreements.” The rationale is that through a step-by-step 
approach of successive agreements the self-definition of the own party as 
well as the image of the conflict constellation will change, to the effect that 
topics on which currently now settlement is in sight should be deferred to 
later stages. “After the first stage of implementation is completed, and both 
Palestinians and Israelis begin to see the tangible results of the agreement, 
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two factors should make further negotiations somewhat easier. The first is 
that changes in [the realities on the ground] inevitably result in both 
reconsideration of [what has led to these realities] and changes in the 
national vision (what is acceptable and what is ‘national’)” (ibid.: 37).  
Although this step-by-step approach seems to be highly plausible and 
promising, the experiences after the Oslo agreement suggest that it is not a 
panacea for dealing with such deep conflicts. The reasons for the Oslo 
agreement’s lack of success are of course likely to be manifold, but obviously 
indicates the dissatisfaction by sections of the conflict parties. Part of this 
dissatisfaction could relate to a weakness in the step-by-step approach, 
which is indicated by Coleman (2006) and Ramsbotham (2010). Coleman 
(ibid.: 550) suspects that “establishing a constructive process might be a 
particularly useful strategy in the early phases of a conflict resolution process 
to create a sense of possibility, but that eventually, if the stakes are high, the 
disputants will demand a focus on the substance of their concerns”. In a 
similar vein, Ramsbotham (ibid.: 210) indicates that in the context of 
intractable conflicts there can be constellations of asymmetric power which 
entail that “the question of ‘incremental’ vs. ‘final state’ processes is part of 
what is at issue”, when the currently advantaged conflict party “favour[s] the 
first”, and the disadvantaged “favour[s] the second”.  
A comprehensive solution which addresses all the substantive aspirations of 
the conflict parties through one final settlement is, of course, the most 
desirable result of third-party intervention. Obviously, however, the defining 
feature of an intractable conflict or radical disagreement is that so far no such 
mutual acceptable settlement could be devised. It is, of course, always 
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essential to exhaustively sound the scope for win-win solutions, which is e.g. 
the rationale of the application of need theories – discussed in chapter one – 
or of proposals aiming at the creation of innovative concepts, such as 
Galtung’s (2002: 140) ideas of “non-territoriality” and “joint sovereignty”. 
Such proposals and ideas for comprehensive win-win solutions are always 
highly desirable. Ramsbotham (2010: 203) hopes that strategic thinking 
might enable the detection or creation of such solutions within an 
environment of changing contingencies, as cited above: “[an inclusive 
internal strategic engagement of discourses] does not dictate which 
particular outcome will prevail. But it helps to ensure that the pilots are not 
flying blind and that the rapidly opening and closing opportunities for a safe 
landing are noticed in time.” As acknowledged above, this hope linked to 
strategic thinking is one of the reasons why strategic thinking seems to be 
promising as an element for dealing with highly escalated conflicts, alongside 
with the other tools mentioned.  
When however the current differences are too immense to allow any 
construction of a mutually acceptable settlement, there is no evident 
alternative to deferring some contested issues to the future, and hoping that 
trustbuilding measures will yield changes in the convictions and aspirations 
that will some day open new opportunities. An essential ingredient for this 
endeavour is plausibly the task, mentioned above, to design an intermediate 
settlement in such a way that it can be seen as sustaining momentum 
towards a more comprehensive solution, keeping alive the conflict parties’ 
hope that their aspirations will be more fully addressed in the future. This 
task is obviously more likely to succeed if the – so-far intractable but 
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substantial – issues can be addressed at least partially by the intermediate 
settlement, and when a basic level of trust has been built.  
In summary, trustbuilding measures can consist of correcting the 
assumptions of the political decision-makers, of changing conflict parties’ 
assumptions by incremental settlements, as well as of intergroup projects 
conducted by NGOs on the local level. Mediation can correct the 
assumptions of decision-makers about their opponents, thereby improving 
the basis on which the costs of potential courses of actions are assessed 
(Curle, 1990). Incremental settlements can change “the realities on the 
ground”, as Michels indicates (1994: 37), and thereby have the potential to 
“precipitate both reconsideration of [what has led to these realities] and 
changes in the national vision (what is acceptable and what is ‘national’)” 
(ibid.). NGO work can help on the societal ground to improve rife 
assumptions about the opponent, thereby changing the wide-spread 
premises on which the conflict behaviour is founded. All these varieties of 
trustbuilding measures are able to change the conflict parties’ assumptions 
about the opponent and modify their aspirations, thereby creating a more 
realistic basis of premises for strategic thinking. The quality of this strategic 
thinking in turn, founded on this more realistic basis, is further increased by 
fostering thorough and inclusive deliberation processes, increasing the 
likelihood that new opportunities are detected as envisaged by Ramsbotham 
(2010).  
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Dealing with persisting differences revisited: An integrative model 
for dealing with deep disagreements 
The ideal to which this combination of measures aspires is a de-escalatory 
spiral of mutually reinforcing steps, constituted by trustbuilding measures on 
various levels, intermediate settlements, and thorough deliberations, while 
preparing future opportunities for win-win opportunities, which in turn can be 
spotted easier by a systematic elucidation of options. A further additive to 
this process is the essential sphere of dealing with the past. In interaction 
with steps of trustbuilding and personalisation, the undermining of double 
standards – in the assessment of atrocities committed by the own side vs. 
those committed by the opponent –, changes the image of past war events 
and thereby the image of the own party relative to the other party, thereby 
decreasing a central obstacle to mutual recognition and to the conceivability 
of peaceful cohabitation.  
Even if the long journey of trustbuilding has corrected wrong assumptions 
about one another and yielded mutual respect, however, some differences 
might persist, as was argued in the section on “Dealing with intergroup 
Differences” above. These differences, which are now between disputants 
who respect one another as equal in value, can be of a religious, cultural, or 
ideological nature. The problems faced with such remaining differences are 
likely to be analogous to the deep disagreement encountered in the 
mentioned “family quarrel” (Ramsbotham 2010: 8-13). As sketched above, 
this quarrel involved a deep disagreement between two family members; in 
this disagreement the disputants found the opinion of the other utterly wrong 
and even offensive, while, hopefully, still respecting one another’s humanity 
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to a comprehensive degree. This example alongside with the intergroup 
differences covered above indicate that respecting fully the humanity of one 
another is not necessarily sufficient for arriving at an agreement. In cases of 
such deep differences, the only alternatives to forcing one position upon the 
other are the options mentioned above, viz. construing a modus vivendi 
enabling the cohabitation with these persisting differences, or to continue 
exchanges on the topic of the disagreement in the hope for a future 
agreement.  
The modus vivendi option necessitates some degree of tolerance for the 
other’s position, while a continuation of the disagreement would require that 
a long-term change in one or both of the positions is deemed realistic. For 
cases in which solely the latter option is feasible, NGO activists emphasised 
the importance of establishing a communicative framework which manifests 
sufficient mutual respect towards the other, as mentioned, for the focus of 
the discussion to remain on exchanges in an open atmosphere.  
When this orientation towards exchange has been created, the willingness 
for continuing dialogue is an indication of the disputants’ conviction that the 
own arguments and value orientations possess convincing power due to their 
factual rightness and/or because of the appeal of the involved values. This 
topic will be further examined in the following section “Theoretical 
frameworks in relation to radical disagreement.”  
This latter option, suggested by NGO activists, is thereby analogous to the 
described element contained in Ramsbotham’s (2010: 201) approach, 
consisting of the attempt to convince the conflict parties that a devised 
intermediate settlement is a useful stepping stone on the route towards a 
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fuller realisation of their aspirations. In both cases, it is the hope that the 
future will enable a solution that might keep alive the nonviolent exchange. 
The essential watershed between these two approaches consists of the 
degree of mutual respect. As long as the other is not fully recognised, an 
intermediate settlement might be necessary which can increase mutual 
respect and trustbuilding by a demonstration that both sides are interested in 
nonviolent collaboration. If, on the other hand, mutual respect is present or 
has been established, the hope consists of the possibility that one or both 
sides will somewhat move in their positions, or that one day an mutually 
acceptable innovative option for accommodating the differences can be 
devised, depending on the nature of the disagreement, as will be discussed 
in the following section.  
 
Theoretical frameworks in relation to radical disagreements 
As mentioned, Ramsbotham (2010: 133) argues that “[t]here is no theory or 
philosophy of radical disagreement”. The central argument for this claim 
appears to be that no extant philosophy sufficiently incorporated the logical 
contradiction which separates the statements of radically disagreeing parties, 
rendering radical disagreements “polylogical” (ibid.: 119): “At the heart of 
radical disagreement itself in written notation is a contradiction, a logical 
scandal:  
p     not-p 
But in the normal ‘third-party’ convention this is written:  
‘p’   ‘not-p’ 
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And now the notation of inverted commas – the usual notation for 
conversation in general – reduces the scandal to a banality” (ibid.: 129). 
From this definition of the essence of radical disagreement it is deduced that 
“[t]here is no adequate third-party monological depiction” (ibid. 130).  
Theories in relation to logical contradictions  
Everything depends of course on the criteria, which are stipulated for a 
philosophy or theory, to be fulfilled in order for a philosophy or theory to be 
accepted as encompassing radical disagreements. According to 
Ramsbotham (2010: 130), a defining characteristic of radical disagreements 
is that “third-party account[s] [are] explicitly rejected by […] conflict parties 
[…] that is what lies at the heart of the linguistic intractability.” The fact that 
third party descriptions cannot be accepted by all of the conflict parties 
follows logically from Ramsbotham’s defining aspect of radical disagreement 
just cited, i.e. from defining radical disagreements as consisting of the 
confrontation of claims that are logically incompatible.  
The fact that a third-party account is rejected by conflict parties is, however, 
no argument for its incorrectness, and is therefore not a logical criterion for 
disregarding a theory. If one expects a theory of radical disagreement to 
imply that the statements of the radically disagreeing parties are of equal 
epistemic/ontological standing, i.e. are equally true or valid, then of course 
one is asking for an impossibility. Asking for a theory which is not just 
describing a logical contradiction, but is containing a logical contradiction, is 
asking for a internally inconsistent theory.  
Due to the inherent contradiction of radial disagreements, a position of 
relativism, e.g. in the variety of social constructionism (e.g. Gergen, 1999), 
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might appear attractive. Such relativism is inherent in Ramsbotham’s reading 
of the notation “‘p’   ‘not-p’” just mentioned (Ramsbotham, 2005: 129). 
However, it should be noted that even such a social constructionist 
description constitutes a definite statement, which claims that ‘p’ and ‘not-p’ 
are on the same ontological level. This perspective, however, is marred by 
even two logical contradictions. If both ‘p’ and ‘not-p’ are regarded as 
possible perspectives, the initial logical contradiction has not been dissolved. 
Unless such a theory neutralises the contradiction by changing the actual 
meaning of the statements ‘p’ and ‘not-p’, the logical clash inevitably remains 
intact.  
A philosophy of relativism contains, furthermore, the related logical 
contradiction that consists of positing a clear claim on the relative status of 
statements in general, viz. declaring the content of all statements as 
ontological equal. However, this claim is a statement in itself. As there are 
obviously theories which contradict relativism, relativism practically makes 
the logically impossible statement: “it is correct and false at the same time 
that the content of all statements is ontologically equal”. As elucidated in the 
methodology section, Wittgenstein (1969) taught us that every statement and 
action is based on trust in some premises. Declaring the content of all 
statements as ontologically equal – so that those which contradict the own 
convictions are equal to the own statements – is a variety of a hyperbolic 
doubt, which was identified by Wittgenstein (ibid.) as logically inconsistent. 
When everything was doubted, this would include doubt on whether words 
have meanings, to the effect that the basis for expressing any statements 
would be dissolved by such universal doubt. In other words, doubting 
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everything would be like saying: “Everything can be doubted – the content of 
all statements is ontologically equal – but this sentence can be meaningless 
or wrong.”  
As outlined in the first chapter of this thesis, the art of conflict resolution 
partially consists of finding creative solutions to apparent contradictions. 
Such apparent contradictions, however, for which an accommodating 
solution can be found, cannot be logical contradictions, even when they 
might appear on the surface as such. Ropers (2008: 17-19) for example 
claims that the “binary logic of the European tradition” can be overcome by 
introducing more options to a conflict, but misidentifies the nature of a formal-
logical contradiction. Ropers’ (ibid.) example for “overcoming binary logic” 
turns out to be of the form “if party one favours self-determination for the 
region and party two wants the region to stay part of a larger country, a third 
position is to establish a federation”. This, however, is not a logical 
contradiction.  
In the context of formal logic, the statement “A” implies by definition that “not 
A”, rendering “A and not A” an impossibility. A case within a conflict 
constellation closer to a logical contradiction would be “party one favours 
self-determination, and party one does not favour self-determination”. Such a 
statement, however, is simply wrong or incomprehensible, unless it’s 
meaning is specified in such a way that the logical contradiction is dissolved 
(Putnam, 1994: 255-8). As logic is fundamental to the definition of reasoning, 
asking for overcoming logic would imply asking to overcome the basis of 
thinking. Consequently, it is indeed impossible that there is a “theory or 
philosophy of radical disagreement” (Ramsbotham, 2010: 133) when such a 
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theory is supposed to neutralise the logical contradiction inherent in the 
disagreement.  
Theories taking sides on factual and normative disagreements 
Is all what can be said philosophically about radical disagreements that there 
cannot be a theory incorporating the mutually exclusive positions constitutive 
of the radical disagreement? There is much more to say if one gives up the 
idea that such a philosophy needs to be incorporating logically contradictory 
positions. Only when it is required that both sides of the radical disagreement 
are to be accommodated as epistemologically and ontologically equal, a cul-
de-sac is reached. As soon as it is accepted that the factual and/or 
evaluative claims of one side, or both sides, can be at least partially wrong, 
the realm of theoretical options re-opens.  
Comparatively easy for conceptualisation are those disagreements which 
centre on the world of objects. In the history of humankind there were radical 
disagreements involving factual beliefs about all sorts of things on which we 
nowadays are happy to take sides, as in the disagreement between the 
Heliocentric vs. Ptolemaic worldview. This factual disagreement clearly 
fulfilled the criterion of involving a logical contradiction, as the sun and the 
other planets cannot orbit the earth when at the same time the sun is orbited 
by the planets including the earth. These are mutually exclusive positions, 
and during some period the accessible observations seemed to be 
compatible, albeit with varying plausibility, with both systems of factual 
beliefs. Still, we are happy nowadays to declare the Ptolemaic model as 
mistaken, as it violates observations related to factual beliefs which are 
nowadays basic. The reference to this profane example does not imply, of 
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course, that most of today’s radical disagreements can be decided or will be 
decided by future factual beliefs. It illustrates, however, that radical 
disagreements centring on the world of objects typically involve clear criteria 
to judge under which conditions one side of the disagreement is wrong.  
Barring theories of radical disagreements from the possibility to contradict 
one or both sides of the disagreements is also analytically impractical when 
there are indications that misunderstandings are involved within a particular 
disagreement. As Ramsbotham (ibid.: 130) argues, “[a]gain and again under 
the moment of alignment, conflict parties find that the question whether they 
are each arguing about the same thing becomes what is at issue: |’You have 
misunderstood me.’  ;  ‘I have understood you perfectly – you are wrong.’|” It 
is important to note that there can be situations in which third-parties become 
convinced that one party is indeed misunderstanding the other, even though 
one of the conflict parties contests that there is a misunderstanding, or even 
when the misunderstanding is not noticed by any conflict party.  
The intervention strategy of these third parties would most likely consist of 
trying to clear this misunderstanding. This intervention would thereby differ to 
those interventions whose analysis would by choice be oriented towards 
agnosticism in this regard, motivated by the wish to give primacy to the 
contradiction of the conflict parties. In practice, third-parties regarding a 
confrontation as a misunderstanding would typically try to dissolve the 
misunderstanding by trying to show the conflict parties that they are missing 
one another’s points. The intervention strategy is likely to be different when 
the confrontation is regarded as a disagreement on substantive content. 
Third-parties should obviously always choose the approach which seems to 
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be most promising given the analysis of the conflict constellation. If they 
would limit themselves in their theoretical description of the conflict in an 
attempt to accommodate the disputant’s positions, despite of the conflict 
parties’ contradicting analyses and convictions, third parties would practically 
act against their best knowledge. More generally, if primacy is given to the 
definitions of the conflict parties, it is not clear why third-parties, with their 
partially contested interests and values, should become involved in the first 
place.  
Radical disagreements with which conflict resolution and peacebuilding 
attempts deal are, of course, not chiefly about the world of objects, thereby 
involving a different level of complexity than the example on the heliocentric 
model just mentioned. They usually involve the moral judgements of actions 
– which in turn are frequently interrelated with religious, ideological, or 
metaphysical questions – and are thereby much more complicated.  
Ramsbotham (2010: 126) states that in situations of radical disagreement 
facts, values, and emotions are closely intertwined, illustrated by the 
mentioned example of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict: “It is the fact of the 
outrage that immediately elicits indignation and the steely will never to rest 
until the wrong is righted. The indignation felt by Palestinians is not 
separable from the fact of what happened in the Naqba and the fundamental 
norms of natural justice that were thereby violated and must now be 
restored. […] Emotion is woven through the fact/value complex at the core of 
radical disagreement” (original emphasis). Assessing this side of the radical 
disagreement from a third-party perspective is clearly not just a question of 
deciding on the basis of factual beliefs about the world of objects. Involved 
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are not just questions on movements in the world of objects, but questions 
on the morality of actions.  
Evaluative terms used to describe social actions are often embedded into a 
particular evaluative perspective, as Putnam (1990, 2005, 2007) indicates. 
The employment of such evaluative terms implies that particular contextual 
details, potentially involving the intentions of the actors, are present. These 
evaluative terms are thereby themselves a manifestation of how description 
and evaluation fuse, as illustrated by Cavell’s analysis (1979, 264-5, original 
emphasis; cited in Putnam, 2007: 10): “If […] we take the case of some 
specific action, then we might take a case in which the ‘action’ in question is 
described in ethically prejudicial terms (e.g. ‘Ought he to have murdered him’ 
rather than ‘…killed him?’, or ‘Was he wrong to betray him?’ rather than ‘…to 
refuse to do what he said?’), or else we might feel that any agreement about 
the morality of an act will turn on some agreement about how the act is to be 
described. Was it really breaking a promise? […] Apparently, what the ‘case’ 
in question is forms part of the content of the moral argument itself”.  
 
Theories on disagreements in relation to Facts and Values  
This entanglement of moral evaluation and description of actions renders it 
indeed more complicated to arrive at an agreement about which actions took 
place and how to evaluate them. As there can be differences in norms 
specifying which actions are under particular conditions legitimised, the 
disagreements in facts and values can constitute a complex compound. 
Given this close relationship between facts and values, it is tempting to 
accept their “fusion” (Ramsbotham, 2010: 125-6) in situations of radical 
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disagreement. “The distinction between fact (reference to the one objective 
world) and value (reference to norms in the shared social world) is regularly 
invoked. But the moments of radical disagreeing have shown that in the 
intense heat of radical disagreement they are fused together from the 
beginning.[…] This already-achieved complex exists prior to any explicit 
challenge and is carried as an amalgam into the ensuing radical 
disagreement”.  
A third-party analysis, however, can profit from keeping facts and values 
conceptually separated. While in the case of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict 
some of the facts are highly contested, there are others about which 
agreement seems to be possible, at least in principle. Importantly, one 
defining aspect of factual beliefs is that it is clearly specifiable under which 
conditions a factual belief is assertable. There are relevant aspects involved 
in this specific conflict about which there is probably little disagreement, as 
for example how many people are living inside of certain areas or refugee 
camps. There are certainly other factual beliefs involved in this conflict which 
are highly controversial, but due to the nature of factual beliefs, it is defined 
which conditions would render a particular factual belief assertable.  
Even when, however, a topic area is controversial due to the involvement of 
moral evaluation and intentions, such as in the case of the term “forceful 
evictions”, the concept is largely defined by linguistic practice, to the effect 
that conflict parties should agree at least in the abstract which conditions 
would define a forceful eviction. Even though there can be deep 
disagreements about how an action in the past should be termed, this is not 
a clash of arbitrary “Humpty Dumpty definitions” (of the sort “‘When I use a 
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word […] it means just what I choose it to mean’”, Carroll, 2009: 190 [1872]), 
but a disagreement on what context conditions were present. Going one step 
further: when the values of the conflict parties were similar, actions in the 
abstract would have to entail similar evaluations. This was the basis for NGO 
measures, presented in previous sections, which aimed at reducing double 
standards. The possibility of moving closer towards an understanding in 
situations of radical disagreements is therefore dependent on the degree to 
which values, at least in the abstract, are shared. If some values really 
possessed a “wide” nearly-universal “appeal”, as claimed by Putnam (2008: 
385), there would be a ground for hoping that the reduction of double 
standards could in principle be successful in a variety of settings.  
 
The inevitability of the involvement of convictions in any theory 
The involvement of values in even the description of social actions suggests 
that there is indeed no neutral third-party position of description of radical 
disagreements, if neutral is supposed to mean independence from third-party 
values and convictions. However, as was argued in previous chapters, 
values are anyway universally involved in any actions, including language. 
The use of language already implies, as Wittgenstein (1969) indicates, that 
certain factual assumptions and values are trusted. Without trust in factual 
assumptions, language use would not be possible, as, minimally, at least 
trust in the meanings of the used words is required. Without trust in values, 
language use and other actions would not have any direction. 
This inevitability of an involvement of factual beliefs and values in the 
creation of any propositions sheds a particular light on the statement that 
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“third-parties, whether as analysts or as interveners, are not discursively 
impartial” (Ramsbotham, 2010: 165). It does solely follow that “[t]here is no 
adequate third-party description or philosophy of radical disagreement” (ibid.) 
if such a third-party philosophy would be required to embrace logically 
contradictory positions of conflict parties, as argued above. As soon as 
evaluative and factual convictions of the third-party are allowed to enter the 
stage, a third-party philosophy of radical disagreement is possible.  
Such conviction-guided third-parties will not be “impartial” in the sense of 
neutral towards violations of values, and not free from own factual 
convictions. These evaluative and factual convictions entail that third-parties 
are likely to frequently contradict, in thought and/or deed, conflict parties on 
also essential issues. However, this does still allow them to be impartial in 
the sense of applying their convictions (and carrying these convictions 
across contexts of conflicts) independently of which conflict side contradicts 
elements of these convictions. Ramsbotham’s (2010: 168-9) indicates that 
“[third party discourses are] yet further discourses struggling to occupy the 
whole of the discursive space and to dictate the course of unfolding events.” 
This insight on the status of third-party descriptions and evaluations is 
essential for the conceptualisation of third-party roles in radical 
disagreements, but from this insight does not follow that third-party 
descriptions and evaluations cannot be true.  
The fact that third-party descriptions and philosophies are contested by the 
conflict parties is no criterion for stipulating such descriptions as 
inappropriate. Third-party descriptions and philosophies of radical 
disagreements will be rejected by some, but that is a characteristic for any 
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statement and any philosophy. When a factual and/or evaluative statement is 
produced, it is inherently claimed that the statement is true (cf. Habermas’ 
“validity claims”, 1995). What renders it true is not that everybody will agree 
with it.  
Universal agreement cannot be a criterion for the truth of a statement, since, 
on the one hand, it is practically never achieved (Putnam, 2008), and, on the 
other hand, since the concept of “truth” does not mean “potential to yield 
universal agreement”, but implies absolute rightness. Habermas’ (1995) strict 
orientation towards discursive agreement in describing how factual and 
evaluative conflicts are typically addressed in everyday life should not be 
misunderstood as the view that the essence of truth was social agreement. 
Habermas (2004: 291-2) explicitly rejects such a conceptualisation of truth, 
and indicates that “the meaning of the truth of assertions is not reducible to 
even the most demanding conditions of corroboration: truth goes beyond 
idealized justification”. As was argued above, once a third-party description 
or philosophy is freed from the requirement to become fully accepted by 
conflict parties of a radical disagreement, such a third-party philosophy 
becomes possible.  
What, then, is an appropriate philosophy of radical disagreement? A 
philosophy of radical disagreement is a philosophy – on particular aspects of 
the world – which is true. On which aspects of the world? This depends on 
the reach expected from the theory, potentially including factual and 
evaluative convictions alongside with theories of sciences, theories on 
history, sociology, psychology, etc. Ramsbotham (2010: 131) states that 
“what makes this my opinion is – precisely and only – the fact that it is a true 
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opinion. A true opinion is my opinion. And that is what is carried, as a single 
complex, into the radical disagreement – to be torn apart” (original 
emphasis). The truth of statements and philosophies can be contested 
indeed, and within radical disagreements statements on essential elements 
of the conflict will be contested by definition, but controversy does not 
compromise truth. Authors always claim to know best and to utter the truth; 
that is the point of propositional statements. As Habermas (2004: 249) 
indicates, “communication cannot work, unless the participants refer to a 
single objective world, thereby stabilising the intersubjectively shared public 
space”.  
It might appear pretentious to conceptualise a philosophy or description of 
radical disagreement as true, but in fact it is inevitable. It is not clear why 
third-parties should try to become involved in a radical disagreement in the 
first place if they would not trust in their convictions, interests, and values. As 
was outlined repeatedly in previous sections, any action and any utterance 
implies trust in some premises, as Wittgenstein (1969) elucidated, while 
doubting anything needs reasons. As argued, our actions, including our 
statements, require values that give them direction and are based on factual 
assumptions that provide the connection between this action/statement and 
the aspired direction. Thereby, all assertions imply trust in truth, so that 
indeed every speaker implies that his opinion is a true opinion. Others will 
judge the truth of the utterance by its relationship to the fundamental beliefs, 
values, and empirical propositions held by them, with an orientation to truth 
that is not reducible to mutual agreement. The theory of radical disagreement 
proposed here must correspondingly be claiming truth, and is constituted by 
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the above argumentation on radical disagreement, of which major points are 
summarised in the next section.  
 
Concluding summary on dealing with deep disagreements 
Main aspects of this argumentation on deep disagreement outlined were, 
drawing chiefly on Ramsbotham (2010), Curle (1990), Burgess and Burgess 
(1996), Michels (1994), Putnam (1990, 2005, 2007), Wittgenstein (1969), 
and the experiences of the investigated NGOs:  
Depending on the conflict constellation being intertwined with a particular 
radical disagreement, the appropriate combination of elements of 
approaches varies. Essential watersheds are constituted by the degree of 
mutual respect amongst disputants and towards the opponent’s position.  
If mutual respect is present and the opposing positions can be mutually 
tolerated, the clash of positions or principles does not challenge cohabitation.  
If mutual respect is present but the other’s position cannot be tolerated, 
creative solutions are required. Either an innovative modus vivendi can be 
devised which is based on parties’ common interests and accommodates the 
parties’ adherence to their convictions, or a conversational framework has to 
be found which enables the continuation of the disagreement with an 
orientation on exchange, in the hope that one or both sides’ positions will 
move in the long-term.  
In cases of escalated intergroup conflicts, when neither respect for the 
opponent nor for its position is present, fostering inclusive strategic thinking 
on the alternative routes of action through consideration of their costs and 
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likely consequences (Ramsbotham, 2010; Curle, 1990) improves, by 
definition, the quality of a decision, when “quality” is understood as being 
more informed and reflected. A task of third-party interveners at this stage 
can be, depending on the context of the conflict, to convince the parties that 
a nonviolent strategy is most effective in accruing legitimacy to the own side 
(Ramsbotham, 2010).  
Such a well-deliberated choice, however, can still precipitate catastrophic 
conflict escalation, especially when the decision is based on exaggerated 
and wrong assessments of the opponent’s intentions and underlying 
interests, as well as when there is a lack of reflection on the own interests. 
Correcting views about the opponent and increasing reflection about the 
nature of the own interests is therefore essential (Curle, 1990). Approaches 
to trustbuilding can take different routes, depending on the context of the 
particular conflict. When the political decision-makers on both sides assess 
the option of unlimited force as (becoming) too costly, there can be scope for 
mediation (cf. Coleman, 2006: 550; cf. Ramsbotham et al., 2005), which can 
enable third-parties to directly correct the view on the other and the view on 
the true interests of the own side (Curle, 1990). It can also encourage 
disputants to venture trustbuilding steps in order to demonstrate to the 
opponent the own side’s willingness to sound jointly the scope for a solution 
(ibid.).  
These trustbuilding measures on the level of political decision makers are 
highly relevant, but the scope for political decision makers is limited by the 
fears and aspirations of their political constituencies (cf. Curle, 1990). That is 
why it is so important that moves are initiated which can change the 
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assumptions about the opponent and induce reflections on the own role in 
the conflict (Michels, 1994; cf. Curle, 1990). These moves, however, do not 
need to be instigated at the top, when local NGOs have the political space to 
engage in intergroup trustbuilding (cf. Lederach, 2003). These local initiatives 
are of particular importance, of course, when the top-level is unwilling or 
unable to improve intergroup relations. Amongst the array of trustbuilding 
measures which were encountered in previous sections were: cooperation 
projects on relevant commonalities such as similar interests and needs; 
encounter situations in which prejudices were corrected; induced changes in 
the assessment of the conflict parties’ roles in the war by recognising crimes 
of the own side, partially through unearthing and reducing double standards; 
and an orientation towards a more promising future based on common 
values.  
In any case, it is the rife assumptions about the opponent and about the own 
side in highly escalated conflicts that need to change, and this change would 
ideally be brought about initiatives from the top as well as from the bottom, 
supplementing one another.  
Intermediate settlements do not only have the potential to redefine the 
mutual relationship by changing mutual assumptions (Michels, 1994), but 
must also function as an indication for the conflict parties that there is some 
momentum towards their aspired aims, by creating a political process 
through which the disagreement can be continued (Burgess and Burgess, 
1996, in Coleman, 2006; Ramsbotham, 2010). This orientation towards a 
continuation of the disagreement through a political process with the aim of 
winning (Ramsbotham, 2010: 200-1) is analogous to the NGO approaches of 
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continuing the disagreement in a framework orientated towards exchange 
with the aim of convincing the other. In both cases, it is the hope towards 
long-term change in the parties’ positions and/or context factors that is on the 
basis of continued engagement. 
When a philosophy or theory on radical disagreements is proposed, it 
necessarily involves factual assumptions and values, since, as Wittgenstein 
(1969) indicates, any statement requires trust in assumptions and values. 
(Without trust in factual assumptions, language use would not be possible, 
as, minimally, at least trust in the meanings of the used words is required; 
without trust in values, language use and other actions would not have any 
direction.) The form of a theory on radical disagreements depends on the 
reach which is expected from such a theory. As radical disagreements are 
defined by Ramsbotham (2010) as involving a logical contradiction amongst 
the disputants, a theory which is supposed to comment on the substance of 
a particular disagreement will be inevitably contradicted by at least one of the 
conflict parties. Expecting a theory to embrace a logical contradiction is 
asking for an impossibility, since this request amounts to asking for giving up 
reasoning. Correspondingly, any theory which is supposed to substantially 
comment on the content of a radical disagreement will have to contradict one 
or both of the conflict parties in some respect, when a radical disagreement 
is defined as containing a logical contradiction.  
If third-parties would not disagree with at least one of the parties on aspects 
of either this parties’ ends or means, there would not be a motivation for any 
intervention in the first place either. Even when a third-party expresses that a 
contested area should be approached with agnosticism, it utters a factual 
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(meta-)statement referring to the basis of the assumptions involved in the 
particular radical disagreement, by expressing the proposition that the factual 
or normative basis of the contested issue is insufficient to enable a decision. 
In general, any theory commenting on the substance of a topic will by 
definition involve a factual or evaluative statement, thereby inherently 
claiming to know best, irrespective of any others’ disagreement with the 
theory. As Habermas (2004: 291-2) indicates, the meaning of the concept of 
truth points beyond discursive agreement.  
The requirement on theories of radical disagreements from a perspective of 
conflict resolution or peacebuilding is, by definition, that a route is found for 
addressing conflicts which reduces the likelihood of a (continued) violent 
confrontation. Such a route is of course most desperately needed in 
situations of highly escalated conflicts. Ramsbotham (2010: 125-6) argues 
that these conflicts frequently are characterised by a fusion of facts and 
values. Persisting in differentiating facts and values analytically is, however, 
beneficial for the ensuing intervention strategy. Even though descriptions of 
actions are frequently implying an evaluative standpoint (Putnam, 1990, 
2005, 2007), a conflict on e.g. how a past action is to be described does not 
necessarily reflect a conflict between underlying values/evaluative 
standpoints themselves. As NGO activities indicate, there is often intergroup 
agreement in the evaluation of violent actions, as long as these actions are 
evaluated in the abstract.  
Disagreements on concrete past actions were often rooted in applying a 
different standard when actions directed against the enemy were under 
consideration. Discussing values in the abstract and raising awareness for 
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these double standards was often sufficient to undermine the differential 
assessment, being indicative of a common intergroup value basis. On a 
general level, even though certain actions are entailing very strong moral 
evaluations, trust in the own value basis and in the “wide appeal” of some of 
these values (Putnam, 2008: 385) is the ground for hoping that the reduction 
of double standards can in principle help to tackle disagreements on violent 
conflict actions in a variety of settings.  
Due to the values and factual assumptions of third-parties that are 
necessarily involved in any description and intervention attempt, it is indeed 
impossible that third-parties are neutral, in the sense of being detached from 
contested actions and contestations. If, however, these factual and value 
convictions are applied independently of which side is violating these 
convictions, third-parties can be impartial towards the disputants while being 
partisan with respect to their convictions.  
Values of nonviolence and equality of people constitute the minimal value 
basis which third-parties oriented on conflict resolution or peacebuilding 
attempt to promote. These values give direction to – and motivation for – 
their activities. A rejection of either these values by disputants, or a rejection 
of third-parties basic factual convictions, is no reason for compromising these 
convictions, as the truth of factual convictions (Habermas, 2004) and the 
rightness of value convictions (Putnam, 2005, 2008) is not bounded by 
partial disagreement.  
As Habermas (2004: 361) indicates, an agreement on “mutual rights and 
duties” is not dependent on the “mutual appreciation” of “cultural lifestyles”, 
but solely requires the assumption that “every person as a person has the 
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same value” (original emphasis). As argued previously, such a mutual 
recognition of human equality is not compatible with forcing the own 
convictions on the opponent, to the effect that recognition entails 
nonviolence.  
When conflict parties appreciate or are able to recognise the “appeal” 
(Putnam, 2008) and/or positive implications of nonviolence and mutual 
recognition, these values can form a general framework for dealing with 
conflicts. As Habermas (2004) indicates, tenacious disagreements can be 
continued within such a framework without the danger of escalating into 
violence, while the conflict parties can hope that a long-term change in the 
parties or the context can bring them closer to a solution (Ramsbotham, 
2010), e.g. hoping that the promotion of the own values will in the long-run 
ensue that the other party can fully or at least partially recognise the worth 
and importance of these values.  
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